Mind the Gap: Reflections on Fiscal Balance in Decentralized Federations Robin Boadway, Queen’s University Prepared for The Federal Idea: A Conference.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
URBAN INSTITUTE Refocusing Responsibility For Dual Eligibles: Why Medicare Should Take The Lead* October 28, 2011 Judy Feder Georgetown University/Urban.
Advertisements

The Macroeconomics of Public Expenditures Vandana Chandra, PRMEP PEAM Core Course January 12, 2004.
Japan’s Fiscal Policy and Fiscal Reconstruction Toshihiro Ihori University of Tokyo.
Local Finance and Fiscal Equalization Schemes in a Comparative Perspective: Australia and Canada Presentation to Conference on Making Fiscal Equalization.
Earmarked Grants and Accountability in Government Richard Bird and Michael Smart University of Toronto Copenhagen, September 2009.
Pricing the right to education The cost of reaching new targets by 2030 Aaron Benavot Director, EFA Global Monitoring Report Launch Event, Results for.
1 The Fiscal Basis for Civic Endeavour Enid Slack Institute on Municipal Finance and Governance University of Toronto Conference on “Building Spaces that.
Lesson 12-1 Fiscal Policy.
Copyright © 2006 Pearson Education Canada Fiscal Policy 24 CHAPTER.
1 Fiscal Federalism in Iraq: OIL and GAS. The oil situation: a snapshot.
DECENTRALIZATION AND RURAL SERVICES : MESSAGES FROM RECENT RESEARCH AND PRACTICE Graham B. Kerr Community Based Rural Development Advisor The World Bank.
Understanding Economics
Objectives for Week Fifteen Discuss Environmental Federalism Discuss Environmental Federalism Brownfields Policy Brownfields Policy Brief Review of Course.
The Federal Scene and Disability Reforms: Disappointments, Discussions, and Designs Michael J. Prince Presentation to joint BCACL and BCCPD Meeting October.
Five Debates over Macroeconomic Policy
Tax Policy Fiscal Context and Economic Concepts Molly Sherlock Washington & Lee University January 23, 2015.
Gareth D. Myles University of Exeter.  The book advances the theory of cost benefit in directions beneficial for EU policy  It builds on the best of.
Macroeconomic Policy and Floating Exchange Rates
DECENTRALIZATION:AN OVERVIEW DENNIS A. RONDINELLI Kenan Institute of Private Enterprise Kenan-Flagler Business School UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, CHAPEL.
Tax autonomy and decentralisation in OECD countries. Network on Fiscal relations across levels of Government José Maria Piñero Campos OECD Fiscal Federalism.
Tax Assignments Jorge Martinez-Vazquez Georgia State University Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations.
 The government generally spends more than it gets in revenue  When expenditures > revenue: budget deficit  If, however, expenditures = revenue, government.
Revenue Options for Canadian Municipalities Enid Slack Institute on Municipal Finance and Governance Presentation to Canadian National Summit on Municipal.
KIPF The contemporary needs of general and earmarked grants in Korea: Assessment Hyun-A Kim Korea Institute of Public Finance 2009 Copenhagen Seminar,
11 FISCAL POLICY CHAPTER.
Chapter 14 Intergovernmental Grants in Theory and Practice
FISCAL FEDERALISM TUĞBA KARAL ESRA YAZAR ELİF KESKİN
Tax Autonomy in Personal income Taxation Comments on François Vaillancourt Christian VALENDUC Studies Department – Ministry of Finance, UCL (LLN, Mons)
Risks in the Global Economy Finn E. Kydland University of California Santa Barbara ASSAL 2012 San Jose, Costa Rica.
Richard Arana Andres Gomez Rodrigo Camacho Daniel Batista.
Fiscal Federalism and Decentralization Parallels of Canadian Experience.
Looking for a New Deal a presentation to the CITY OF EDMONTON April 15, 2004 Melville McMillan and Paul Boothe Institute for Public Economics  Department.
Fiscal Decentralisation Processes in the EU With Some Perspectives for Croatia Giorgio Brosio University of Torino, Italy and EU CARDS Programme for Croatia:
Decentralization In Developing Nations. What is decentralization? Transfer of authority from central to local Transfer of authority from central to local.
1 State and Local Fiscal Trends and Future Threats A Report Prepared for National Association of Realtors By State and Local Fiscal Policy Research Program.
