Social Movements and Social Change. Announcements Soc Lexicon: Final Deadline Today, 5 pm!

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Presentation transcript:

Social Movements and Social Change

Announcements Soc Lexicon: Final Deadline Today, 5 pm!

Extensions to PD model Allow for conferencing participants make a pact Creates even more incentive to defect? Multiple iterations Don’t want to rat out partner, since they might punish you next time More actors Hope that ‘others’ will cooperate

Generalizing to Groups There are large numbers of persons relative to a particular space All persons have the same 2 opposing impulses, to conform (usually the dominant impulse) and not to conform It is possible to act non-normatively; that is, it is physically possible to do the non-normative thing

Payoff matrix for groups P = +/- G = ++ P = -- G = - P = ++ G = +/- P = +/- G = -- Person Group Take Turns Rush Exit Take Turns Rush Exit Payoff matrix

Implication of PD models Behavior that is rational at the individual level leads to sub-optimal outcomes at the aggregate (collective, group) level Can explain riots and mobs, without attributing behavior to ‘loss of control’ Results in a failure to provide collective goods

Collective Goods Goods that, if provided, are enjoyed by all, whether or not they contribute to their provision Examples: Commons Parks PTA Picnics public television clean air union negotiated wages

Class ‘Union’ Outcome P = snacks (-) G = snacks + fun P =out $1 G = nada P = free snacks! G = snacks P = no loss G = no snacks Person Group Vote Yes Vote No Vote Yes Vote No Payoff matrix

Collective Goods and the Free Rider Problem Collective good Provided (optimal) ‘ sucker’ Free rider Sub-optimal outcome Person Group Contributes Doesn’t contribute ContributesDoesn’t contribute Payoff matrix

Free Riders Free riders enjoy the benefits of collective goods without contributing to their provision It is rational to be a free-rider if you can get away with it, but if everyone is a free rider, collective goods will never be provided Solution to the free rider problem: Organization

Overcoming the Free Rider Problem Organizations may offer Incentives (available only to those who contribute) to encourage people to participate Selective incentives: special tangible benefits available only to members According to RC, strongest type of incentive Solidary incentives: promise of strong social bonds among members, distinction between “us” and “them” Hard to maintain in large groups Value incentives: emphasis on intrinsic value of the work of the organization