Vasubandhu (4th century AD) Yogacara Philosophy Yoga = “discipline” Cara = “practice” Vasubandhu (4th century AD) Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only (Vimsatika-Karika) Text, pp. 223-228

Topics Covered in the Twenty Verses Reality as Consciousness-Only Perception & its Objects (No Self/No Thing) Atomism & Experience Monism & Experience What is Perception? Interactions between Individuals The Problem of Other Minds Conclusion

The dialogical structure of the text Objections & Yogacara (Vasubandhu) Replies

Reality as Consciousness-Only Metaphysical Idealism 1 Vasubandhu’s thesis Reality as Consciousness-Only Metaphysical Idealism The external world is an IDEA, i.e., a construction of consciousness (chit), mind (citta), thought (manas), perception (pratyaksa). There are, in fact, no objects external to consciousness, no non-mental realities.

Objections to metaphysical idealism If the objects of consciousness have no external existence, then, contrary to actual experience, any idea could arise at any time or in any place; different minds could “perceive” different objects at the same time & in the same place; objects could function in unexpected (surprising, unpredictable) ways. (See Text, p. 223)

Vasubandhu’s Reply Even in dreams, ideas (images, events) arise in particular places at certain times. Souls in hell experience the same things although the things experienced do not really exist (i.e., hell is a mental state). Things experienced in dreams can function in the expected ways. (Summary statement on p. 224)

Do V’s replies establish the truth of metaphysical idealism? Critical Question Do V’s replies establish the truth of metaphysical idealism? Or do they merely suggest that the consciousness-only thesis MAY be true?

A debate about the existence & nature of hell Why say that the things experienced in hell do not have objective existence?. Because the guardians of hell, who inflict the sufferings of the hellish state, are in hell but do not experience its torments. Animals, hell-guardians, & rebirth. Hell as the creation of the bad karma of the condemned -- best interpreted as a mental state rather than as an external, objective reality.

Perception & its Objects 2 Perception & its Objects No Self / No Thing

Perception & its Objects Objection: The Buddha taught that consciousness arises out of the interaction of the six senses with external objects. Reply: Yes, but that teaching was merely an introductory & exoteric preparation for a deeper, esoteric view of reality (102) -- namely, the “seed-consciousness” doctrine. The Buddha was trying to gradually initiate his disciples into an under-standing of the insub-stantiality of self & of the insubstantiality of objects. That is,

self & objects as constructed by ordinary consciousness, as opposed to reality as it is in itself (tathata, “suchness”). Beyond the ordinary, constructed self (ego) & its subject-object duality, there is a transcendent (true) Self, which is substantial, i.e., “really real.” (p. 225) (Isn’t this an abandonment of the Buddhist doctrine of no-self [anatta], a return to Hinduism?)

3 Atomism & Experience

What is an “atom”? OR ?

Vasubandhu’s criticism of atomism * 1. An empiricist criticism We have no perceptual experience of atoms (since atoms are imperceptible). no experience of wholes without parts (indivisible entities), i.e., individual atoms no experience of groups of distinct & separate atoms no experience of aggregations of atoms * What is empiricism?

2. A logical critique of atomism If atoms are indivisible & thus have no parts, then they cannot form aggregations. If atoms can aggregate, then they must have parts (& be divisible) & are thus not atoms. If the atoms in an atomic aggregation occupy different locations, then each of them has parts & is not an atom. If all atomic aggregates occupy the same location, then “they” would be just a single atom, & the “aggregation” would not be an aggregation.

The Kasimira Vaibhashika view Logical criticism, continued The Kasimira Vaibhashika view that atoms cannot aggregate, but that aggregations of atoms can aggregate to form larger aggregations is self-contradictory and thus makes no sense. (p. 226)

Logical criticism, cont’d If one atom can be “in front of,” “behind,” “over,” or “under” another, then atoms must have fronts, back, tops, & bottoms, i.e., parts, & thus atoms are not atoms. If atoms have no fronts, backs, tops, or bottoms -- i.e., no parts -- then how is the overshadowing & concealment (e.g., sunlight & shadow, etc.) of atoms possible? Objection: It is aggregations of atoms, not individual atoms, that are subject to overshadowing & concealment.

V’s reply to the latter objection (p. 227) Either atomic aggregations are (A) essentially different from atoms, or they are (B) not essentially different from atoms. If (B), then how can atomic aggregations be any more subject to overshadowing & concealment than atoms are? If (A), then what happens to the atomic theory of the nature of macroscopic objects (i.e., that they are composed of atoms)?

