IAEAs Approach to Safety Culture

IAEA Safety Standards 2

IAEA Safety Standards This is the Safety Fundamentals SF-1 our agreed 10 principles for protecting people and environment. In the third principle of leadership and management for safety can read the following: 3

Fundamental Safety Principles SF-1 Integration of safety culture 3.13. “A safety culture that governs the attitudes and behaviour in relation to safety of all organizations and individuals concerned must be integrated in the management system. Safety culture includes: Individual and collective commitment to safety on the part of the leadership, the management and personnel at all levels; Accountability of organizations and of individuals at all levels for safety; Measures to encourage a questioning and learning attitude and to discourage complacency with regards to safety.”

General Safety Requirements Specific Safety Requirements Part 1 Governmental and Regulatory Framework 1. Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations Part 2 Leadership and Management for Safety 2. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants 2.1 Design and Construction 2.2 Commissioning and Operation B. Design of Nuclear Power Plants Part 3 Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources Part 4 Safety Assessment 3. Safety of Research Reactors Part 5 Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste 4. Safety of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities Part 6 Decommissioning and Termination of Activities 5. Safety of Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities 6. Safe Transport of Radioactive Material Part 7 Emergency Preparedness and Response

General Safety Requirements Specific Safety Requirements Part 1 Governmental and Regulatory Framework 1. Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations Part 2 Leadership and Management for Safety 2. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants 2.1 Design and Construction 2.2 Commissioning and Operation B. Design of Nuclear Power Plants Part 3 Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources Part 4 Safety Assessment 3. Safety of Research Reactors Part 5 Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste 4. Safety of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities Part 6 Decommissioning and Termination of Activities 5. Safety of Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities 6. Safe Transport of Radioactive Material Part 7 Emergency Preparedness and Response

Difference between Management and Leadership “The difference between management and leadership can be stated simply whereby ‘management’ is a function and ‘leadership’ is a relation. Management ensures that work is completed in accordance with requirements, plan and resources. It is through leadership that individuals may be influenced and motivated, and organizations changed. Managers may also act as leaders.” Source: IAEA Safety Standards: GS-G-3.5

Evolution to Management Systems Systemic approach GSR Part 2 2013 (Integrated) Management Systems Safety & Performance GS-R-3 2006 Quality Management 50-C-Q 1996 Quality Assurance This slide shows how the agency standards followed the evolution in this area. Quality Control 50-C-QA 1985-88 Time

Objective of the GS-R Part 2 Leadership and Management for Safety The application of SF-1 to establish requirements for: Effective leadership for safety Effective management for safety Effective safety culture improvement activities Safety as a sustainable outcome of excellence in leadership and management Integrated management system: make sure that other requirements will not compromise Nuclear Safety Systemic approach of ITO

Systemic Approach – The Interaction between Individuals, Technology and Organization Monica

IAEA Safety Standards This is the Safety Fundamentals SF-1 our agreed 10 principles for protecting people and environment. In the third principle of leadership and management for safety can read the following: 11

Safety (Culture) Requirement GS-R-3 “The management system shall be used to promote and support a strong safety culture by: Ensuring a common understanding of the key aspects of safety culture within the organization; Providing the means by which the organization supports individuals and teams in carrying out their tasks safely and successfully, taking into account the interaction between individuals, technology and the organization; Reinforcing a learning and questioning attitude at all levels of the organization; Providing the means by which the organization continually seeks to develop and improve its safety culture.”

IAEA Safety Standards This is the Safety Fundamentals SF-1 our agreed 10 principles for protecting people and environment. In the third principle of leadership and management for safety can read the following: 13

IAEA Safety culture characteristics and attributes (GS-G-3.1) 14

Safety is a clearly recognized value Attributes High priority to safety: shown in documentation, communications and decision- making Safety is a primary consideration in the allocation of resources The strategic business importance of safety is reflected in business plan Individuals are convinced that safety and production go ‘hand in hand’ A proactive and long-term approach to safety issues is shown in decision-making Safety conscious behavior is socially accepted and supported (both formally and informally) GS-G-3.1

Accountability for safety is clear Attributes Appropriate relationship with the regulatory body exists, which ensures that the accountability for safety remains with the licensee Roles and responsibilities are clearly defined and understood There is a high level of compliance with regulations and procedures Management delegates responsibilities with appropriate authority to enable accountabilities Ownership for safety is evident at all organizational levels and by all individuals GS-G-3.1

Safety is learning driven Attributes A questioning attitude prevails at all organizational levels An open reporting of deviations and errors is encouraged Internal and external assessments, including self-assessments are used Organizational and operating experience (both internal and external to the facility) is used Learning is enabled through the ability to recognize and diagnose deviations, formulate and implement solutions and monitor the effects of corrective actions Safety performance indicators are tracked, trended, evaluated and acted upon There is a systematic development of staff competencies GS-G-3.1

Safety is integrated into all activities Attributes Trust permeates the organization Consideration for all types of safety, including industrial and environmental safety and security, is evident Quality of documentation and procedures is good Quality of processes, from planning to implementation and review, is good Individuals have the necessary knowledge and understanding of the work processes Factors affecting work motivation and job satisfaction are considered Good working conditions exist with regards to time pressures, work load and stress Cross-functional and interdisciplinary cooperation and teamwork are present Housekeeping and material condition reflect commitment to excellence GS-G-3.1

