Economics of Conflict, War, and Peace Prof. Dr. Jurgen Brauer; Summer 2009 Chulalongkorn University; Bangkok, Thailand Session 4.1 Capital: ABC weapons/WMD.

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Economics of Conflict, War, and Peace Prof. Dr. Jurgen Brauer; Summer 2009 Chulalongkorn University; Bangkok, Thailand Session 4.1 Capital: ABC weapons/WMD

Prof. J. Brauer; Summer 2009 Chulalongkorn U., Bangkok Economics of Conflict, War, and Peace Session ABC/WMD ABC: atomic, biological, chemical weapons  Atomic or radiological  Biological or bacteriological  Chemical: not including explosives WMD: weapons of mass destruction

Prof. J. Brauer; Summer 2009 Chulalongkorn U., Bangkok Economics of Conflict, War, and Peace Session ABC/WMD: atomic weapons USA and Russia/USSR nuclear weapons, Source: Anderton/Carter – Fig. 10.3; draft manuscript (2008)

Prof. J. Brauer; Summer 2009 Chulalongkorn U., Bangkok Economics of Conflict, War, and Peace Session ABC/WMD: atomic weapons Information very scant  Some count data Obviously not wholly reliable, credible  Virtually nothing on economic costs, or even production (technical) cost Pakistan: started in 1972; cost estimate of $500-$700 million annually, not counting delivery system (based on UNSCOM study for Iraq) Pakistan economic/social indicators: GDP, HDI  Basically we have a binary (0, 1) variable, not a continuous one Even then, there are some states (e.g., Israel) for which we don’t know

Prof. J. Brauer; Summer 2009 Chulalongkorn U., Bangkok Economics of Conflict, War, and Peace Session ABC/WMD: atomic weapons Past or current weapons-related atomic programs:  Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kazakhstan, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Yugoslavia  + US, UK, France  In all, that’s 23 states  Source: Nuclear Threat Initiative (

Prof. J. Brauer; Summer 2009 Chulalongkorn U., Bangkok Economics of Conflict, War, and Peace Session ABC/WMD: atomic weapons Withdrawn: Argentina, Brazil, Iraq, Libya, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan Not acknowledged: Israel Suspected: Iran [now maybe also Syria] Tested: China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and known to possess some delivery and targeting technology

Prof. J. Brauer; Summer 2009 Chulalongkorn U., Bangkok Economics of Conflict, War, and Peace Session ABC/WMD: atomic weapons Number of states suspected of nuclear weapons research and possession Source: Anderton/Carter (2009) – Fig. 10.3

Prof. J. Brauer; Summer 2009 Chulalongkorn U., Bangkok Economics of Conflict, War, and Peace Session ABC/WMD: atomic weapons Main stimulus: perception of threat  Same as for domestic production of major conventional arms [Brauer 1991, 2000] Important observation: even poor states can tackle a major scientific and industrial undertaking, often with assistance from others (willingly or unwittingly) [see, e.g., Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea stories] Cost is apparently high, possibly explaining industry exit (Brazil, Libya, South Africa) or sell-off (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine) as threat-perceptions change

Prof. J. Brauer; Summer 2009 Chulalongkorn U., Bangkok Economics of Conflict, War, and Peace Session ABC/WMD: biological weapons BTWC [Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention]  1972  147 states are members  Nonmembers include Syria  1975: entered into force  Prohibits development, production, stockpiling  No verification protocol Independent confidence-building measures  Annual declarations, etc. but since 1986, <40 states report regularly (and almost no LDCs report) Biodefense/biosecurity work

Prof. J. Brauer; Summer 2009 Chulalongkorn U., Bangkok Economics of Conflict, War, and Peace Session ABC/WMD: biological weapons Known bioweapons work  Offensive: Iran, Iraq, Libya, South Africa, former USSR  Defensive: India  Alleged: China, Cuba, Egypt, North Korea  Eliminated: Belarus, Ukraine, Uzbekistan  Potential: Brazil, Pakistan, Russia (but no evidence of current work)  Conflicting reports: Israel, Syria

Prof. J. Brauer; Summer 2009 Chulalongkorn U., Bangkok Economics of Conflict, War, and Peace Session ABC/WMD: biological weapons Application  Only known effective mass-dispersal method for bacteria, viruses, and toxins is through infectious aerosols  Requires industrial processing of biological agents to 1-10 microns while maintaining viability in storage and dispersal, thought to be “technologically demanding”

Prof. J. Brauer; Summer 2009 Chulalongkorn U., Bangkok Economics of Conflict, War, and Peace Session ABC/WMD: biological weapons Assessment  Small-scale production probably possible  Mainly for state-terror, shock and uncertainty value, etc.  Practical military field application questionable  Questionable diplomatic (threat, negotiation, bargaining) value …  … as compared to other uses of scarce resource for military purposes

Prof. J. Brauer; Summer 2009 Chulalongkorn U., Bangkok Economics of Conflict, War, and Peace Session ABC/WMD: chemical weapons CWC [Chemical Weapons Convention]  1993  Has a secretariat [Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)]  167 states have ratified (as of 31 Dec 2004)  Nonsignatories include: Egypt, Iraq, North Korea, Syria  Signed but not ratified: Israel

