the National Security Strategy

Vital interests Threats Resilience

ALL-HAZARD APPROACH

NATIONAL SECURITY the ‘Dutch definition’ 5 vital interests:  Territorial security  Phsyical safety  Economical security  Ecological security  Social and political stability Societal disruption All-hazard approach Safety and security

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY GOAL: To increase our national resilience through insight in threats and capabilities Multi-sector approach Ministries remain primarily responsible – for prevention and preparation and – in cooperation with the ministry of Security and Justice – for response Ministry of Security and Justice is primarily responsible for crisismanagement Government-wide cooperation based on equality Public-private cooperation

WORKPROCESS Threat/Risk Analysis Risk Assessment TasksCapabilities Policy initiatives Which threats do we face? What is the impact? What do we need to do? What do we need to have? Strategic foresight Short-term analysis National Risk Assessment Capabilities Analysis Political Decision

ACTORS INVOLVED

Scenario Impact RISK Likelihood RISK: likelihood and impact

10 IMPACT CRITERIA 1. Territorial security 2. Physical safety 3. Economical security 4. Ecological security 5. Social and political stability 1.1 infringement of territorial integrity 1.2 infringement of the international position of the Netherlands 2.1 fatalities 2.2 seriously injured or chronically ill 2.3 physical suffering (lack of basic necessities) 3.1 costs 4.1 longterm impact on environment and nature (flora & fauna) 5.1 disruption of everyday life 5.2 violation of the democratic system 5.3 social-psychological impact

Uncertainties in risk assessment Experts should state source of know-how (e.g. empirical data) Available empirical data may not be rejected, replaced or removed Experts should differentiate between uncertainties (due to a lack of knowledge) and differences of opinion between experts Records should be kept of all references, sources assumptions and uncertainties used by experts

WORKPROCESS Threat/Risk Analysis Risk Assessment TasksCapabilities Policy initiatives Which threats do we face? What is the impact? What do we need to do? What do we need to have? Strategic foresight Short-term analysis National Risk Assessment Capabilities Analysis Political Decision

CAPABILITIES ANALYSIS GOAL: Identifying capabilities that help reduce the impact and/or likelihood of a threat. General capabilities The capabilities analysis primarily identifies capabilities that have a positive effect on more than one type of threat.  reasons are: cost-efficiency and also covering unknown threats

PreventionPreparationResponseRecovery TRADITIONAL PARADIGM RESILIENCE POLICY INITIATIVES

All ministries: Responsible ministry leads capabilities analysis Secretariat by NCTV Experts: Private sector and critical infrastructure companies Thematic experts (e.g. social media) Other bodies of government: Local/Regional International Societal organisations and civilians ACTORS INVOLVED

WORKING TOGETHER Different responsibilities – Common interest  To avoid societal disruption Government: Prevent fatalities and injury and prevent a loss of confidence in government Private sector: Prevent loss of income/profit/customers Individuals: Prevent personal losses (cash, gas/water/electricity)

POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY Yearly report to Parliament about: The National Risk Assessment Priorities (based on Capabilities analysis) Progress on previous priorities Interdepartmental cooperation: Interdepartmental Workinggroup on National Security (IWNV) Steeringgroup National Security (SNV) Council on Safety and Security Council of ministers

ADVICE & DECISIONMAKING PER STEP Risk assessment Capabilities Analysis Choosing themes Policy Initiatives Scenario- development IWNV SNV Coregroup IWNV Network of Analists IWNV SNV Workinggroup Capabilities Analysis IWNV SNV MR Roles: Decision making & Advice E.g.: Network of Analists Ministries Thinktanks Safety Regions Steps workprocess

QUESTIONS?

PRIVATE SECTOR & CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE Critical infrastructure sectors: products, services and underlying processes that, if interrupted, can cause societal disruption The dependency of society on these (mostly) basic needs is a reason to take extra measures. Critical infrastructure in NL: 12 sectors, partly public, mostly private companies What is expected of C.I.-sectors? Resilience, garanteed continuity, prevention of disruption Mutual aim: to avoid losses as a result of discontinuity Mutual interest: shared notions of possible risks and ‘solutions’

CIVILIANS & SOCIETAL ORGANISATIONS Openness to the public on risks: Risk map on the internet: Mass communication campaign Resilience of citizens Public participation (encourage citizens to act) Implementing a cell-broadcast system Cooperation with societal organisations: Red Cross & Orange Cross (Disaster response and first aid) Educational organisations Knowledge & advice organisation for post-disaster psychosocial care Center for Crime-prevention and Safety

THE INTERNATIONAL CONNECTION International attention for risk-analysis is rising: EU (guidelines for risk assessment) NATO (Civil Protection Committee) OECD (future global shocks) UN (ISDR-Hyogo Framework for Action ) Similar approaches in different countries (UK, France, Germany, Norway, Canada, The Netherlands) But many different ways of organising the process Exchange on methodology, process and outcomes Exchange of experiences, also in crisissituations