Third Parties in Moving from Conflict Management to Conflict Resolution Jonathan Wilkenfeld University of Maryland Center for International Development and Conflict Management

Prescriptions Monitoring and early warning Intervention matching circumstances

Peace and Conflict 2010 CIDCM University of Maryland

Over the past two years, the risks of instability and conflict have increased significantly in the regions of the world where those dangers were already very high.

The most serious current threats to international stability - the recurrence of armed hostilities in conflicts that have recently come to an end. Largely a post-Cold War phenomenon

Peace and Conflict 2010 Making cutting edge academic research accessible to the policy community Open-source data Commitment to transparency Available from Paradigm Publishers

Peace and Conflict Ledger What does the Peace and Conflict Ledger measure? The risk of an instability event occurring in a country in the next three years.

Some Key Details The focus is on how structural attributes of states influence the risk of instability Four domains of government activity (economics, politics, security, and social) Estimated a statistical model on data from (training data) Obtain country risk estimates by inputting 2007 values for all countries

Indicators – The Usual Suspects EconomicsPoliticsSecuritySocial GDP per capitaExtent of factionalism State repression of citizens Male secondary enrollment GDP annual growth rate Citizen participation in selecting gov’t Size of military budget Infant Mortality GDP 3-year growth rate Gov’t revenues as % of GDP Number of active armed personnel Access to water supplies/ sanitation CPI annual changeDuration of present regime Peace DurationYouth literacy rates Primary commodity dependence Regime ConsistencyConflict in contiguous states Immunization rates Ratio of trade to GDP Level of DemocracyConflict in regionMale/female literacy ratio Poverty ratesExecutive Constraints Number of IDPsCultural or religious discrimination Change in foreign investment Legislative Effectiveness Intensity of internal armed conflicts Male/female life expectancy ratio

Indicators – The Usual Suspects EconomicsPoliticsSecuritySocial GDP per capitaExtent of factionalism State repression of citizens Male secondary enrollment GDP annual growth rate Citizen participation in selecting gov’t Size of military budget Infant Mortality GDP 3-year growth rate Gov’t revenues as % of GDP Number of active armed personnel Access to water supplies/ sanitation CPI annual changeDuration of present regime Peace DurationYouth literacy rates Primary commodity dependence Regime ConsistencyConflict in contiguous states Immunization rates Ratio of trade to GDP Level of DemocracyConflict in regionMale/female literacy ratio Poverty ratesExecutive Constraints Number of IDPsCultural or religious discrimination Change in foreign investment Legislative Effectiveness Intensity of internal armed conflicts Male/female life expectancy ratio

Risks of Instability,

Instability Risk: Top 25

Instability Risk: Top 25 (cont.)

Significant Increase in Risk DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO Transition to partial democracy Poor performance on other indicators DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO Transition to partial democracy Poor performance on other indicators BURUNDI Democratic transition begins in 2005 Renewed fighting in neighboring DRC (2007) BURUNDI Democratic transition begins in 2005 Renewed fighting in neighboring DRC (2007) NIGERIA Renewed fighting in neighboring Chad (2005) and Niger (2007) NIGERIA Renewed fighting in neighboring Chad (2005) and Niger (2007) MAURITANIA Tenuous democratic transition begins in 2005 Continued low-intensity violence in Mali and Algeria MAURITANIA Tenuous democratic transition begins in 2005 Continued low-intensity violence in Mali and Algeria

Sources of Increased Risk? Democratization Recurring Armed Conflict

New and Recurring Conflict, Number of Conflict Onsets

Recently Terminated Conflicts and Prospects for Recurrence, Number of Recently Terminated Conflicts

Costs of State Failure Global estimated cost of state failure: $270 billion* * Anke Hoeffler, Peace and Conflict 2010

Conclusion Devastating costs of state failure Stay tuned Diagnostic tools for policy-makers to support effective policies to mitigate conflict risks

Prescriptions Monitoring and early warning Intervention matching circumstances

Mediation in Crisis - Styles Facilitation: act as a channel – Helps reduce uncertainty – Helps reduce perceptions of mutual hostility Formulation: suggest/coordinate solutions – Helps by setting focal points – Helps by highlighting areas of compromise Manipulation: offer incentives (+ and -) – In particular: security guarantees – Helps by changing real costs and benefits

Mediation in Crisis Outcomes of interest: – Mutual compromise – Formal agreement – Post-crisis tension reduction

Results: Mediation Style, Compromise, and Agreements Manipulation has largest positive effect on crisis termination – Especially when it involves arrangements for or provision of security guarantees Formulation has slightly lesser but still powerful positive effect Facilitation has little effect – Pure facilitation has negative effect on compromise

Results: Mediation Style and Post-Crisis Tensions Formulation has largest positive effect on post-crisis tension reduction Facilitation has lesser but still significant positive effect Manipulation is ineffective at reducing tensions, post-crisis – Even when security guarantees are involved. This finding contrasts w/ previous studies.

Experimental Approaches to the Study of Mediation Mediation and Crisis – Style – Power relations – Zone of agreement Cultural factors in mediation – Design of automated mediator