Chapter 8: Financial Structure, Transaction Costs, and Asymmetric Information Chapter Objectives Describe how nonfinancial companies meet their external.

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Chapter 8: Financial Structure, Transaction Costs, and Asymmetric Information Chapter Objectives Describe how nonfinancial companies meet their external financing needs. Explain why bonds play a relatively large role in the external financing of U.S. companies. Explain why most external finance is channeled through financial intermediaries. Define transaction costs and explain their importance. Define and describe asymmetric information and its importance. Define and explain adverse selection, moral hazard, and agency problems. Explain why the financial system is heavily regulated.

Trade credit: Credit granted in the course of trade, as when suppliers ship their wares, then bill net 15 or 30, or when customers, like libraries for academic journals, pay for goods or services before they are provided most of those funds ultimately come from loans, bonds, or equity.) Bank loans Stock (Market direct) Bond (direct) 1. The Sources of External Finance

Why are bank and other loans more important sources of external finance than stocks and bonds? Why does indirect finance, via intermediaries, trump direct finance, via markets? Why are most of those loans collateralized? – Collateralized: To pledge some asset, like land or financial securities, for the repayment of a loan Why are loan contracts so complex? Why are only the largest companies able to raise funds directly by selling stocks and bonds? Finally, why are financial systems worldwide one of the most heavily regulated economic sectors?

2. Transaction Costs, Asymmetric Information, and the Free-Rider Problem Minimum efficient scale: The smallest a business can be and still remain efficient and/or profitable Peer-to-peer banking: In this new type of banking, a facilitator links lenders to borrowers, acting more like a securities broker than a bank, e.g. Kiva Key to the success of financial intermediaries – – Ability to keep credit information that they have created a secret – Ability to achieve minimum efficient scale – Expertise (reduction of asymmetric information)

Asymmetric information makes markets less efficient than they otherwise would be – By allowing the party with superior information to take advantage of the party with inferior information Where asymmetric information is high, resources are not put to their most highly valued uses Stock Options 2. Transaction Costs, Asymmetric Information, and the Free-Rider Problem

Key Takeaways Transaction costs, asymmetric information, and the free-rider problem explain why most external finance is channeled through intermediaries. Most individuals do not control enough funds to invest profitably given the fact that fixed costs are high and variable costs low in most areas of finance. In other words, it costs almost as much to buy 10 shares as it does to buy 10,000. Also, individuals do not engage in enough transactions to be proficient or expert at it. Financial intermediaries, by contrast, achieve minimum efficient scale and become quite expert at what they do, though they remain far from perfect. Transaction costs are any and all costs associated with completing an exchange.

2. Transaction Costs, Asymmetric Information, and the Free-Rider Problem Key Takeaways Transaction costs include, but are not limited to, broker commissions; dealer spreads; bank fees; legal fees; search, selection, and monitoring costs; and the opportunity cost of time devoted to investment-related activities. They are important because they detract from bottom-line profits, eliminating or greatly reducing them in the case of individuals and firms that have not achieved minimum efficient scale. Transaction costs are one reason why institutional intermediaries dominate external finance.

3. Adverse Selection Adverse selection applies to a wide variety of markets and products, including financial ones – Adverse selection afflicts the market for insurance Financial facilitators and intermediaries seek to profit by reducing adverse selection – By screening – By private production and sale of information

Any behavior where a party takes more than his or her fair share of the benefits, or does not pay his or her fair share of the costs, of some activity Free-rider Problem 3. Adverse Selection

Free-rider problem inherent in markets – Hence financial intermediaries have incentives to create private information about borrowers and people who are insured. Governments can no more legislate away adverse selection than they can end scarcity by decree – They can give markets and intermediaries a helping hand Adverse selection can be reduced by contract with groups instead of individuals.

4. Moral Hazard The main weapon against moral hazard is monitoring - – Restrictive covenants: Clauses in loan contracts that restrict the uses to which borrowed funds can be put and otherwise direct borrower behavior – Align incentives o Collateral o Deductibles, Co-Insurance Efficiencies in monitoring from: – Economies of scale – Specialization

5. Agency Problems Principal-agent problem is an important subcategory of moral hazard that involves postcontractual asymmetric information of a specific type. – Arises when agents do not act in the best interest of the principal (for example, when employees and/or managers steal, slack off, act rudely toward customers, or otherwise cheat the company’s owners)

5. Agency Problems To mitigate the principal-agent problem – Monitoring – Align incentives o Efficiency wages: Wages higher than the equilibrium or market clearing rate o Commissions o Bonuses o Stock options

5. Agency Problems A free-rider problem makes it difficult to coordinate the monitoring activities that keep agents in line. Initial public offering (IPO): Offering of stock to investors with the aid of an investment bank Direct public offering (DPO): Offering of stock to investors without the aid of an investment bank Government regulators try to reduce asymmetric information