Lecture notes Prepared by Anton Ljutic. © 2004 McGraw–Hill Ryerson Limited Fiscal Policy CHAPTER ELEVEN.
Public Finance by John E. Anderson Power Point Slides to Accompany:
Fiscal policy in EMU Prepared by/ Mohamed Sayed Abunar Asaad Tolba Abdel-Halim Supervised with/ Prof Dr. Nagwa Sama k.
Government Revenues Attributable to Tourism Conrad Barber-Dueck, Statistics Canada The Seventh International Forum of Tourism Statistics Stockholm, Sweden.
Introduction to Fiscal Decentralization. Three Economic Roles of Government Equitable Distribution of Income Stable Economic Environment Efficient Allocation.
Five Debates over Macroeconomic Policy Chapter 18.
Principles for Designing Transfers Jorge Martinez-Vazquez Georgia State University The Challenge of Designing Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in Bolivia.
Fiscal Federalism Douglas Brown Pols 321 St. Francis Xavier University October 2012.
Government budget Budget deficits and debt 1.  Recall, when we talked about national savings:  T – G is not a budget surplus  Because it is missing.
Page1 Decentralization of Functions International Conference on Governance and Accountability in Social Sector Decentralization Dana Weist
SME Taxation in China Professor Yang Yao China Center for Economic Research Peking University Creating A Conducive Legal & Regulatory Framework for Small.
CHAPTER 7 Federalism. What is federalism?  A system of government under which the constitutional authority to make laws and raise revenue is divided.
Macroeconomic Policies. Fiscal policy  “Fiscal policy” is the government operation of government spending (G) and taxes (T).  Typically we consider.
Enforcing Hard Budget Constraints Introduction The Problem: Bailouts and Soft Budget Constraints Two Types of Solution: –Markets and Hierarchies Three.
Comments on Fatas: Automatic Stabilizers Steven Symansky FAD.
An Optimal Economic Growth Strategy for Alabama Dr. Sam Addy Associate Dean for Economic Development Outreach & Senior Research Economist Montgomery, AlabamaJanuary.
Fiscal Policy Activities 30b by Advanced Placement Economics Teacher Resource Manual. National Council on Economic Education, New York, N.Y.
Own source revenues of local governments: international practices Olaf Merk (OECD, Regional Development Division) Fiscal Management of Local Administrations-Conference,
March 24-25, 2005 CONFERENCE “Russia’s Social Sectors under Decentralization: Issues of Financing, Performance and Governance” World Bank Moscow Office.
Progress on Fiscal Decentralization World Bank Presentation to the Sudan Consortium Vivek Srivastava & Bill Battaile Khartoum, March
Framework for Expenditure Assignment Decentralization and Intergovernmental Fiscal Reform 24 March 2003 Dana Weist PRMPS.
Fiscal Policy Fiscal policy – changes in government expenditures and taxation to achieve macroeconomic goals. Fiscal policy may affect whether the economy.
1 Bosnia and Herzegovina: Creating a Stable Decentralized Fiscal System The World Bank.
Page1 Intergovernmental Aspects of Service Delivery Public Expenditure for Human Development Course Dana Weist PRMPS 12 November 2003.
C OMMENTS ON P. S MOKE ’ S PRESENTATION Teresa Ter-Minassian.
STATE GOVERNMENT REVENUE SOURCES The largest source of state revenue consists of intergovernmental revenue —funds collected by one level of government.
By Dr. Aisha-Ghaus Pasha Director, Institute of Public Policy, Beaconhouse National University.
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies ISMERI EUROPA Ex post evaluation of cohesion policy programmes Work Package 1: Coordination,
Fiscal Policy UNIT 6 Chapter 15.
Economics 202 Principles Of Macroeconomics
Challenges of Budget Management in Decentralization Budget Management and Financial Accountability Course Dana Weist Lead Public Sector Specialist,
Universita’ of Torino, Italy
Messages from the OECD’s Fiscal Network
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Creating a Stable Decentralized Fiscal System
13 FISCAL POLICY. 13 FISCAL POLICY After studying this chapter, you will be able to: Describe the federal budget process and the recent history of.
Presentation transcript:

