Briefing to the ROK- United Nations Disarmament Conference

The Promise of Prague “…the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons…” “reduce the role of nuclear weapons” –New START –Nuclear Posture Review –CTBT –FMCT “strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty” –NPT Review Conference “build a new framework for nuclear energy cooperation” –GNEP  IFNEC –Fuel banks “secure all vulnerable nuclear material” –Nuclear Security Summit –4-year lockdown effort

Nuclear Security Summit Planning Goals Identify collective steps to Secure vulnerable nuclear materials Combat proliferation-related smuggling Deter, detect, and disrupt attempts at nuclear terrorism Principles Narrow focus on nuclear security –Address nonproliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses issues in existing channels Diverse participation in a conversational format Reinforce, not replace or duplicate, existing nuclear security mechanisms and instruments

Summit Participants Algeria Argentina Armenia Australia Belgium Brazil Canada Chile China Czech Republic Egypt Finland France Georgia Germany India Indonesia Israel Italy Japan Jordan Kazakhstan Malaysia Mexico Morocco Netherlands New Zealand Nigeria Norway Pakistan Philippines Poland Republic of Korea Russia Saudi Arabia Singapore South Africa Spain Sweden Switzerland Thailand Turkey United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States Ukraine Vietnam United Nations European Union IAEA

Key Issues to Navigate Threat –Terrorists –Weapons states –Proliferators Scope –Weapons –Fissile materials –Radiological sources Sovereignty –National responsibility –International commitments Nuclear energy –HEU and Pu in civil use –Role of industry –Security: barrier or enabler? Institutions –Formal –Informal “3 pillars” –Relationship to security –Outliers

Summit Outcomes Communiqué: high level political commitment –Four-year lockdown –National responsibilities –International cooperation Work Plan: detailed guidance for national and international actions to implement Communiqué National Statements: individual steps taken in support of commitments in Communiqué and Work Plan

Summit Work Plan Ratifying and implementing treaties on nuclear security and nuclear terrorism; Cooperating through the United Nations to implement and assist others in connection with Security Council resolutions; Working with the International Atomic Energy Agency to update and implement security guidance and carry out advisory services; Reviewing national regulatory and legal requirements relating to nuclear security and nuclear trafficking; Converting civilian facilities that use highly enriched uranium to non- weapons-usable materials; Research on new nuclear fuels, detection methods, and forensics techniques; Development of corporate and institutional cultures that prioritize nuclear security; Education and training to ensure that countries and facilities have the people they need to protect their materials; and Joint exercises among law enforcement and customs officials to enhance nuclear detection approaches.

National Commitments Nuclear material removals/elimination –Canada, Chile, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Russia, Ukraine, US Research reactor conversions –Chile, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Vietnam Ending fissile material production –Russia Treaty ratifications –Armenia, Argentina, Australia, France, Georgia, Germany, Poland, UK, US IAEA support –Belgium, Japan, NZ, Norway, Russia, UK, US IAEA security reviews (IPPAS) –Finland, France, UK, US Capacity building/Centers of Excellence –China, France, India, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, UK, US Cooperative mechanisms (e.g.,G8 GP, GICNT) –Argentina, Canada, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, UK, US, Vietnam National regulations export control –Armenia, Egypt, Malaysia Detection (e.g., Megaports) –Argentina, Italy, UAE,US Contributions –Canada, NZ, Norway, US International meetings –Canada, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Saudi Arabia

Parallel Events NGO Summit: Next Generation Nuclear Security, April 12 –200+ experts –40+ countries –Key points: “The detonation of a nuclear explosive device would be the quintessential terrorist act of the 21st century. It poses a real and present danger to the security of nations around the world. We cannot allow our response to fall short of the dimensions of the threat.” Robert Gallucci, President, MacArthur Foundation “…nuclear security is too important to be left to each country to implement unaided. We know that unauthorized diversion of fissile material in any country could lead to global consequences – every country has a stake in the effectiveness of security measures everywhere else. “ Gareth Evans, ICNND Co-Chair Industry Summit: Nuclear Security Conference 2010, April 14 –170+ participants –40+ countries –Key points: Need for greater understanding of industry’s role and risk of nuclear terrorism Commercial industry should be more involved in treaties, security arrangements, best practices Need for industry-government dialogue on nuclear security Need to improve corporate governance for security International terrorism affects everyone Industry has yet to take on its proper role in nuclear security discussions nationally and internationally

