Host Identity Protocol

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Presentation transcript:

Host Identity Protocol Pekka Nikander Ericsson Research Nomadiclab and Helsinki Institute for Information Technology http://www.hip4inter.net

Presentation outline Introduction: What and why? Background HIP in a Nutshell Mobility and multi-homing (multi-addressing) HIP infrastructure: Hi3 Current status Summary

What is HIP? HIP = Host Identity Protocol A proposal to separate identifier from locator at the network layer of the TCP/IP stack A new name space of public keys A protocol for discovering and authenticating bindings between public keys and IP addresses Secured using signatures and keyed hashes (hash in combination with a secret key)

Motivation Not to standardise a solution to a problem No explicit problem statement Exploring the consequences of the id / loc split Try it out in real life, in the live Internet A different look at many problems Mobility, multi-homing, end-to-end security, signalling, control/data plane separation, rendezvous, NAT traversal, firewall security, ... 8 minutes

Background A brief history of HIP Architectural background Related IETF Working Groups

A Brief History of HIP 1999 : idea discussed briefly at the IETF 2001: two BoFs, no WG created at that time 02-03: development at the corridors 2004: WG and RG created Now: base protocol more or less ready Four interoperating implementations More work needed on mobility, multi-homing, NAT traversal, infrastructure, and other issues

Architectural background IP addresses serve the dual role of being End-point Identifiers Names of network interfaces on hosts Locators Names of naming topological locations This duality makes many things hard

New requirements to Internet Addressing Mobile hosts Need to change IP address dynamically Multi-interface hosts Have multiple independent addresses Mobile, multi-interface hosts most challenging Multiple, dynamically changing addresses More complex environment e.g. local-only connectivity

Related IETF WGs and RGs Better-Than-Nothing Security, IKE requires authentication (shared secret, certificate, Kerberos), Unauthenticated IKE, Bare RSA keys, self-signed certificates, late binding IPv6 Signaling and Handoff Optimization Site multihoming for IPv6 minimize adverse effects IKEv2 mobility and multi-homing support. Multiple/changing prefixes in SA. multi6 tsvwg (sctp) Mobility mip6 mip4 mipshop Site multihoming by IPv6 Intermediation, new shim layer, based on Multi6 Multi-homing Namespace research group (IRTF), need other namespace than IP? API implications. nsrg ID/loc split Security ipsec shim6 mobike hip HIP WG chartered for experimental RFCs btns

Presentation outline Introduction: What and why? Background HIP in a Nutshell Mobility and multi-homing (multi-addressing) HIP infrastructure: Hi3 Current status Summary

HIP in a Nutshell Architectural change to TCP/IP structure Integrates security, mobility, and multi- homing Opportunistic host-to-host IPsec ESP End-host mobility, across IPv4 and IPv6 End-host multi-address multi-homing, IPv4/v6 IPv4 / v6 interoperability for apps A new layer between IP and transport Introduces cryptographic Host Identifiers

The Idea A new Name Space of Host Identifiers (HI) Public crypto keys! Presented as 128-bit long hash values, Host ID Tags (HIT) Sockets bound to HIs, not to IP addresses HIs translated to IP addresses in the kernel Process < , port> Host ID IP addr Transport Host Identity Host ID IP address IP layer Link layer

An analogy: What if people were hosts Connect to whoever happens to be at +1-123-456-7890 Connect to Current IP HIP

More detailed layering Transport Layer End-to-end, HITs IP layer Mobility Multi-homing v4/v6 bridge IPsec HIP Fragmentation Forwarding Hop-by-hop, IP addresses Link Layer

Protocol overview Initiator Responder Control Data I1: HITI, HITR or NULL Control R1: HITI, [HITR, puzzle, DHR, HIR]sig I2: [HITI, HITR, solution, DHI, {HII}]sig R2: [HITI, HITR, authenticator]sig User data messages Data

Puzzle Mechanism Responder supplies random number I Initiator must find number J so that Lowest order K bits in RHASH(HITS || I || J) are zeros K is the difficult of the puzzle The computation time is exponential to the number K

Base exchange Initiator Responder Select precomputed R1. Prevent DoS. Minimal state kept at responder! Does not protect from replay attacks. • Based on SIGMA family of key exchange protocols standard authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange for session key generation Initiator Responder I1 HITI, HITR or NULL R1 HITI, [HITR, puzzle, DHR, HIR]sig solve puzzle I2 [HITI, HITR, solution, DHI,{HII}]sig Emphasise: no extra encapsulation or header in regular user data. In theory: many encapsulating protocols; only ESP fully specified. verify, authenticate, replay protection R2 [HITI, HITR, authenticator]sig ESP protected TCP/UDP, no explicit HIP header User data messages draft-ietf-hip-base-02.txt, draft-jokela-hip-esp-00.txt

