OUTSIDE ACTORS DONORS and MILITARY

Topics Last Week n NGOs by Gerry Martone

TOPICS n Next week readings n Donors (perhaps) n Military u Review of earlier discussion of military intervention u Tasks u Implementation u Alternatives u Conclusions n Guest Speaker: Tanya Domi

Remember the 4 themes? n WHEN AND HOW TO INTERVENE? (SOVEREIGNTY IN INTRA-STATE CONFLICTS) n CONTINUUM DEBATE: LINKING RELIEF, REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT n DECLINING RESOURCES, DISPARITIES IN ALLOCATION n MANAGEMENT u INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL u INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL

ODA as a Percentage of Government Expenditure

Aid to Developing Countries in Millions of Dollars Source: Based on 1998 OECD statistics. World Disasters Report 2000.

Aid to Developing Countries as Percentage of GNP Source: Based on 1998 OECD statistics. World Disasters Report 2000.

Aid to Developing Countries as Percentage of GNP from 1956 to 1998 Source: Based on 1998 OECD statistics. World Disasters Report 2000.

What is Aid Spent On?

Source: Global Humanitarian Emergencies: Trends and Projections, National Intelligence Council, August 1999.

How Aid is Given

Bilateral Spending for Emergencies 1998 Source: Based on 1998 OECD statistics. World Disasters Report 2000.

Increase in Emergency Spending in Dollars 1980s s Source: World Disasters Report, Oxford University Press, 1998

Emergency Relief as Percentage of All Development Assistance Source: Based on 1998 OECD statistics. World Disasters Report 2000.

Top Donors to Refugee Aid Agencies in Millions of Dollars United States444.9 Japan160.1 European Commission138.9 Norway 70.3 Sweden 68.3 Netherlands 60.9 Denmark 56.4 Germany 52.9 Switzerland 49.8 Canada 38.8 United Kingdom 36.3 Australia 26.8 Finland 18.0 Adapted from World Refugee Survey 2000, U.S. Committee for Refugees.

Top Donors to Refugee Aid Agencies in US Dollars Per Capita Population Norway Denmark Sweden 7.67 Switzerland 7.01 Luxembourg 5.97 Netherlands 3.86 Finland 3.47 United States 1.63 Australia 1.41 Canada 1.27 Japan 1.26 Ireland 1.10 Belgium 0.89 Kuwait 0.71 Adapted from World Refugee Survey 2000, U.S. Committee for Refugees.

Development Assistance as a Percentage of Military Expenditure Source: Adapted from United Nations Development Program. Human Development Report. New York, NY: Oxford University Press; Percent of military expenditure

Percentage of Bilateral Assistance Allocated to Emergencies 1996 Source: World Disasters Report, Oxford University Press, 1998

Percentage of Foreign Assistance Spent as Emergency Aid, 1999

Donors: Conclusions n ODA has started to increase slightly again in the last 2 years; n but it is a small part of: u GNP u military spending n Emergency spending seems to be cyclical n Multilateral aid is relatively small: Bretton Woods institutions are doing better than the UN n NGOs grew financially in the past decade n Also, there are huge disparities in allocation n Absorptive capacity can also be a problem

Military n Remember the Breakdown of Distinctions: we discussed the overlap/interdependence among Security, Relief, Rehabilitation, and Development. In addition, we discussed the Continuum Debate. n Remember discussion on types of intervention

TYPES OF INTERVENTIONS Military n Security Council decision n Department of Peace- keeping Operations (DPKO) n all other organizations n ++ Legal (Moral) MilitaryCivilian (UN mainly) n Secretary General initiative n Department of Political Affairs (DPA) n all other organizations n ++ Moral (Legal) Civilian (NGO mainly) n no central decision (state sovereignty) n all organi- zations (but not SC or SG) n ++ Moral (- Legal)

MILITARY INTERVENTION n Double nature of the military: due to its power and technology, it is u a decisive threat to life & order, and u the instrument to protect both n When to use force? u Non-intervention is the norm to contain powerful states and protect sovereignty

MILITARY INTERVENTION n One big exception (allow use of force): u Genocide (but no force used to stop Rwandan genocide) u Human Rights abuses? u Cross-border impact n Hehir (chapter 2) wants to broaden the possibilities for intervention in case of human rights abuse in failed states