Mind the Gap: Reflections on Fiscal Balance in Decentralized Federations Robin Boadway, Queen’s University Prepared for The Federal Idea: A Conference in Honour of Ronald L. Watts IIGR, October 18-20, 2007

Outline Introduction Introduction Caveats Caveats Evolving views of the fiscal gap Evolving views of the fiscal gap Fiscal imbalance vs. Fiscal Gap Fiscal imbalance vs. Fiscal Gap Fiscal imbalance I: The soft budget constraint Fiscal imbalance I: The soft budget constraint Fiscal imbalance II: Tightening the budget constraint Fiscal imbalance II: Tightening the budget constraint Seeking some balance Seeking some balance

Introduction Fiscal gap—transfers from higher to lower level—is a feature of multi-level governments Fiscal gap—transfers from higher to lower level—is a feature of multi-level governments Applies to both federal-provincial abnd provincial-local levels Applies to both federal-provincial abnd provincial-local levels Fiscal gap varies widely across countries, mainly due to differences in revenue-raising Fiscal gap varies widely across countries, mainly due to differences in revenue-raising Gradual tendency for growing expenditure decentralization; revenue side mixed Gradual tendency for growing expenditure decentralization; revenue side mixed

Introduction, cont’d No consensus about the most suitable fiscal gap for any given nation, but some common mantras No consensus about the most suitable fiscal gap for any given nation, but some common mantras Changing circumstances (scope of government policy) and changing views about decentralization have fed into changes in ideals about the fiscal gap Changing circumstances (scope of government policy) and changing views about decentralization have fed into changes in ideals about the fiscal gap Among economists, decentralists have taken center stage, and to some extent among policy makers and advisors as well Among economists, decentralists have taken center stage, and to some extent among policy makers and advisors as well

Introduction, cont’d Recently, concept of fiscal imbalance has entered the lexicon Recently, concept of fiscal imbalance has entered the lexicon In Canada, distinction between fiscal gap and fiscal imbalance made by S éguin Commission In Canada, distinction between fiscal gap and fiscal imbalance made by S éguin Commission Some suggestion that the two are related Some suggestion that the two are related This talk: exploration of the evolution of thinking about fiscal gap and its relation with fiscal imbalance This talk: exploration of the evolution of thinking about fiscal gap and its relation with fiscal imbalance

Caveats Draw heavily on Canadian experience Draw heavily on Canadian experience Economists’ perspective vs. broader ones Economists’ perspective vs. broader ones Economic dimension of policy choices Economic dimension of policy choices Relevance of incentives Relevance of incentives Importance of one’s view of benevolence of government, or quality of governance Importance of one’s view of benevolence of government, or quality of governance Importance of value judgments: solidarity/social citizenship vs. efficiency Importance of value judgments: solidarity/social citizenship vs. efficiency

Evolving Views of the Fiscal Gap Arguments determining the size of fiscal gap Arguments determining the size of fiscal gap Decentralization of spending versus revenues Decentralization of spending versus revenues Accountability Accountability Equalization Equalization Exercise of the spending power Exercise of the spending power Fiscal harmonization Fiscal harmonization Potential for federal-provincial-local cooperation Potential for federal-provincial-local cooperation Importance of fiscal competition? Importance of fiscal competition? The fiscal gap versus the responsibility gap The fiscal gap versus the responsibility gap

Evolving Views, cont’d Evolution of expenditure decentralization Evolution of expenditure decentralization Spending now dominated by services to people, transfers and social insurance: decentralized provision efficient but national interests at stake Spending now dominated by services to people, transfers and social insurance: decentralized provision efficient but national interests at stake Infrastructure: potential conflict between provincial responsibility and national interest, especially if highly decentralized (lessons from econ geography) Infrastructure: potential conflict between provincial responsibility and national interest, especially if highly decentralized (lessons from econ geography) Reconciliation of benefits of decentralized delivery with national interest is a key issue Reconciliation of benefits of decentralized delivery with national interest is a key issue

