THE VITAMINS‘ CARTEL global dimension 1997 Case filed in Alabama: Robertson v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. 1998 Donaldson & Hosenbein, Inc. v. Hoffmann-LaRoche.

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THE VITAMINS‘ CARTEL global dimension 1997 Case filed in Alabama: Robertson v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd Donaldson & Hosenbein, Inc. v. Hoffmann-LaRoche Justice Department‘s investigation 1999 Rhône Poulenc (now Aventis) negotiated with the DOJ the admission to a leniency program 1999 Rhône Poulenc admitted to the European Commission that there was a vitamin‘s cartel 2001 European Commission‘s decision 2004 Supreme Court: F. HOFFMAN-La ROCHE LTD. et al. v. EMPAGRAN S. A. et al.

U.S. nearly $907 million criminal fines private class action lawsuit by domestic purchasers of vitamin products settled: $1.05 billion Individual corporate executives sentenced to prison

Canada: $100 million in criminal fines paid EU: $759 million of administrative fines Australia: $14 million South Korea:$3 million ELSEWHERE

2004 Supreme Court: F. HOFFMAN-La ROCHE LTD. et al. v. EMPAGRAN S. A. et al. U.S. courts do not have jurisdiction “where the plaintiff’s claim rests solely on the independent foreign harm“. AVOID contrast with domestic leniency programs ? „less incentive to make a voluntary disclosure to Canadian authorities, because criminal immunity from Canadian authorities would come at the increased cost of punitive treble damages under U.S. law for its worldwide transactions. This threat of treble damages may make it too expensive for many cartel members to cooperate, which potentially risks a significant diminution in the effectiveness of the disclosure and immunity programs upon which Canadian antitrust enforcement has successfully relied“

RISK of forum shopping? U.S. treble damages: triple the amount of the actual/ compensatory damages