Prof. J. Brauer; Summer 2009 Chulalongkorn U., Bangkok Economics of Conflict, War, and Peace Session ABC/WMD: chemical weapons Known activity  I raq, Syria (through Egypt), Libya (now renounced) Inspection  “anytime, anywhere” Declaration  By 2005, 5 states declared possession  12 declared >60 former production sites  10 declared pre-1946 stockpiles  3 declared harboring “abandoned” munitions (e.g., over 1 million Japanese munitions in China)  Destruction of “declared” chemical munitions and dismantling of production facilities occur

Prof. J. Brauer; Summer 2009 Chulalongkorn U., Bangkok Economics of Conflict, War, and Peace Session ABC/WMD: chemical weapons Assessment  On the whole, the CWC supervision, advice, inspection regime is thought to work well  OPCW has staff of 500; budget of E75 million (in 2005)  The CWC received active support from the world’s chemical industry (!)  Nonetheless, the chemical industry’s knowledge improves, including in the area of miniaturization of production processes

Prof. J. Brauer; Summer 2009 Chulalongkorn U., Bangkok Economics of Conflict, War, and Peace Session ABC/WMD: bio/chemical weapons Cost, delivery, use  Little known about production cost  For long-distance application, same long-distance delivery method problems as for atomic weapons need to be solved With the additional difficulty of keeping bio and chem agents alive in flight transit and during high- temperature atmospheric re-entry and final explosion

Prof. J. Brauer; Summer 2009 Chulalongkorn U., Bangkok Economics of Conflict, War, and Peace Session ABC/WMD: bio/chemical weapons Use  Highly dependent on meteorological and topological conditions  These weapons probably of minor genuine state-on-state warfare use For strategic purposes More likely for tactical purposes, esp. when overwhelmed in terms of major conventional forces  Perhaps more likely to be used by nonstate terror organizations  Binding constraint may be organizational and diplomatic: new military doctrine and training Withdrawal from BTWC, CWC

Prof. J. Brauer; Summer 2009 Chulalongkorn U., Bangkok Economics of Conflict, War, and Peace Session ABC/WMD: bio/chemical weapons Substitutes/complements  Missile technology is a complement to most ABC weapons  Brazil, China, India, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa – indigenous progress [Brauer (1991, 2000) setup, findings] Cost data n/a Accuracy: not really important for atomic weapons The more accurate the targeting system, the more valuable conventional warheads become as compared to bio/chem weapons

Prof. J. Brauer; Summer 2009 Chulalongkorn U., Bangkok Economics of Conflict, War, and Peace Session ABC/WMD: bio/chemical weapons Missile delivery vehicle/technology prices likely to drop in future  Still, special fuels, engines, warheads, re-entry vehicles, guidance systems needed – all technologically complex Quite a surprising amount of outer-space activity by LDCs  37 former/current LDCs involved in outer space activity  But only three with active military programs: China, Russia, U.S.  Only U.S. has capacity to weaponize satellites Economies of scale and scope likely so that in future the likelihood is of more capacity, not less

Prof. J. Brauer; Summer 2009 Chulalongkorn U., Bangkok Economics of Conflict, War, and Peace Session ABC/WMD: bio/chemical weapons ABC weapons theory  Limited amount of work  Singh and Way (2004) theory of entry Motivation: threat perception & capacity; like Brauer (1991) for major conventional arms; the issue always comes back to demand: “willing and able” (i.e., threat perception/motivation and industrial production capacity)

Prof. J. Brauer; Summer 2009 Chulalongkorn U., Bangkok Economics of Conflict, War, and Peace Session ABC/WMD: bio/chemical weapons Jehiel, Moldavanu, and Stachetti (1996) theory of exit  Case of Ukraine: sell weapons in exchange for “aid” from the U.S./Russia; or sell weapons knowledge to other bidders like Iran, Iraq  Interesting part: include the avoidance of negative externality into the pricing request for U.S./Russia  One result: the seller can credibly commit not to sell; instead Ukraine can “sell” dismantlement

Prof. J. Brauer; Summer 2009 Chulalongkorn U., Bangkok Economics of Conflict, War, and Peace Session ABC/WMD: bio/chemical weapons Almost no work done on nuclear weapons theory of production  Koubi (1991) model based on commercial R&D and patent literature  Competitors monitor their relative position; if one gets a patent first, the others switch to alternative work  But in the nuclear case, if one gets a breakthrough first, the others try harder in order to catch up  With patents, the loser concedes; with nuclear arms, the loser never concedes

Prof. J. Brauer; Summer 2009 Chulalongkorn U., Bangkok Economics of Conflict, War, and Peace Session ABC/WMD: bio/chemical weapons So the race continues and there is no unilateral withdrawal from the race; such are the dynamics of the model This dynamic is heightened when the dynamics are multilateral  Instead of Indo-Pak …  Its U.S. <= Russia <= China <= India <= Pakistan  That is, so long as the U.S. races, so will Pakistan through this knock-on chain

Prof. J. Brauer; Summer 2009 Chulalongkorn U., Bangkok Economics of Conflict, War, and Peace Session ABC/WMD: bio/chemical weapons Four facts  Atomic weapons proliferation does take place  Some LDCs successfully have entered the market  Atomic weapons races do take place  Some LDCs exit Theory  A single theory that would tie together and explain all four of these fact we do not (yet) have