Evolving Views, cont’d Case for revenue decentralization weakened Case for revenue decentralization weakened More reliance on VAT More reliance on VAT Evolution toward schedular (dual) income taxes Evolution toward schedular (dual) income taxes Globalization and mobility of tax bases Globalization and mobility of tax bases Competitiveness Competitiveness Importance of harmonized tax bases Importance of harmonized tax bases Increase in horizontal disparities Increase in horizontal disparities Growing importance of cities Growing importance of cities

Evolving Views, cont’d The elusive concept of accountability The elusive concept of accountability Economists argue fiscal gap deters accountability Economists argue fiscal gap deters accountability In fact, revenues from major tax bases little different from transfers in terms of accountability In fact, revenues from major tax bases little different from transfers in terms of accountability Effect of incentives on gov’t vastly overstated Effect of incentives on gov’t vastly overstated Watertight division of responsibilities misconceived Watertight division of responsibilities misconceived Accountability argument overstated Accountability argument overstated Has decentralization mantra gone too far? Has decentralization mantra gone too far?

Fiscal Imbalance vs. Fiscal Gap The existence or otherwise of a fiscal imbalance has been a highly charged issue in Canada The existence or otherwise of a fiscal imbalance has been a highly charged issue in Canada Séguin argument: Given expenditure responsibilities and division of tax room, transfers inadequate, given major cutbacks Séguin argument: Given expenditure responsibilities and division of tax room, transfers inadequate, given major cutbacks Also, they suggested fiscal gap too large Also, they suggested fiscal gap too large Horizontal imbalance also pronounced Horizontal imbalance also pronounced Some observers deny possibility of fiscal imbalance Some observers deny possibility of fiscal imbalance

Fiscal Imbalance vs. Fiscal Gap, cont’d Distinction conceptually meaningful, but ambiguous Distinction conceptually meaningful, but ambiguous Concept of fiscal imbalance judgmental: relies on views about optimal fiscal gap Concept of fiscal imbalance judgmental: relies on views about optimal fiscal gap Large fiscal gap not inconsistent with fiscal balance Large fiscal gap not inconsistent with fiscal balance In the long run, imbalance should not persist, assuming provinces have fiscal discretion In the long run, imbalance should not persist, assuming provinces have fiscal discretion In the short run, sudden changes can cause imbalance: can go either way  In the short run, sudden changes can cause imbalance: can go either way 

Fiscal Imbalance I: The Soft Budget Constraint Excessive lower-level spending and debts leading to higher transfers: negative imbalance Excessive lower-level spending and debts leading to higher transfers: negative imbalance Some causes/symptoms Some causes/symptoms Lack of commitment (bailouts: Nwfld?) Lack of commitment (bailouts: Nwfld?) Lack of lower-level accountability Lack of lower-level accountability Lack of lower-level policy-making discretion Lack of lower-level policy-making discretion Use of central discretionary funding Use of central discretionary funding Excessive central controls Excessive central controls Fiscal gap too high? Fiscal gap too high?

Fiscal Imbalance II: Tightening the Budget Constraint Restriction on higher-level transfers starting from a situation of fiscal balance Restriction on higher-level transfers starting from a situation of fiscal balance Some causes/symptoms Some causes/symptoms Debt imbalance Debt imbalance Discretionary central transfers Discretionary central transfers Horizontal imbalance increasingly expensive Horizontal imbalance increasingly expensive Sub-national governments able to raise revenues Sub-national governments able to raise revenues Responsibilities for spending programs ill-defined Responsibilities for spending programs ill-defined Fiscal gap too low? Fiscal gap too low?

Seeking Some Balance How to combine benefit of decentralized public services and targeted transfers with efficient harmonized tax system, horizontal balance and balanced response to fiscal shocks? 1. Significant fiscal gap: federal control of VAT, environmental tax, and income tax 2. Constraint on federal government: revenue sharing (Australian/German system)

Seeking Some Balance, cont’d 3. Provincial revenue-raising discretion: access to harmonized income tax and narrow taxes 4. Reduced discretion on year-to-year transfers 5. More cooperative decision-making 6. Institutional cooperation: federal provincial advisory fiscal commission 7. Use of the spending power an open question