Other core components Per-packet identity context Indirectly, through SPI if ESP is used Directly, e.g., through an explicit shim header A mechanism for resolving identities to addresses DNS-based, if FQDNs used by applications Or distributed hash tables (DHTs) based

How applications work today (when IPsec ESP is used) DNS query DNS server Client app DNS library Server app DNS reply connect(IPS) IKE IKE socket API socket API TCP SYN to IPS TCP SYN from IPC IPsec SPD IPsec SAD IPsec SAD IPsec SPD ESP protected TCP SYN to IPaddrS

One way to implement HIP HIT DNS query DNS server Client app DNS library Server app DNS reply HIT ----- >  {IP addresses} connect(HITS) HIP daemon HIP daemon socket API socket API TCP SYN to HITS TCP SYN from HITC IPsec SPD IPsec SAD IPsec SAD IPsec SPD ESP protected TCP SYN to IPaddrS convert HITs to IP addresses convert IP addresses to HITs

Using HIP with ESP DNS server Client app Server app HIP daemon HIT DNS query DNS server Client app DNS library Server app DNS reply HIT ----- >  {IP addresses} connect(HITS) HIP daemon HIP daemon socket API socket API TCP SYN to HITS TCP SYN from HITC IPsec SPD IPsec SAD IPsec SAD IPsec SPD ESP protected TCP SYN to IPaddrS convert HITs to IP addresses convert IP addresses to HITs

Many faces More established views: A different IKE for simplified end-to-end ESP Super Mobile IP with v4/v6 interoperability and dynamic home agents A host multi-homing solution Newer views: New waist of IP stack; universal connectivity Secure carrier for signalling protocols

HIP as the new waist of TCP/IP v4 app v6 app v4 app v6 app TCPv4 TCPv6 TCPv4 TCPv6 Host identity IPv4 IPv6 IPv4 IPv6 Link layer Link layer

HIP for universal connectivity Goal: Lowest layer providing location- independent identifiers and end-to-end connectivity Work in progress: Support for traversing legacy NATs Firewall registration and authentication Architected middleboxes or layer 3.5 routing Identity-based connectivity with DHTs

Signalling carrier Originally HIP supported only ESP-based user data transport (previous slides) ESP is now being split from the base protocol Base protocol is becoming a secure carrier for any kinds of signalling Support for separate signalling and data paths Implicitly present in the original design Now being made more explicit

Faces summary: Motivating architectural factors A “reachability” solution across NATs New “waist” for the protocol stack Built-in security Implicit channel bindings connect(HIT) provides a secured connection to the identified host Puzzle-based DoS protection Integrated mobility and end-host multi-homing

Presentation outline Introduction: What and why? Background HIP in a Nutshell Mobility and multi-homing (multi-addressing) HIP infrastructure: Hi3 Current status Summary

Introduction to IP based mobility and multi-homing Mobility implemented at “lP layer” IP addresses are assigned according to topology Allows for routing prefix aggregation Mobile hosts change their topological location Multi-homed hosts present at many locations In an IP based m&m solution Transport & apps do not see address changes or multiple addresses

Rendezvous Initial rendezvous How to find a moving end-point? Can be based on directories Requires fast directory updates Bad match for DNS Tackling double-jump What if both hosts move at same time? Requires rendezvous point

Mobile IP HA MN CN Home Agent (HA) Serves a Home Address Initial reachability Triangular routing Route optimization Tunnels to bypass HA HA as rendezvous point HA MN CN

Multi-addressing dimensions homing end-host multihoming SoHo site multihoming enterprise multihoming moving, multi-homed networks ad hoc networks end-host mobility Moving networks (NEMO) Mobility One host Single subnet Parts of topology All hosts

HIP Mobility & Multi-homing Mobility and multi-homing become duals of each other Mobile host has many addresses over time Multi-homed host has many addresses at the same time Leads to a Virtual Interface Model A host may have real and virtual interfaces Merges the “Home Agent”

Mobility protocol Mobile Corresponding ESP on both directions ESP from MN to CN UPDATE: HITs, new locator(s), sig UPDATE: HITs, RR challenge, sig UPDATE: HITs, RR response, sig ESP on both directions

