Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May AMS-02 Safety Summary

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May AMS-02 Safety  Topics to be Discussed  Payload Safety Review Panel Meeting History Summary  Safety Analysis/Hazard Report Since Phase I  Significant Changes Since Phase I  Action Item Status  Operational Controls  Hazard Report/Pre-Review Discussion Results

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May AMS-02 Safety  Meeting History

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May AMS-02 Phase 0/I  11 Unique Hazard Reports Reviewed  1 Standardized Form 1230 Hazard Report Reviewed  All Approved at Phase I  3 Action items assigned

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May AMS-02 Phase 0/I  Action Items Assigned:

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May Vacuum Jacket SDM  Topics Discussed:  Overpressurization of the Payload Bay During Ascent  Caused by Loss of Vacuum  Originally Total Loss of Vacuum (Instant) Was Assumed  Deemed Unrealistic – Credible Maximum Leak Sized Established  Action Item 3 from Phase 0/I Closed by S. Loyd

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May Gauss Limit SDM  Topics Discussed:  Acceptable Hole Size for Vacuum Loss Analysis  Agreement to:  Qualification and Acceptance Testing of AMS-02 Structural Test and Flight Units  Independent testing of Flight O-Rings of Vacuum Case  Monitoring of Vacuum Case Leading up to T-9 minutes.  Gauss Limits of EMU  Changing EMU limits to 300 Gauss

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May AMS-02 TIM  Topics Discussed:  Burst Disks  Certification as Equivalent of Single Fault Tolerant  Reverse Acting Circumferentially-Scored with Cutting Teeth Burst Disks  Venting due to Burst Disk Operation Causing Overpressurization of Payload Bay  Three Burst Disks Used in Series

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May Significant Changes In AMS-02  Major Hardware No Longer Part of AMS-02  Synchrotron Radiation Detector (SRD)  AMS-02 Crew Operations Post (ACOP)  ACOP Was Only ISS Interior Element of AMS-02  Natural Design Evolution Presented in SDP/Presentations  Series/Reflown Hardware  No Elements or Systems of AMS-02 Are Considered Series or Reflown As They Were At Phase 0/I  All of AMS-02 Considered in the Unique Configuration and Environments of this Mission in Hazard Reports  Facilitates Integrated Safety Control and Verification Efforts

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May Significant Changes In AMS-02  Zenith Radiators and Cryocooler Loop Heat Pipes added to design.  Lower Radiator Panels Removed (Still Visible in Some Graphics)  Folding ROEU Support Bracket Incorporated in the Design  Addition of Star Trackers and GPS Receiver  AMS-02 Tilted 12° for Clearance and Viewing  Weight Has Increased

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May Safety Analysis  After Phase I AMS-02 Project Revisited the Safety Analysis to Prepare the Phase II SDP  Three Year Effort to SDP Submittal  New System and Subsystem Level Safety Analyses Performed and Documented in SDP  Energy Analysis  Historical Comparative Analysis  Maintenance Safety Analysis

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May Hazard Reports  Hazard Report Generation  Phase I Hazard Reports (HRs) Served as Foundation for Phase II HRs  Reorganization and Additional HRs Required.  NEW Designators Assigned to HRs  Use Of Flight “F” Designator And A Two Digit Number To Differentiate Between Phase I And Phase II HRs

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May Hazard Reports  Custom Hazard Report Form  Compliant with NSTS/ISS  Grouping of Controls and Safety Verification Methods Together  New Control, Cause and Safety Verification Methods Numbering System  aa.bb.cc  aa – Cause Reference  bb – Control Reference  cc – Safety Verification Method and Status Reference

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May Hazard Reports

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May Hazard Reports Phase II  Two Standard Hazard Reports Used  Exterior Elements of the AMS-02(Shuttle Payload Bay, ISS Exterior Environment)  Interior Elements of AMS-02 (Present in Shuttle Habitable Environment)  20 Unique Hazard Reports  1 Withdrawn as Non-Hazardous Condition  Due to New Safety Analysis and Rewrite, Phase II SDP is Effectively Entirely New Package Compared to Phase I (Re Agreement 3.2 Phase I Safety Review)

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May  New Hazard Report Format Provides for Ready Identification of Operational Hazard Controls.  Last Column Indicates Operational Control Present and Vehicle Association  S – Shuttle, I – ISS, G – Ground Operational Hazard Controls

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May Operational Hazard Controls

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May Operational Hazard Controls

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May Operational Hazard Controls

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May Operational Hazard Controls

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May Operational Hazard Controls The following controls have been established subsequent to AMS-02 Phase II SDP submittal.