Another argument against atomism that seems to be sprinkled through pp Another argument against atomism that seems to be sprinkled through pp. 225-7 is the following: But if atoms have no spatial or temporal location (extension), then the world has no spatial or temporal location; it is “no place” at “no time.” Isn’t this the same as saying that the world does not exist? Does atomism imply metaphysical nihilism? Atoms are indivisible. Whatever is located in space (& time?) is divisible (because space & time are divisible). So atoms cannot be located (extended) in space (or in time?) -- they are “no place” at “no time.” Now, atomism is the view that everything in the space-time world is composed of atoms. Also,

space & time are infinitely divisible. So whatever is located in space & time is infinitely divisible. Atoms are indivisible. Either atoms are (A) located in space & time, or (B) they aren’t. Either way, atoms cannot exist. Can you see why? 1  2 = .5  2 = .25  2 = .125  2 = .0625  2 = .03125  2 = .015625  2 = .0078125  2 = .00390625  2 = .001953125  2 = . . .

* * Monism & Experience 4 (227) Metaphysical monism is the view that reality is an absolute & indivisible unity (“All is one; one is all”).

V’s arguments against monism If monism were true, then there could be no gradual motion from one place to another (since everything would be in one place); it would not be possible to see only one side of an object while not seeing the other side of it (no difference between one side & another); there would be no distinctions or differences between different beings (in fact, there wouldn’t be different beings); all things would have the same location (no separation of things in space); and there would be no difference between the visible and the invisible (the macroscopic & the microscopic).

6 What is Perception? 1st Objection: If external objects do not exist, how is “perception” possible?

V’s Reply There is a time-lapse between sensation & perception. By the time perception arises, sensations & their objects (which are “momentary”) are gone. The object of perception is a construction of reflective consciousness. There is perception in dreams, but the objects perceived are not external to the mind. (But perhaps dream images come into the mind in the 1st place as a result of waking experiences of external objects.) (Well, then, it seems that sensation [if not perception] implies the reality of external objects, right?)

2nd Objection: Memory presupposes the reality of extra-mental objects; we cannot remember what we have not experienced. V’s Reply (Yes, but [as suggested in the preceding slide] perceptions, according to V, are derived from past sensations, & he does not show that sensations have no external objects.) What we remember are not external objects, but rather our perceptual experiences, which, as shown above, are constructions of consciousness.

V’s Reply Does this mean that . . . 3rd Objection: It is commonly recognized that there is a significant difference between dream states (in which objects are mentally constructed) and waking states (in which objects are experienced as external to consciousness). Does this mean that . . . Those who are dreaming do not recognize the unreality of the objects experienced in the dream state; but those who wake up do recognize this. Similarly, the enlightened are those who have awakened to a still higher state of consciousness; and they discern the unreality of the world constructed in the so-called “waking state.” V’s Reply

only the enlightened (who are few) can KNOW that reality is consciousness-only & that everybody else must either take it on faith (in the authority of the enlightened) or not believe it at all (since V’s arguments in support of metaphysical idealism do not seem very effective)?

Interactions between Individuals 7

1st Objection: Doesn’t the fact that one mind can be influenced by another prove that there are objects external to one’s own consciousness (e.g., friends, teachers, etc.)? V’s Reply: The doctrine of consciousness-only does not deny the existence of other minds external to one’s one; what it denies the existence of external material objects. (228)

(More control, more moral concern?) 2nd Objection: Different degrees of moral concern with regard to the consequences of what we do in dreams as opposed to waking states. V’s Reply: That’s because the mind has more control of itself in the waking state than it does in dream states. (More control, more moral concern?) (Good response?)

3rd Objection: If there are no material objects, then there are no bodies. If there are no bodies, then how can butchers kill sheep & then be blamed for taking life? V’s Reply: One mind can change/affect another (appeal to scripture). Killing is the disruption of one stream of consciousness by another. * * Butchering is a vocation condemned by the Dharma.

The Problem of Other Minds 8

Objection Can one mind have knowledge of another? If so, doesn’t that refute the consciousness-only thesis? According to Vasubandhu, there is a difference here (again) between the enlightened & the unenlightened. The unenlightened know neither the minds of others nor their own minds. The enlightened know their own minds & the minds of others. (See p. 228)

9 Conclusion (228) Only the enlightened can truly know & understand the truth of consciousness-only.