Conventional Prompt Global Strike Recent development and implications James M. Acton jacton@ceip.org

Basic technological approaches

Key recent developments 12 December 2013: President Putin’s State of the Nation address 9 January 2014: First test flight of WU-14 (China) 7 August 2014: Second test flight of WU-14 25 August 2014: Second test flight of Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (United States)

Putin’s 2013 State of the Nation qddress “The ramping up of high-precision strategic non-nuclear systems by other countries, in combination with the build-up of missile defence capabilities, could negate all previous agreements on the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, and disrupt the strategic balance of power… Russia will respond to all these challenges, both political and technological. We have all we need in order to do so. Our military doctrine and advanced weapons, weapons that are being and will be deployed, will unconditionally allow us to ensure the security of the Russian state.” Russian President Vladimir Putin (December 2013)

Other key Russian statements Recent series of statements by senior officials: New heavy ICBM “would provide the capability of creating a strategic high-accuracy weapon system with a conventional payload with practically global range, if the U.S. does not pull back from its program for creating such missile systems.” Col. Gen. Karakayev (December 2012) “Taking into account the U.S. activity, Russia is forced to develop [non-nuclear, strategic offensive arms] arms in future.” Deputy Defense Minister Antonov (April 2013) Periodic reports of testing a maneuverable, hypersonic re-entry vehicle since at least 2004 (unclear whether goal is to develop a nuclear or non-nuclear payload)

Hypersonic Technology Vehicle-2 Program initiated in 2003 Planned range of 17,000 km (global reach with weapons based on east and west coasts) Tests in April 2010 and August 2011; both terminated less than 3 minutes into a planned 23 minute endo-atmospheric flight, before “equilibrium gliding” was achieved Downgraded to risk mitigation program, i.e. effectively cancelled, in 2012

Advanced Hypersonic Weapon: Basic concept Endo-atmospheric boost-glide system Congress forced DoD to fund AHW in FY08 NAS (2008): Range of 8,000 km [?] Evolutionary design based on SWERVE Could be land- or sea-based At least a decade away from deployment Side note: Tactical Boost Glide Program appears in DARPA/AF FY15 Budget request

Advanced Hypersonic Weapon: Flight tests Successful test in November 2011 over 3,800 km Second test, over longer range with significant cross-range maneuver, failed in August 2014 due to booster malfunction Retest likely (but no official announcement)

Capability-based planning “We prefer actually in our shop not to talk about specific scenarios, but a set of attributes that targets have…Those attributes are time-urgent, very distant, perhaps highly defended or in other ways access denied for the United States; high value targets, high regret factor for not striking a target; and potentially an interest in low collateral damage. It is those kinds of targets…that make us think that this particular kind of capability is very valuable.” Brian Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic Capabilities, 2007

Possible CPGS missions Denying a new nuclear proliferator the ability to employ its nuclear arsenal Destroying or disabling antisatellite capabilities Countering anti-access/area-denial capabilities Killing high-value terrorists and disrupting terrorist operations

WU-14 flight test II First flight test in January 2014 (presumably successful) WU-14 is Pentagon’s designation WU is designator for Wuzhai/Taiyuan Photos of crash site appeared on social media in August 2014 Media report of second WU-14 test on 7 August

Geolocating the crash site Work with Jeffrey Lewis and Catherine Dill Crash site turns out to be near a spa resort in the Mongolian desert about 200 km south east of Ordos

Keep-out zones Westward launch Eastern zone identical to January test Crash site outside keep-out zone Range of 1,750 km Very limited cross-range maneuvering

Analysis of WU-14 test The launch’s purpose was, almost certainly, to test a hypersonic glider. The test was probably a failure. The WU-14 appears to be significantly less ambitious than the U.S. Advanced Hypersonic Weapon. What is the significance of a liquid-fueled booster? Technically driven—need for greater burn-out velocity? Financially driven—use of retired missile is cheap? Strategically driven—goal is delivery of nuclear warheads?

CPGS weapons do not solve the ISR challenge of hunting mobile missiles Accuracy “Refresh rate” Need continuous or near-continuous coverage Visual reconnaissance satellites, HUMINT, SIGINT [?] inadequate In-theatre capabilities (aircraft) or space-based radar needed Timeliness Discrimination Trucks on busy roads v. mobile missiles

Potential paths to escalation—including to the nuclear level Warhead ambiguity: An observing state’s uncertainty about whether an incoming warhead was conventional or nuclear Dominant issue: overstated re Russia; understated re China Destination ambiguity: An observing state’s uncertainty about whether it was the target of a CPGS attack Target ambiguity: An observing state’s uncertainty about whether the United States intended to attack a conventional or nuclear target with a CPGS weapon Crisis instability: Pressures felt by an adversary to use or threaten to use “strategic” weapons out of concern that they lacked survivability

No CPGS system possess all the desirable characteristics for risk reduction Separate deployment areas for CPGS and nuclear weapons Different trajectories for CPGS and nuclear weapons Use of boosters with no nuclear association for CPGS Predictable trajectories for CPGS weapons Observable mid-course trajectories for CPGS weapons Limited CPGS deployments Strategic risks of boost-glide systems not appreciated Cooperative risk reduction measures more effective than unilateral measures

Confidence-building measures can help address warhead ambiguity and survivability concerns Inspections Surveillance Notifications (could also help with destination ambiguity) Survivability concerns Can include non-prompt systems on reciprocal and politically binding basis Data exchanges Declarations Joint studies Observation of exercises

The feasibility of treaty based-limits depends on basing mode Make some/all CPGS weapon types treaty accountable Address Russian and Chinese survivability concerns Conventional ICBMs & SLBMs are New START accountable Disagreement over boost-glide missiles (but probably academic) Treaty inclusion very difficult for some some basing modes Strong Navy opposition to inspections on SSNs and surface ships Inspections on SSBNs and SSGNs already occur—but this basing mode exacerbates warhead ambiguity