MKTG 476 SECURITY Lars Perner, Instructor 1 Internet Security Servers Hacking Publicly available information Information storage Intrusion methods –Phishing –Pharming –Spyware Viruses Spam Identity theft
MKTG 476 SECURITY Lars Perner, Instructor 2 Concerns Shared by Firms and Consumers Identity theft Fraudulent use of credit cards or bank accounts Loss of privacy Consumer reluctance to shop online due to fears of fraud Costs of authentication
MKTG 476 SECURITY Lars Perner, Instructor 3 Consumer Privacy Concerns Large amounts of consumer information can be bought online Some information is available to the public through government offices—e.g., –Real estate ownership –Vehicle registrations –Licenses (driver’s /professional) –Personal records—e.g., Marriage divorce Certain tax liens Certain criminal records Bankruptcies Information inadvertently posted online Information posted without consent of customer –E.g., employment records –E.g., membership directories
MKTG 476 SECURITY Lars Perner, Instructor 4 Consumer Privacy Concerns, Part II Online services combining information –Information sold by vendors (e.g., unlisted phone numbers of customers; purchase histories) –Aggregation of databases (e.g., combining multiple phone directories and real-estate recordings) Information that is only supposed to be available when authorized –Credit records –Medical Some information may be available only to certain kinds of users
MKTG 476 SECURITY Lars Perner, Instructor 5 Online Data Storage Types of information stored on customers –Login, passwords –Credit card information –Purchase histories –Home addresses –Other personal info May or may not have resulted from online transactions—databases are often networked for internal firm use
MKTG 476 SECURITY Lars Perner, Instructor 6 “Vulnerable” Information Social security numbers Place and date of birth; mother’s maiden name Home address Login and passwords Financial information
MKTG 476 SECURITY Lars Perner, Instructor 7 Data Interception By employees or others with direct access to information Cyber thieves may attempt to access information through –Phishing/pharming –Host computer Log-in through insecure passwords Hacking –Internet traffic –Local networks—especially wireless with limited or no security
MKTG 476 SECURITY Lars Perner, Instructor 8 Password Vulnerabilities Disclosure to strangers Theft of databases Phishing Use of obvious passwords –Common words –Personal information—e.g., phone number, address, birthday Passwords not frequently changed Password “sniffers”
MKTG 476 SECURITY Lars Perner, Instructor 9 Some Security Measures Encryption Tracking of IP address of entry into the computer Secondary passwords Consumer chosen icon –In s –At site, once origin IP address is recognized
MKTG 476 SECURITY Lars Perner, Instructor 10 Servers “Denial of service” –Numerous “requests to identify” are sent to targeted server –The server may slow down or become entirely in accessible –Computers and servers infected through viruses are often targeted –Mostly intended as “vandalism” Hacking –“Hackers” break into computer systems –Purposes Taking on challenge/political expression Vandalism Stealing information
MKTG 476 SECURITY Lars Perner, Instructor 11 Hacking Established software has “holes” that are gradually discovered May be able to “crash” sites and access “core dump” files intended for use by programmers to identify problems Exploitation of “back doors” left by programmers
MKTG 476 SECURITY Lars Perner, Instructor 12 Phishing Consumer receives an e- mail asking that he or she log in to take care of account issues This contains a legitimate-looking hyperlink title but the actual link is to a take site 1% of consumers are estimated to fall for the hoax The consumer logs into a fake site, providing login, password, and other info
MKTG 476 SECURITY Lars Perner, Instructor 13 Phishing--Remedies Consumer education Software safeguards –Warning if the internal link does not match the title Feasible only when the title features an actual address filters – programs –Server –Anti-virus software Quick identification of phishing sites –Cooperation with host –Denial-of-service attacks if needed –Massive entry of fake data Tracing of logins based from origin of phishing e- mail or site
MKTG 476 SECURITY Lars Perner, Instructor 14 Pharming The user attempts to go to a legitimate web site address but is redirected –Through hacking of DNS servers (match domain names with numerical IP address) –Through false report of changed server to DNS registrar –Malicious code in “trojan horse” or virus to redirect traffic
MKTG 476 SECURITY Lars Perner, Instructor 15 Viruses “Malicious code” that attacks a computer to –Cause damage (vandalism) –Serve as spam or denial of service attack server –Transmit data Spread through –Software (as trojan horse or through infection of legitimate software) – attachments –Online activity
MKTG 476 SECURITY Lars Perner, Instructor 16 Trojan Horses Legitimate-looking software intended to spread malicious code User downloads software and once run, malicious code is run with results similar to those of viruses
MKTG 476 SECURITY Lars Perner, Instructor 17 “Spyware” Software that sends back user information through Internet connection Legal vs. illegal –Legitimate and authorized by user –Non-malicious intent but not authorized –Malicious May be spread through program, trojan, or virus
MKTG 476 SECURITY Lars Perner, Instructor 18 Spam Unsolicited messages Unsolicited contacts have always happened but telemarketing and bulk mail are more expensive than Very low response rate but very low cost of distribution Usually sent by –Unauthorized vendors –Fraudulent persons/vendors
MKTG 476 SECURITY Lars Perner, Instructor 19 Determining When Is Likely to Be Welcome Individual vs. mall mailing Established relationship with receiver –Logistical communication –Offering of new services –Promoting services by others Opt-in policies
MKTG 476 SECURITY Lars Perner, Instructor 20 Spam Remedies Termination by host – generally sent through SMTP servers located at the Internet Service Provider (ISP) site –Problems Foreign governments may not cooperate Spammer may move on to other addresses quickly Anti-spam programs –Locations In servers On the user’s computer At local server –Problems Distinguishing legitimate messages from non- legitimate –Imperfect algorithms Regulatory –Legal limits –Litigation of offenders in reachable jurisdictions