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May Launch Commit Criteria  One Safety Related LCC  During pre-launch activities, the status of the superfluid helium tank will be monitored for signs of loss of thermal isolation (vacuum case breach/leak). In the event that there is an increase in pressure indicating the loss of thermal isolation, launch will be scrubbed. Monitoring will continue at a minimum to within L-9 minutes. Credible loss of thermal isolation at L-9 minutes can not manifest to an over-pressurization of the Orbiter payload bay hazard in the time available.

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May Flight Rules  Flight Rules in Hazard Reports

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May Pre-Review Activity  In response to comments, working group discussions and new data on AMS-02 System, Hazard Reports have been updated  Six (6) were unchanged since submittal March 19 th with safety data package.  Fifteen (15) were changes as a result of necessary modifications.

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May Unmodified Hazards  AMS-02-F02, “Toxic Material Offgassing “  AMS-02-F10, “Flammable Materials in the Payload Bay”  AMS-02-F15, “Thermal Extremes from Cryogenics”  AMS-02-F18, “Rapid Safing/Payload Reconfiguration”  AMS-02-F20, “Crew Exposure to Coherent Light  STD-AMS-02-F02, Standard Hazard Report, Orbiter Interior Elements

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May Modified Hazard Reports  AMS-02-F01, “Structural Failure of Hardware”  SVM/STATUS Updates  Editorial Clarification on Definition of Structural Fasteners in Control and SVM  Updated Attached Tables for Main and Tracker Radiators

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May Modified Hazard Reports  AMS-02-F03, “Rupture of Superfluid Helium Tank, Vacuum Case and/or Cryosystem Pressurized System Element”  Added Description of BD18 to Note and Tables.  Editorial – Added Acronyms to List  Updated Cryosystem Pressure System Tables  Updated Cryosystem Schematic for Warm Helium System Update.  Updated References in Pressure Tables

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May Modified Hazard Reports  AMS-02-F04, “Overpressurization of Orbiter Payload Bay ”  Deleted Oscillating Heat Pipe from Hazard Report  Editorial fixes  Added clarification to powered status during ascent  Updated Schematics with Latest Revisions (Warm Helium Update)

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May Modified Hazard Report  AMS-02-F05, “Rupture of AMS-02 Pressurized Systems …”  Revised Warm Helium System MDP  Removal of High Pressure Burst Disk  Removal of Oscillating Heat Pipe  Updated TTCS Accumulator Heat Pipe MDP  Corrected description in control of heater control for TRD tank heaters.  Editorial Changes  Updated Pressure Tables to reflect new and corrected values.  Updated Schematics

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May Modified Hazard Report  AMS-02-F06, “Excessive Thrust/Overturning Moments”  Corrected electrical bus references in control  Updated Schematics  AMS-02-F07, “Excessive Field Strengths: EMI, Magnetic (DC Field)”  Editorial Corrections, change wording to remove “radiated” from magnetic descriptions.  Clarified SSRMS Power Bus Reference  Clarified to have UMA separated for SSRMS Grapple

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May Modified Hazard Report  AMS-02-F08, “Electric Shock/Discharge”  Added Bonding/Grounding Diagrams for PDS and CAB  AMS-02-F09, “Exposure of the Crew to Excessive Ionizing Radiation”  Closed SVM  Clarified JSC Form 44 will have to be resubmitted, opened SVM Status, added note  Added Description of composite straw/tube within calibration tube isolating Fe 55 further  Clarified graphic error in JSC Form 44  Added/Updated graphics

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May Modified Hazard Report  AMS-02-F11, “Mechanism Failure”  Editorial Change  Clarified Open Status of SVM 5.4.3,  AMS-02-F12, “Mate/Demate of Connectors”  Change, SSRMS will demate prior to UMA being connected. Update Control and added SVM.

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May Modified Hazard Report  AMS-02-F13, “Battery Failure (Leakage/Rupture)”  SVM Status with “Closed” Status and TBD Document Reference was changed to “Open”  AMS-02-F14, “EVA/EVR Hazards”  Editorial Clarifications  Added ISS Flight Rule to require AMS-02 to have magnetic field removed prior to EVA to AMS-02.

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May Modified Hazard Report  AMS-02-F16, “Shatterable Material Release”  Added Control to State there are no glass materials in proximity to EVA translation paths that may be impacted by EVA tools.  AMS-02-F17, “Electrical Power Distribution Damage”  Added Control to preclude interconnecting different RPCM Buses, UMA to SSRMS

Leland D. HillAMS-02 Phase II Flight Safety Review - May Modified Hazard Report  STD-AMS-02-F01, Standard Hazard Report, Exterior Elements  Editorial Changes  Ignition Source Table Updated  Cryosystem Vacuum Pump speed and mass updated in table