Next Steps Implementation –Four-year effort to secure vulnerable nuclear material –Work Plan –National commitments Outreach –IAEA-- UNSCR 1540 Committee –GICNT-- G8 Global Partnership –Regional groups-- Industry/private sector –Treaty events-- Other approaches? Next Sherpa meeting: Argentina, November 2010 Next Summit: Republic of Korea, April 2012

Lessons Learned Listen and lead –Flexible –Firm Show your work Maintain focus Let leaders be themselves Shape expectations –Outside experts –Media

Back-up Slides

Planning Questions for 2012 Timing and venue of Sherpa meetings? –Potential for intermediate sous-Sherpa/expert meetings to work on certain technical issues? Tracking implementation progress? New initiatives to be announced in 2012? Additional steps within Work Plan that reflect new political opportunities created by the Summit? Participation? Industry and/or NGO event(s) in Seoul? –Relationship to official Summit?

Fuel Cycle and Security Enrichment –IAEA safeguards US facilities New technologies –Multilateral ventures Angarsk IUEC US? Reprocessing –Limit accumulations of separated Pu –Ensure appropriate security for MOX in transit and at reactors Limiting E&R spread –Nuclear Suppliers Group –123 Agreements –IFNEC –Fuel assurances –Cradle-to-Grave concepts –R&D Fissile material disposition –US-Russian Pu Disposition –HEU blend down Civil HEU phase out

International Convention on Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terror “an important legally binding multilateral instrument addressing threats posed by acts of nuclear terrorism” 1.Universality 2.Assistance in implementing 3.“Participating States Parties to the Convention encourage discussions among States Parties to consider measures to ensure its effective implementation, as called for in Article 20 of the Convention.”

UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) “Noting the need to fully implement UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) … in particular as it relates to nuclear material,” 1.Dialogue between the 1540 Committee and States 2.Activities of the 1540 Committee to promote full implementation; 3.Importance of complete and timely reporting, and providing technical support or assistance; 4.Comprehensive Review : establishment of a voluntary fund; effective and sustainable support for the activities of the 1540 Committee 5.Evaluating and improving physical protection systems to ensure that they are capable of achieving the objectives set out in relevant International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Series documents and INFCIRC/225 6.Technical assistance to those States that request it through appropriate mechanisms, including through the Committee’s efforts to match needs with available resources.

International Atomic Energy Agency Primary UN agency for nuclear security 1.Nuclear Security Series – recommendations and guidance 2.Completion and implementation of guidance, and assistance in doing so 3.Finalize INFCIRC 225, Rev. 5 4.Upcoming guidance document on materials control and accounting 5.Incorporate guidance into planning, design and operation of nuclear facilities 6.Utilization of guidance on design basis threats 7.Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans to guide improvements 8.International Physical Protection Advisory Service review missions 9.Necessary resources for IAEA nuclear security activities

US National Actions Domestic nuclear security: IPPAS mission at NIST Ratifying conventions: conforming legislation for CPPNM & ICSANT Minimizing HEU: all US reactors converted that can be with current LEU fuel Plutonium disposition: signed PMDA protocol with Russia Nuclear detection: new technologies to address H-3 shortages Nuclear forensics: new classification guide Sharing best practices: GICNT durability, WINS support International cooperation: $1.6 billion FY11 request for nuclear security programs UNSCR 1540: voluntary support program IAEA Nuclear Security Programme: US voluntary contribution up 59% since 2007 G8 Global Partnership: US support to extend and expand scope, nuclear security focus