QUIZ

Discussion Real-life examples from the news that differ in problem structure terms used from last class From NYT two INTERNATIONAL problems that illustrate one of the differences we have discussed

Outline Problem structure from Game Theory perspective Reviewing 9 key questions

Key questions of problem structure Q1: Is it conflict, cooperation, or harmony? Q2: Who are the actors? Q3: Absolute capacities and relative power Q4: Incentives/preferences Q5: Information/knowledge Q6: Norms Q7: Violation tolerance Q8: Inherent transparency Q9: Response incentives

ROW’S PERSPECTIVE COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW Silence (Cooperate) R gets 2 yrR gets 10 yr Confess (Defect) R gets 0 yrR gets 5 yr

COLUMN’S PERSPECTIVE COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW Silence (Cooperate) C gets 2 yrC gets 0 yr Confess (Defect) C gets 10 yrC gets 5 yr

OVERALL GAME COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW Silence (Cooperate) C gets 2 yr R gets 2 yr C gets 0 yr R gets 10 yr Confess (Defect) C gets 10 yr R gets 0 yr C gets 5 yr R gets 5 yr

ROW’S PERSPECTIVE COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW Silence (Cooperate) R gets 2 yrR gets 10 yr Confess (Defect) R gets 0 yrR gets 5 yr What should Row do?

ROW’S PERSPECTIVE COLUMN Confess (Defect) ROW Silence (Cooperate) R gets 10 yr Confess (Defect) R gets 5 yr First, assume Column confessed. What should Row do?

ROW’S PERSPECTIVE COLUMN Confess (Defect) ROW Silence (Cooperate) R gets 10 yr Confess (Defect) R gets 5 yr If Column confessed, Row clearly prefers to Confess.

ROW’S PERSPECTIVE COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) ROW Silence (Cooperate) R gets 2 yr Confess (Defect) R gets 0 yr Now, assume Column stayed silent. What should Row do?

ROW’S PERSPECTIVE COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) ROW Silence (Cooperate) R gets 2 yr Confess (Defect) R gets 0 yr If Column stayed silent, Row still prefers to Confess.

ROW’S PERSPECTIVE COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW Silence (Cooperate) R gets 2 yrR gets 10 yr Confess (Defect) R gets 0 yrR gets 5 yr So, no matter what Column does, Row prefers to Confess!

COLUMN’S PERSPECTIVE COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW Silence (Cooperate) C gets 2 yrC gets 0 yr Confess (Defect) C gets 10 yrC gets 5 yr What should Column do?

COLUMN’S PERSPECTIVE COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) C gets 10 yrC gets 5 yr First, assume Row confessed. What should Column do?

COLUMN’S PERSPECTIVE COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) C gets 10 yrC gets 5 yr If Row confessed, Column clearly prefers to Confess.

COLUMN’S PERSPECTIVE COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW Silence (Cooperate) C gets 2 yrC gets 0 yr Confess (Defect) Now, assume Row stayed silent. What should Column do?

COLUMN’S PERSPECTIVE COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW Silence (Cooperate) C gets 2 yrC gets 0 yr Confess (Defect) If Row stayed silent, Column still prefers to Confess.

COLUMN’S PERSPECTIVE COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW Silence (Cooperate) C gets 2 yrC gets 0 yr Confess (Defect) C gets 10 yrC gets 5 yr So, no matter what Row does, Column prefers to Confess!

OVERALL GAME COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW Silence (Cooperate) C gets 2 yr R gets 2 yr C gets 0 yr R gets 10 yr Confess (Defect) C gets 10 yr R gets 0 yr C gets 5 yr R gets 5 yr BUT, since both Column and Row confess, they end up both getting 5 years,

OVERALL GAME COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW Silence (Cooperate) C gets 2 yr R gets 2 yr C gets 0 yr R gets 10 yr Confess (Defect) C gets 10 yr R gets 0 yr C gets 5 yr R gets 5 yr BUT, since both Column and Row confess, they end up both getting 5 years, even though they both would prefer 2 years!

Question 1: Is it conflict? Is it conflict or would it be if no institution? Is it harmony? If conflict, is it Deadlock, i.e., unresolvable? Potential for resolution REQUIRES absolute gains frame

Deadlock Stop engaging in conflict Continue engaging in conflict Stop engaging in conflict Continue engaging in conflict

Harmony Allow education of foreigners in your universities Do not allow education of foreigners in your universities Allow education of foreigners in your universities Do not allow education of foreigners in your universities

Q2: Actors Who is involved? What actors are causing or affected by the problem? Who could help fix the problem? What roles do actors have? – Perpetrator (fishing countries, upstream polluting state) – Victim (other fishing countries, downstream states) – Vested interests (US in Middle East) – Could be interested (debt for nature swaps) – Uninterestable (landlocked African states and whaling) Types of actors – Many problems due to actions by governments – Others due to non-government actors – Differ in whose behavior must be controlled and relationship between governments who create institutions and actors who must change behavior

Q3: Capacities and power Do “perpetrators” of problem have capacity to engage in “good” behavior? If not, it’s a “ Positive Externality Plagued by Incapacity ”. E.g., – Protecting accidental detonation of nuclear weapons – Reducing AIDS in developing countries – Helping small countries defend selves from attack Behavior not a result of logic of consequences or logic of appropriateness

Positive Externality Plagued by Incapacity Incapable state => Capable state –V Contribute to AIDS prevention (but NOT POSSIBLE) Don't contribute to AIDS prevention Contribute to AIDS prevention Don't contribute to AIDS prevention

Q4: Incentives How do material consequences for perpetrators depend on other countries? Types of incentive problems – Upstream / downstream – Coordination – Collaboration All involve logic of consequences issues

Upstream/Downstream Upstream ==> Downstream -V Contribute to pollution reduction Don't contribute to pollution reduction Contribute to pollution reduction Don't contribute to pollution reduction

Coordination Train pilots in Row Language Train pilots in Col Language Train pilots in Row Language Train pilots in Col Language

Collaboration Maintain Low Tariffs Maintain High Tariffs Maintain Low Tariffs Maintain High Tariffs

Q5: Information/knowledge Any unknown effects that perpetrators would care about if they knew about them? Two types of info/knowledge problems – Epistemic/knowledge problems (unsure about how the world works): e.g., acid rain in Europe, trade wars, health quarantine regulations – Assurance problems (unsure about how other actors will behave): e.g., war games Largely still logic of consequences

Q6: Norms Problem is not material consequences but violations of values and notions of legitimacy Normative problems involve “conflicts over values”, e.g., – Human rights abuses – Apartheid or treatment of women – Choice of government Involves logic of appropriateness

Q7: Violation Tolerance Consequences of violation and violation tolerance – What are consequences if institution rules violated? Problems vary in how much states will tolerate violation Compare non-proliferation to tariffs to human rights to environmental protection

Q8: Inherent Transparency Inherent transparency and ability to act secretly – Before any institution at all, does each actor know what other actor is doing? Compare – Security: nuclear weapons vs. war games – Trade: tariffs/quotas vs. NTBs/subsidies – HR: civil/political vs. economic/social

Q9: Response Incentives If there is a violation, do those harmed have sufficient incentives to respond? Weak incentives to respond to HR and environmental violations but strong for trade and VERY strong for weaponry – Notice that in weapons agreements the “response” is implicit ending of agreement Cost of responding vs. cost of not responding

Types of problem Review Deadlock Positive externality plagued by incapacity Upstream / downstream problems Coordination Collaboration Epistemic / knowledge problems Assurance problems Normative problems