MILITARY INTERVENTION n If one uses force, distinguish: u jus ad bellum (defining the conditions under which force can be used) u jus in bello (defining how force is to be legitimately employed) The latter will get (a bit) more attention today n Normally, the Security Council decides, one big exception: NATO action in Serbia/Kosovo

MILITARY INTERVENTION n Different types of military intervention: u preventive measures u peacekeeping F 1st generation: separating warring groups F 2nd generation: peace-building with an essential security component (incl. facilitation and protection of humanitarian assistance) u peace-building u peace-making u peace enforcement: actual use of force to end conflict and/or to protect minorities, such as the Kurds and the no-fly zone, (it can include the facilitation and protection of humanitarian relief).

MILITARY INTERVENTION n Differentiate actual use of force from facilitating & protecting peace accords and hum. relief! n In all but peace-enforcement consent of the parties is crucial n Peace enforcement has been the least successful in practice, e.g., Somalia. It can also compromise impartiality/neutrality of humanitarian organizations n threat of force (deterrence) does not function as in inter-state conflict. It is more limited, because factions are already fighting. After Somalia and Rwanda, most thugs don’t have a high opinion of peacekeeping forces.

TASKS (facilitation & protection) n The release and transfer of prisoners (military can take care of security and logistics) n Logistics (as with natural disasters, e.g., food transport, infrastructure (tents, bridges, simple buildings, heavy equipment)) n Search for missing persons n Mine awareness n Civilian-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), e.g., information exchange, security meetings

TASKS (facilitation & protection) n NGOs & military can train each other on operations, on rebuilding, on international humanitarian law, etc. n Security/Protection is a hot issue. Generally, NGOs like to remain independent (see Tauxe on ICRC)

Implementation: Mandate of the Military n Under which Security Council resolution? What are the exact contents (tasks, enforcement, duration)? n Which countries contribute? What can they contribute (equipment, quality of manpower, etc.) n Who leads the force? u quality of the commander of the forces; u quality of the Special Representative of the Secretary General & UN HQs’ support; u Do donor countries support the SRSG and commander? (Do we need African operations led by Africans?)

Implementation: Cooperation of the Military, Civilians (NGOs) n Protection (security of the NGOs) by the military in Somalia actually led to more violence. This highlights some possible military shortcomings: u mission creep (from security role to political, enforcing role); u Generally, weapons reinforce language of war; u Military are not a democratic institution. This leads to cultural differences: F not participatory F role of hierarchy/ centralization (vs. decentralization & field initiative in most NGOs) F different meaning of protection (security vs. int. refugee law)

Alternatives 1.Humanitarian action alone (the other two types). Sometimes this has been more effective, sometimes this was an excuse for international political inaction. Central question: are the root causes tackled? 2.Development cooperation (same question) 3.Sanctions (blunt instrument) & Conditionality 4. Denunciations 5. Denial of diplomatic privileges 4. Let them fight it out u the end of the war u hurting stalemate/ripeness of conflict u can imply genocide?

Conclusions n Comparing the three types of intervention, there are more civilian missions and NGO activities than military interventions n Peace enforcement only in rare cases & it can compromise humanitarian actors n Military/UN/NGO relationship is here to stay, but it is often an uneasy relationship n Different perception of mandates; how do Military perceive their mandate and how do NGOs perceive their mandate? In principle, the mandates can be complementary & none of the authors in Moore wants to completely abolish the use of force

Conclusions n Define what you mean by use of force (enforcement or facilitation and protection) n Check alternatives, but these also have their problems. Central question is and remains are the root causes being tackled!

Conclusions n More intra-state conflicts have led to a broader interpretation of security: aids, underdevelopment, civil wars (terrorism), etc. are now increasingly seen as international security threats n However, the preference is to delineate the respective roles and tasks of humanitarian and military actors better (whereas in the areas of relief, rehabilitation, and development the tendency is towards more complete forms of reintegration)

TOPICS n Next week readings n Donors (perhaps) n Military u Review of earlier discussion of military intervention u Tasks u Other roles of the military u Interaction with NGOs u Conclusions n Guest Speaker: Tanya Domi