Part V The Financial Institutions Industry

Chapter Fourteen Theory of Financial Structure

Slide 14–4 Sources of External Finance in U.S. Figure 14.1: Sources of External Funds for Nonfinancial Businesses in the United States

Slide 14–5 Sources of Foreign External Finance Figure 14.2: Sources of External Funds for Nonfinancial Businesses: A Comparison of the United States with Germany and Japan

Slide 14–6 Facts of Financial Structure 1.Stocks are not most important source of finance for businesses 2.Issuing marketable securities not primary funding source for businesses 3.Indirect finance (financial intermediation) is far more important than direct finance 4.Banks are most important source of external finance

Slide 14–7 Puzzles of Financial Structure (cont.) 5.Financial system is among most heavily regulated sectors of economy 6.Only large, well established firms have access to securities markets 7.Collateral is prevalent feature of debt contracts 8.Debt contracts are typically extremely complicated legal documents with restrictive covenants

Slide 14–8 Transactions Costs and Financial Structure Transactions costs hinder flow of funds to people with productive investment opportunities Financial intermediaries make profits by reducing transactions costs 1.Take advantage of economies of scale (example: mutual funds) 2.Develop expertise to lower transactions costs –Explains fact 3

Slide 14–9 Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard: Definitions Adverse Selection 1.Before transaction occurs 2.Potential borrowers most likely to produce adverse outcome are ones most likely to seek loan and be selected Moral Hazard 1.After transaction occurs 2.Hazard that borrower has incentives to engage in undesirable (immoral) activities making it more likely that won't pay loan back

Slide 14–10 Adverse Selection and Financial Structure Lemons Problem in Securities Markets 1.If can't distinguish between good and bad securities, willing pay only average of good and bad securities’ value 2.Result: Good securities undervalued and firms won't issue them; bad securities overvalued so too many issued 3.Investors won't want buy bad securities, so market won't function well –Explains fact 2 and fact 1 –Also explains fact 6: Less asymmetric info for well known firms, so smaller lemons problem

Slide 14–11 Tools to Help Solve Adverse Selection (Lemons) Problem 1.Private production and sale of information 1.Free-rider problem interferes with this solution 2.Government regulation to increase information (explains fact 5) 3.Financial intermediation –Analogy to solution to lemons problem provided by used car dealers –Avoid free-rider problem by making private loans (explains facts 3 and 4) 4.Collateral and net worth (explains fact 7)

Slide 14–12 Moral Hazard: Debt versus Equity Moral Hazard in Equity –Principal-agent problem 1.Result of separation of ownership by stockholders (principals) from control by managers (agents) 2.Managers act in own rather than stockholders' interest Solutions to Principal-Agent Problem 1.Monitoring: production of information 2.Government regulation to increase information 3.Financial intermediation 4.Debt contracts Explains fact 1: Why debt is used more than equity

Slide 14–13 Moral Hazard and Debt Markets Moral hazard: Borrower wants to take on too much risk Solutions 1.Net worth 2.Monitoring and enforcement of restrictive covenants 3.Financial intermediation—banks and other intermediaries have special advantages in monitoring Explains facts 1–4

Slide 14–14 Financial Development and Economic Growth Financial repression leads to low growth Why? 1.Poor legal system 2.Weak accounting standards 3.Government directs credit 4.Financial institutions nationalized 5.Inadequate government regulation Financial Crises

Slide 14–15 Financial Development and Economic Growth Factors Causing Financial Crises 1.Increase in interest rates 2.Increases in uncertainty 3.Asset market effects on balance sheets Stock market effects on net worth Unanticipated deflation Cash flow effects 4.Bank panics

Figure 14.3: Sequence of Events in U.S. Financial Crises

Figure 14.4: Sequence of Events in Mexican and East Asian Financial Crises