Leveraging UICC with Open Mobile API for Secure Applications and Services Ran Zhou.

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Presentation transcript:

Leveraging UICC with Open Mobile API for Secure Applications and Services Ran Zhou

Introduction and Motivation Until 2011, there were 6 billion mobile subscriptions (87% of the population) UICC serves as the security anchor in mobile telecom network Java Card make the UICC more powerful: digital signature, cryptography… UICC is an ideal module to enhance the security level of terminal application Interface is required to fill the gap between UICC applet and terminal application Open Mobile API is proposed to provide this interface A Dual Application Architecture together with the access control mechanism will be introduced As an example to be implemented: an UICC-based Local OpenID protocol will be considered in this thesis

Agenda Introduction and Motivation Basic Technologies – UICC – SIMalliance Open Mobile API – OpenID Concept of Local OpenID Thesis Outline Time Plan

Universal Integrated Circuit Card: UICC UICC is a smart card used in mobile terminals within telecom networks [1] It provides aauthentication ssecure storage ccrypto algorithms …… Java Card as UICC can provide [2] HHash functions: MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256 … SSignature functions: HMAC … PPublic-key cryptography: RSA … SSymmetric-key cryptography: AES, DES … ……

UICC – Related Technologies Toolkit Smart Card Web Server Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) Open Mobile API [3]

Open Mobile API Open Mobile API is established by SIMalliance as an open API between the Secure Element and the Terminal Applications [4] Crypto Authentication Secure Storage PKCS#15 …

Open Mobile API 3 Layers [5]  Transport Layer: using APDUs for accessing a Secure Element  Service Layer: provide a more abstract interface for functions on SE  Application Layer: represents the various applications using Open Mobile API Figure 1: Architecture overview

Dual Application Architecture NFC (Near Field Communication) services Payment services Ticketing services Loyalty services (Kundenbindungsmaßnahmen) ID Management services (e.g. Single Sign-On) UICC Terminal Application Open Mobile API Transport Layer Access Control Module Access Control Table

OpenID Provider Relying Party User Device Relying Parties Submit OpenID Association User authentication Log-on OpenID

OpenID Weakness [6] Phishing An “Identity System” without Trust: no authority can promise OpenID rzhou.myopenid.com is Ran Zhou Redirects Communication Overhead: lots of HTTP requests

Phishing Sensitive data remains on UICC An “identity system” without Trust: no authority can promise OpenID rzhou.myopenid.com is Ran Zhou. Trusted Identity through Network Operator (contract) Redirects Local OpenID Server interface Communication Overhead: lots of HTTP requests Significantly reduced authentication traffic  Terminal part is developed by a project partner of Morpho  Integration of UICC is the main topic of this thesis Concept: Local OpenID Server with UICC

Network OpenID Provider Relying Party User Local OP Provider = Mobile Application + UICC Applet Relying Parties Association Signed Assertion (with same derivated key) Local OpenID Architecture Trust (Long-Term Secret) Local authentication (with PIN) Association Handle + Derivated Key Submit OpenID Association Handle

Contents 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Motivation 1.2 Solution Idea 1.3 Overview 2. UICC AND JAVA CARD 2.1 UICC 2.2 Java Card Introduction Security and Crypto New Features in Java Card Related Technologies SIM Toolkit Smart Card Web Server Generic Bootstrapping Architecture 3. OPEN MOBILE API 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Fundamental Structure 3.3 Use Pattern 3.4 Access Control 3.5 Application Scenario 4. LOCAL OPENID 4.1 OpenID Protocol Introduction Weakness of OpenID 4.2 SAML Protocol Introduction Weakness of SAML

Contents 4.3Local OpenID Protocol Introduction Architecture and Description Compare of OpenID, SAML and Local OpenID 5. IMPLEMENTATION 5.1 Platform Introduction of Android Android Security Management 5.2 App on UICC Applet on UICC Algorithms and Functions Configuration of UICC PKCS15 Structure Implementation 5.3 App on Android Functional Description Open Mobile API in Android Implementation 5.4 Test Test Environment Test Procedure Test Result 5.5 Weakness Analysis 6. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK 6.1 Summary 6.2 Future Work

Time plan Investigate and design NovDecJan Feb MarAprMay 1 st Implementation 2 nd Implementation Jun 1 st Thesis 2 nd Thesis Final Thesis Test

Thanks! Questions?

References [1] Rankl, W. (2oo8), Handbuch der Chipkarten, Carl Hanser Verlag München. [2] Sun Microsystems, I. (2006), 'Application Programming Interface Java Card™ Platform, Version 2.2.2'. [3] Wikipedia, t. f. e. (2012), 'Generic Bootstrapping Architecture'. [4] SIMalliance (2011), 'SIMalliance Open Mobile API An Introduction'. [5] SIMalliance (2011), 'Open Mobile API specification V2.02', SIMalliance. [6] van Delft, B. (2010), 'A Security Analysis of OpenID', IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology 343/2010,

Authentication Protocol