GAO’s Work on Radiological Security David Trimble Director, Natural Resources and Environment U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) Presentation for Organization of Agreement States (OAS) 2014 Annual Meeting Chicago, IL August 26, 2014 For more information, contact David Trimble, Page 1

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) The GAO is an independent, nonpartisan agency that works for Congress. Our Mission is to support the Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and ensure the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people. We provide Congress with timely information that is objective, fact-based, nonpartisan, nonideological, fair, and balanced. Page 2

U.S. and International Nuclear Security and Cleanup Mission Group The U.S. and International Nuclear Security and Cleanup mission group covers a wide range of nuclear issues involving: The U.S. nuclear weapons security enterprise; Cleanup of U.S. nuclear facilities and Cold War sites; Special nuclear material production, consolidation, and storage; Physical and cyber security of U.S. nuclear facilities; Nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship; Nuclear nonproliferation; Nuclear and radiological smuggling and terrorism; International worker and nuclear safety; Department of Energy's project management and contracting. Page 3

GAO’s Focus on Nuclear and Nonproliferation Issues Key areas of focus for nuclear and radiological nonproliferation include: Combating Nuclear Smuggling Overseas—GAO has issued several reports identifying challenges impacting the effectiveness of DOE’s Second Line Defense program, which provides the majority of radiation detection equipment at international border sites and seaports; Securing U.S. Borders—GAO has reported on DHS’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) since 2006, and identified challenges in developing a Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, replacing radiation detection equipment, and coordinating R&D across the agency; Securing Radiological Materials—GAO has issued several reports on federal efforts to secure potential “dirty bomb” material both overseas and in the U.S., with recent work focusing on securing radiological materials in the U.S. Page 4

Recent Congressional Interest in Radiological Security GAO testimonies “Additional Actions Needed to Increase the Security of U.S. Industrial Radiological Sources”, before Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (U.S. Senate, June 12, 2014); “Further Actions Needed by U.S. Agencies to Secure Vulnerable Nuclear and Radiological Materials”, before Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (U.S. Senate, March 14, 2012). Senate Energy and Water Appropriations Bill for FY2015 (June 16, 2014) Within 5 years, NRC shall establish mandatory security standards for all equipment using high risk radiological material in the U.S.; NRC shall base new mandatory security standards on security criteria established by NNSA/GTRI; During 5-year period NRC develops and implements new minimum security standards, facilities have option to receive NNSA/GTRI support on a cost share arrangement (GTRI provides no more than 50% of total costs), but after 5 years facilities responsible for all costs; NNSA/GTRI will create program to explore use of non-radioactive or very short- lived radioactive replacement technologies and within 15 years NRC will discontinue licensing for new high-risk radiological sources unless replacement technologies are not available. Page 5

GAO’s Recent Focus on Domestic Radiological Source Security Reported on industrial radiological security in the U.S. in June 2014 “Additional Actions Needed to Increase the Security of U.S. Industrial Radiological Sources” (GAO ) Reported on radiological security at U.S. medical facilities in September 2012 “Additional Actions Needed to Improve Security of Radiological Sources at U.S. Medical Facilities” (GAO ) Page 6

GAO Report on Industrial Radiological Security Visited 33 facilities in 6 states, including: California, Colorado, Hawaii, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wyoming. Types of facilities included: industrial radiographers using Ir- 192 radiography cameras, well loggers within Am-241 well logging devices, Co-60 panoramic irradiators, and Cs-137 research irradiators used in aerospace and manufacturing sectors. Primary federal agencies we spoke to: NRC, NNSA, and Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Met with Agreement State officials from California, Colorado, Texas, and Washington State. Page 7

Main Findings in Industrial Radiological Security Report Challenges exist in reducing risks for mobile and stationary industrial radiological sources We identified four cases in which radiological sources were stolen while on trucks since NRC’s increased controls security order was issued in December 2005; We identified two cases of individuals impersonating state radiological safety and security inspectors at remote worksites where mobile sources were being used. Licensees face challenges in protecting against an insider threat Officials at 7 of the 33 facilities we reviewed said that they have granted unescorted access to high-risk radiological sources to individuals with criminal histories; We found two cases where employees of industrial radiographers in two different states were granted unescorted access despite having serious criminal records (including one individual with two convictions for terroristic threats). Page 8

Recommendations Addressing Industrial Radiological Security GAO made four recommendations to strengthen the security of industrial radiological sources in the U.S. NRC should obtain the views of key stakeholders, such as licensees, during the development of the Best Practices Guide. NRC should reconsider whether the definition of collocation should be revised for well logging facilities that routinely keep radiological sources in a single area but secured in separate storage containers. NRC should conduct an assessment of the T&R process to determine if it provides reasonable assurance against insider threats. Specifically, why criminal history was not provided to a licensee during the T&R process, and if NRC should consider whether certain criminal convictions or other indicators should disqualify an employee from T&R status or trigger a greater role for NRC. NNSA, NRC, and DHS should review their existing collaboration mechanism for opportunities to enhance collaboration, especially in the development of new technologies. Page 9

GAO Report on Radiological Security at U.S. Medical Facilities Visited 26 hospitals in California, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Washington, D.C. Mainly visited hospitals and bloods banks with Cs-137 irradiators and Co-60 gamma knife machines. Main federal agencies visited were NRC and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Also, met with officials from DOD and the VA. Met with Agreement State Officials from 20 of the 37 Agreement States. Page 10

Main Findings in Medical Radiological Security Report Some medical facilities licensed by NRC are more vulnerable than others to potential sabotage and theft because of security weaknesses. At one hospital we observed that the interior door to the hospital blood bank had the combination to the lock written on the door frame; At another hospital, we were told that the current data system does not allow entering more than 500 individuals with unescorted access. In the past, the hospital had as many as 800 people with T&R status. NNSA has completed security upgrades at more than 300 medical facilities, but some hospitals do not participate in the voluntary program. NNSA does not expect to complete security upgrades at all facilities until 2025; As of July 2012, 14 facilities containing over 41,000 curies of high-risk material, have declined to participate in the NNSA program. Page 11

Recommendations Addressing Medical Radiological Security GAO made four recommendations to address radiological security at U.S. medical facilities. NRC, NNSA, and Agreement State Officials increase outreach efforts to promote awareness of and participation in NNSA’s security upgrade program. NRC strengthen its security requirements by providing hospitals and medical facilities with specific measures they must take to develop and sustain a more effective security program. NRC ensure that NRC and Agreement State inspectors receive more comprehensive security training. NRC supplement existing guidance for facilities in how to adequately secure equipment containing high-risk radiological sources. Page 12

Ongoing and Planned Nonproliferation Portfolio Current nonproliferation engagements: Second Line Defense; Status of four-year nuclear material security initiative. Areas of new work that are not yet underway: Security of high risk radiological material in transit; Alternative/substitute technologies for high-risk radiological sources. Page 13

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