Leadership for safety is clear Attributes Senior management is clearly committed to safety Commitment to safety is evident at all management levels Visible leadership showing involvement of management in safety related activities Leadership skills are systematically developed Management assures that there is sufficient and competent staff Management seeks the active involvement of staff in improving safety Safety implications are considered in the change management process Management shows a continuous effort to strive for openness and good communications throughout the organization Management has the ability to resolve conflicts as necessary Relationships between management and staff are built on trust GS-G-3.1

IAEA Safety Standards This is the Safety Fundamentals SF-1 our agreed 10 principles for protecting people and environment. In the third principle of leadership and management for safety can read the following: 20

Safety (Culture) Guidance GS-G-3.5 Specific guidance for nuclear installations* Further explanation of the five safety culture characteristics and the attributes Improving safety culture Warning signs of a decline in safety culture Concept of interaction between individuals, technology and the organisation Assessment of safety culture * Nuclear power plants, other reactors (research and critical assemblies), nuclear fuel cycle facilities GS-G-3.5

Post-Fukushima activities – Strengthening of Nuclear Safety IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety Vienna, 20-24 June 2011 Chairpersons’ Summaries 15. In spite of all recent efforts there is still room for improvement in understanding the concept of safety culture and implementing it effectively worldwide in the management of all NPPs.

Basis for the recent work on safety culture Member States requests to IAEA to provide practical guidance IAEA Safety Standards Behaviour and social science Past experiences

IAEA Safety culture publications http://www.iaea.org Document Title Safety Fundamentals No. SF-1 Fundamental Safety Principles Safety Requirements No. GS-R-3 The Management System for Facilities and Activities Safety Guide No. GS-G-3.1 Application of the Management System for Facilities and Activities Safety Guide No. GS-G-3.5 The Management System for Nuclear Installations Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-4 Safety Culture Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-15 Key Practical Issues in Strengthening Safety Culture Safety Report Series No. 11 Developing Safety Culture in Nuclear Activities Safety Report Series No. 42 Safety Culture in the Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants Safety Report Series: No 74 Safety Culture during Pre-Operational Phases of Nuclear Power Plant Projects Safety Report Series: How to Perform Safety Culture Self-Assessment – final draft How to Continuously Improve Safety Culture – draft TECDOC-1321 Self-assessment of safety culture in nuclear installations TECDOC-1329 Safety culture in nuclear installations TECDOC-1707 Regulatory Oversight Of Safety Culture In Nuclear Installations UPD

From Variable to Metaphor Approach Technology Management system Safety- Culture Strategy Technology Management system Safety- Strategy Culture Culture as one variable amongst others: Culture as something inherent in all aspects of the organisation: Safety culture is often in the nuclear world seen as something rational that managers can decide over and develop. But this is not the nature of culture. Culture is a dynamic concept, not as something binary or linear. Some times you can see naïve attitude campaigns, with posters on the wall about wanted values, behaviour expectations. Science has showed this has no or minor influence of culture. Science in culture has gone from seeing culture as an variable to see culture as something inherent in all aspects of the organisation. If you approach culture as a metaphor, you will have better possibility to detect the culture, work with it. An organisation that has a metaphor approach would probable have a more developed safety culture. IAEA have been successful with there management systems approach to integrate not only the different management system, also the safety culture. (Reference GS-R-3) A management system is a way to try to control people’s behaviours. And as we all know the reality is not so rational as if we have written a procedure, people will follow it in all cases. They culture will also influence the outcome of the management systems as well as the culture will influence the quality of the management system it self. Here is the dynamics of the culture concept that you always play with in this subject. The Variable Approach Organizations have cultures The Metaphor Approach Organizations are cultures

Organizational culture theories nowadays Culture is seen as less of a ‘quick fix’ It is recognized that culture can be changed, but it is also recognized that this often takes time, effort, and does not always end up the way it is planned. Culture can be seen as something we can influence, rather than something we can control Culture work needs to encompass the whole organization – not a top-down process Communication is essential Shared understanding

What use can we draw from the theories? We need to accept: Culture is complex Culture is abstract and inherent into all aspects There are many cultures in an organization So what do we need to do? Educate and train to become more effective in improvement activities Address the deepest cultural elements when assessing and to make sustainable change Better understand how different cultures impacts safety culture

Some of TEPCO’s conclusion in IEM5 The IAEA International Expert Meeting on Human and Organizational Factors TEPCO: “The cause of the accident should not be treated merely as a natural disaster due to an enormous tsunami being something difficult to anticipate. We believe it is necessary to seriously acknowledge the result that TEPCO failed to avoid an accident which might have been avoided if ample preparations had been made in advance with thorough use of human intellect.” TEPCO concluded the following in the IAEA International Expert Meeting5: Believed that severe accident was unlikely Did not pay attention to low probability high consequence risks Missed out the opportunities to learn from others and improve Is this only valid for TEPCO? The official report of Executive summary The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission

Importance to surface the assumptions Culture is stronger than the technical factors. We easily get ”blind” and get socially conformed. Therefore it is of key importance to create a good shared space which support the basic assumptions to surface and to periodically perform safety culture assessments.

From Theory of culture to Practice Behaviour Attitudes Values Understanding 34

Performance Depends on the ability and willingness of individuals to continuously think, engage, and demonstrate safe behaviours Shaped by: Personal motivation Shared space Me Shared space External space

The Difference…. Debate Dialogue Discussion

Shared Space

Shared space as a tool for cultural change Behaviour Behaviour Attitudes Attitudes Values Values Understanding Understanding Shared Understanding Dialogue 38

…Thank you for your attention