Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA U N C L A S S I F I E D Challenges in Verification of Nuclear Weapons Reduction Treaties ANS Section Dinner July 17, 2013 Duncan MacArthur LA-UR

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA U N C L A S S I F I E D Overview Nuclear arms reductions treaties Treaty confirmation Measurement types Information Barriers Challenges in warhead confirmation The future Slide 2

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA U N C L A S S I F I E D Generic Arms Reduction Treaty Slide 3 The owner of nuclear material or a device (the host party) makes a declaration concerning that item (the treaty-limited item or TLI) and/or its disposition to another entity (the monitoring party) and … The monitoring party must confirm this declaration … … without unintended release of classified information. Current treaties are “counting-treaties”, future treaties may require confirmation

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA U N C L A S S I F I E D The Challenges Slide 4 Evaluate the material/object presented (Measurement) Protect the host country’s classified information (Certification) Allow monitors to draw independent conclusions (Authentication)

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA U N C L A S S I F I E D Dismantlement and Warhead Confirmation Dismantlement can be defined as separation of fissile material (FM) and high explosive (HE). Measurements - “Absence”, “Everything present”, or something else Confirmation – of an “item,” or a declared TLI, or the specified TLI? No similar definition for “nuclear weapon” Measurements - Characteristics, similarity, and/or history Confirmation – How good, where, when? Slide 5

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA U N C L A S S I F I E D Confirmation Methods Provenance: Has the item undergone movements or come from a location consistent with being a warhead? Template comparison: Is the item consistent with other items known or believed to be warheads? Attribute measurements: Are specified item properties consistent with it being a warhead? Slide 6

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA U N C L A S S I F I E D Provenance From a delivery vehicle? Handling procedures Packaging details and procedures Facility suitability “Right place at the right time” All of these are confidence building Important to maintain chain of custody (CoC) Slide 7

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA U N C L A S S I F I E D Template Comparison Compare each new item with template Proof that an item is unchanged – use for CoC May accommodate a shorter measurement time Do all treaty limited items fit the template? Template is probably classified How does one initialize the template? Only need to fool the system once—during the initialization Slide 8

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA U N C L A S S I F I E D Attribute Measurement Measures agreed attributes of each item Each measurement is independent of previous results System can be used with several types of items with the same attributes Attributes are necessarily not very specific Choice of attributes is very important Not only must the attribute display be unclassified, but the reason to choose that attribute must also be unclassified Slide 9

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA U N C L A S S I F I E D Information Barriers (IBs) Slide 10 Control & Power Display Detectors Analysis & Output TLI radiation Potentially sensitive Non-sensitive data within IB Information barrier Non-sensitive display Data Barrier

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA U N C L A S S I F I E D The Challenges Evaluate the material/object presented (Measurement) Protect the host country’s classified information (Certification) Allow monitors to draw independent conclusions (Authentication) Slide 11

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA U N C L A S S I F I E D Measurement: Technical Feasibility The Trilateral Initiative demonstration Slide 12  LANL/LLNL collaboration  IAEA/Russian audience  Small plutonium sources

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA U N C L A S S I F I E D The Challenges Evaluate the material/object presented (Measurement) Protect the host country’s classified information (Certification) Allow monitors to draw independent conclusions (Authentication) Slide 13

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA U N C L A S S I F I E D Certification: Feasibility The Fissile Material Transparency Technology Demonstration (FMTTD) Slide 14  LANL/LLNL collaboration  Russian/USG audience  Measurements on US weapon component Only measurement of its kind ever performed.

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA U N C L A S S I F I E D The Challenges Evaluate the material/object presented (Measurement) Protect the host country’s classified information (Certification) Allow monitors to draw independent conclusions (Authentication) Slide 15

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA U N C L A S S I F I E D Authentication Challenge Everything interesting (the object, the measurement system, and the data) has been hidden. If the host has a reason to cheat,... Why should the monitors believe the red/green lights? Slide 16

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA U N C L A S S I F I E D Authentication: Proposed Solutions Who gets it last? Combination of methods for authentication Joint design Joint development Random selection Reverse engineering Monitor “private” inspection Construction techniques Commercial off the shelf (COTS) Custom Slide 17

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA U N C L A S S I F I E D Authentication: Construction Techniques The Next-Generation Attribute Measurement System (NG-AMS) Slide 18  LANL design  U.S. labs audience  Small plutonium sources COTS-based system

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA U N C L A S S I F I E D Authentication: Joint Design Both parties develop design together. Both parties build systems from agreed design. Both parties are intimately familiar with both design and capabilities of measurement system. If the host certifies the measurement system and the monitor validates the validation system, then demonstrating the continued equality of the two systems (continuity of knowledge) is equivalent to authenticating the host system. Slide 19

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA U N C L A S S I F I E D Authentication: Joint Design The Attribute Measurement System for Neutrons and Gammas (AVNG) Slide 20  VNIIEF/LANL/ LLNL collaboration  Russian construction  U.S. audience  Multi-kg plutonium sources

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA U N C L A S S I F I E D AVNG Detail Slide 21

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA U N C L A S S I F I E D Authentication: Random Selection Motivation – confidence that the measurement system (host) and validation system (monitoring party) are identical. Simple in concept Several “identical” copies of a component or system are presented One (or more) is randomly chosen for use in the measurement system One (or more) is randomly chosen for validation If the two are identical, validation of the “validation copy” is equivalent to validation of the measurement system But the devil is in the details What about continuity of knowledge? Slide 22

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA U N C L A S S I F I E D Authentication: Is it Possible? The third-generation attribute measurement system – My vision Slide 23  Multi-lab (or international) design and construction  Designed for random selection  Multi-lab (or international) red teams  Testing with realistic plutonium and/or HEU items

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA U N C L A S S I F I E D The Challenges: Current Status Evaluate the material/object presented (Measurement) – Done for Pu (Ideas for HEU) Protect host country’s classified information (Certification) – Toolkit exists Allow monitors to (simultaneously) draw independent conclusions (Authentication) – Building hardware is very expensive Demonstrating hardware is much more expensive Simultaneous Certification and Authentication Slide 24