Chapter 3: Decision Making

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Presentation transcript:

Chapter 3: Decision Making

Task allocation and subsidiarity Key question: “Which level of government is responsible for each task?” Setting foreign policy Speed limits School curriculum Trade policy, etc Typical levels: local regional national EU Task allocation = ‘competencies’ in EU jargon

Subsidiarity principle Task allocation in EU guided by subsidiarity principle (Maastricht Treaty) Decisions should be made as close to the people as possible, EU should not take action unless doing so is more effective than action taken at national, regional or local level.

3 Pillars and task allocation 3 Pillar structure delimits range of: Community competencies (tasks allocated to EU) Shared competencies (areas were task are split between EU and member states) National competencies 1st pillar is EU competency 2nd and 3rd are generally national competencies details complex, but basically members pursue cooperation but do not transfer sovereignty to EU

Fiscal federalism: The basic trade-offs NB: there is no clear answer from theory Diversity and local informational advantages Diversity of preference and local conditions argues for setting policy at low level (i.e. close to people) Scale economies Tends to favour centralisation and one-size-fits-all to lower costs Spillovers Negative and positive spillovers argue for centralisation Local governments tend to underappreciated the impact (positive or negative) on other jurisdictions Democracy as a control mechanism Favours decentralisation so voters have finer choices Jurisdictional competition Favours decentralisation to allow voters a choice

Diversity and local information One-size-fits-all policies tend to be inefficient since too much for some and too little for others central government could set different local policies but Local Government likely to have an information advantage

Scale By producing public good at higher scale, or applying to more people may lower average cost This ends to favour centralisation Hard to think of examples of this in the EU

Spillovers Example of a positive spillovers If decentralised, each region chooses level of public good that is too low e.g. Qd2 for region 2 Two-region gain from centralisation is area A Similar conclusion if negative spillovers Q too high with decentralised

Democracy as a control mechanism If policy in hands of local officials and these are elected citizens have more precise control over what politicians do High level elections are take-it-over-leave-it for many issues since only a handful of choices between ‘promise packages’ (parties/candidates) and many, many issues

Jurisdictional competition Voters influence government they live under via: ‘voice’ Voting, lobbying, etc. ‘exit’. Change jurisdictions (e.g. move between cities). While exit is not a option for most voters at the national level, it usually is at the sub-national level. since people can move, politicians must pay closer attention to the wishes of the people. With centralised policy making, this pressure evaporates.

Decision-making efficiency Quantitative measure of efficiency Passage probability, likelihood of a randomly selected proposal passing the decision making body Work out all possible coalitions (2n) Using actual voting weights and majority see how many would ‘win’, i.e. get proposal passed If all coalitions equally likely fraction of winning coalitions to all coalitions is an abstract indicator of how difficult it is to pass proposals

Historical voting efficiency for EU

Blocking coalition analysis

Distribution of power among EU members Power in Council of Ministers under pre- Nice voting rules

Impact of Nice reforms Power changes from Nice reforms, EU25 (for newcomers, is compared to what they would have got under pre-Nice rules)

Impact of draft Constitution rules Power changes from proposed CT reforms, EU25 (compared to what they would have got under Nice rules)

Legitimacy in EU decision making Legitimacy is slippery concept Approach: equal power per citizen is legitimate ‘fair’ Fairness and square-ness requires Council votes proportional to square root of national populations EU is a two-step procedure citizens elect national governments, These vote in the Council typical Frenchwoman is less likely to be influential in national election than a Dane So French minister needs more votes in Council to equalise likelihood of being influential (power).

Legitimacy in EU decision making How much more? Mathematics of voting says it should be the square root of national population