Presentation outline Introduction: What and why? Background HIP in a Nutshell Mobility and multi-homing (multi-addressing) HIP infrastructure: Hi3 Current status Summary

Key distribution for HIP Depends on application For multi-addressing, self-generated keys Usually keys in the DNS Can use PKI if needed Opportunistic mode supported SSH-like leap-of-faith Accept a new key if it matches a fingerprint DNS server DNS query: A, AAAA, KEY DNS reply: A, AAAA, KEY Client app

Basic HIP rendezvous Rendezvous server Rendezvous registration Server Client I2 R2

HIP registration protocol Server informs client about registrar capability (BE) Client Server Client requests registration I1 R1 + REG_INFO Also update messages (protected) Cancel with zero timeout Authz. Based on local policies I2 + REG_REQUEST R2 + REG_RESPONSE

The infrastructure question HIs originally planned to be stored in the DNS Retrieved simultaneously with IP addresses Does not work if you have only a HIT Question: How to get data based on HIT only? HITs look like 128-bit random numbers Possible answer: DHT based overlay like i3

Distributed Hash Tables Distributed directory for flat data Several different ways to implement Each server maintains a partial map Overlay addresses to direct to the right server Resilience through parallel, unrelated mappings Used to create overlay networks

i3 rendezvous abstraction Trigger inserted by receiver(s) Packets addressed to identifiers i3 routes packet to the receiver(s) send(R, data) Sender Receiver (R) send(ID, data) ID R trigger

Hi3: combining HIP and i3 Developed at Ericsson Research IP Networks Uses i3 overlay for HIP control packets Provides rendezvous for HIP Data packets use plain old IP Cryptographically protected with ESP Only soft or optional state in the network

Hi3 and DHT-based rendezvous i3 overlay based control plane IP-based user plane

Control/data separation i3 overlay based rendezvous infra ID R

Hi3 overlay and IPsec connectivity i3 overlay for signalling (control plane) Routes only HIP control packets e2e ESP for data traffic (user plane) Firewalls/middle boxes opened dynamically Only end-to-end signalling (HIP) Middle boxes “snoop” e2e messages Lots of details to be filled in

An Internet control plane? HIP separates control and data traffic Hi3 routes control traffic through overlay Control and data packets take potentially very different paths Allows telecom-like control … … but does not require it

Benefits for everyone Operators Control, security, resilience, revenue Enterprises Security, resilience, mobility Individual users Security, mobility, ease of use

Benefits to operators More controlled network Data requires HIP handshake first Protection against DoS and DDoS Resilience Integrated multi-homing No single points of failure

Benefits to enterprises More secure firewalls Integrated mobility and multi-access Across IPv4 and IPv6 No single points of failure

Benefits to users DoS and DDoS protection Supports home servers (NAT traversal) Configuration free baseline security (ssh-like leap-of-faith encryption

Presentation outline Introduction: What and why? Background HIP in a Nutshell Mobility and multi-homing (multi-addressing) HIP infrastructure: Hi3 Current status Summary

Current status WG and RG formed at the IETF / IRTF First meetings in Seoul, March 2004 Four known interoperating implementations A number of internet drafts Base specifications start to be mature About a dozen papers published or submitted

Implementation status Four interoperating implementations Ericsson Research Nomadiclab, FreeBSD Helsinki Institute for Information Tech., Linux Boeing Phantom Works, Linux and Windows Sun Labs Grenoble, Solaris Other implementations Indranet (obsolete), DoCoMo US Labs, rumours about other

Evolution of drafts: Early era

Evolution of drafts: Restart

Evolution of drafts: 2005 Architecture Base exchange Mobility & multi-homing HIP WG chartered for experimental RFCs DNS Rendezvous Registration 11

Current status RFCs Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Architecture RFC 4423 RFC queue Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Domain Name System (DNS) Extensions IESG Processing Host Identity Protocol End-Host Mobility and Multihoming with the Host Identity Protocol Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Rendezvous Extension Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Registration Extension Using ESP transport format with HIP Using the Host Identity Protocol with Legacy Applications Internet-Drafts HIP Extensions for the Traversal of Network Address Translators Native Application Programming Interfaces for SHIM APIs

Summary New cryptographic name space IP hosts identified with public keys Integrates security, mobility, multi-homing Evolving into a more generic signalling carrier Four interoperating implementations (total 7?) Base specifications start to be mature http://www.hip4inter.net http://www.tml.hut.fi/~pnr/publications/