A Logic Specification for Usage Control Xinwen Zhang, Jaehong Park Francesco Parisi-Presicce, Ravi Sandhu George Mason University SACMAT 2004.

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Presentation transcript:

A Logic Specification for Usage Control Xinwen Zhang, Jaehong Park Francesco Parisi-Presicce, Ravi Sandhu George Mason University SACMAT 2004

2 Outline Introduction of UCON Temporal Logic of Action (TLA) Logic Model for UCON with TLA Specification of Authorization Core Models Obligations and Conditions Conclusions and Future Work

3 UCON A unified framework for next generation access control A comprehensive model to represent the underlying mechanism of existing access control models and policies. Try to extend the limits of traditional access control models: –Authorization only – No obligation or condition based control –Identity based only – No attributes based support –Decision is made before access – No ongoing control –No consumable rights - No mutable attributes –Rights are pre-defined and granted to subjects

4 UCON UCON provides a general model beyond DRM and Trust management: –Digital Rights Management (DRM) Mainly focus on intellectual property rights protection with architecture and mechanism level studies Lack of access control model –Trust Management Authorization for strangers access based on credentials Lack of an abstract model for attribute-based authorization

5 OM-AM Layered Approach Model examples: Access Matrix, Lattice-based model, Role-base access control model

6 UCON Model Basic components: –Subjects and attributes –Objects and attributes –Rights Logically, UCON is a mapping from a set of {subject/object attributes, right} to {true, false} Usage control decisions are based on authorization, obligations, and conditions. Referred as UCON ABC model

7 Continuity and Mutability of UCON A single usage process has three phases –before access, during usage, and access Continuity: control decision can be checked before or during access Mutability: attribute updates can be performed before, during or after access –Pre-update, on-update, and post-update

8 Core Authorization Models According to the authorization control attribute update points, we have seven core authorization models: –preA 0 : control decision is determined before access, and there is no attribute update. –preA 1 : control decision and and attribute update before access. –preA 3 : control decision is determined before access, and attribute update after access. –onA 0 : control decision is checked and determined during usage, and there is no attribute update. –onA 1 : control decision is checked and determined during usage, and there is attribute update before access. –onA 2 : control decision is checked and determined during usage, and there is attribute update during usage. –onA 3 : control decision is checked and determined during usage, and there is attribute update after usage. A real UCON system may be a hybrid of them.

9 Outline Introduction of UCON Temporal Logic of Action (TLA) Logic Model for UCON with TLA Specification of Authorization Core Models in UCON Obligation and Conditions Conclusions and Future Work

10 Temporal Logic of Action Basic Terms: –Variables: x, y –Values: 5, abc –Constants –A state is an assignment of values to variables Functions: nonboolean expression with variables and constants –Semantically, a function is a mapping from states to values. State Predicates: boolean expression with variables and constants –Semantically, a predicate is a mapping from states to booleans. Actions: boolean expression with variables, primed variables, and constants –Semantically, an action is a function assigning a boolean to a pair of states (s,t), where s is the old state with variables, and t is the new state with primed variables.

11 TLA Behavior: a sequence of states Semantics of an action A: Temporal operator: (always) Temporal Formula: Semantics:

12 TLA Other temporal operators: –Eventually: –Next: –Until: Past temporal operators: –Has-always-been, Once, Previous, Since

13 Outline Introduction of UCON Temporal Logic of Action (TLA) Logic Model for UCON with TLA Specification of Authorization Core Models in UCON Obligation and Conditions Conclusions and Future Work

14 Logical Model of UCON: States and Attributes A state of UCON is an assignment of values to attributes: –Subject attributes: role, security clearance, credit amount, etc. –Object attributes: type, directory, etc. –System attributes: time, location, etc. –A special system attribute: state(s,o,r)={initial, requesting, denied, accessing, revoked, end} To specify the status of a single access process (s,o,r) Authorization actions defined to change this state.

15 Logical Model of UCON: Predicates Predicates: boolean expression built from subject attributes, object attributes, and system attributes. –Mapping a state to True/False –Unary predicates: Alice.credit > $1000, file1.classification = secure –Binary predicates: Dominate(Alice.clearance, file1.classification) in((Bob, read), file2.ACL) –Ternary predicate permit(s,o,r): Specify usage control decisions True if a s is allowed to access o with r.

16 Logic Model of UCON: Actions Two types of actions: –Actions performed by a subject –Actions performed by the system state(s,o,r) transition with actions:

17 Logic Model of UCON

18 Logical Model of UCON Semantics:

19 Outline Introduction of UCON Temporal Logic of Action (TLA) Logic Model for UCON with TLA Specification of Authorization Core Models Obligation and Conditions Conclusions and Future Work

20 Specification of Core Models preA 0 : Example 2: BLP model Example 3: DAC with ACL

21 Specification of Core Models preA 1 : Example 4: DRM pay-per-use application

22 Specification of Core Models preA 3 :

23 Specification of Core Models onA 0 : Example 6:

24 Specification of Core Models onA 1 : onA 2 : onA 3 :

25 Specification: an Example Example 7: Resource-constrained access control –Limited number (10) of ongoing accessing for a single object –Object attribute: –When 11 th subject requesting new access, one ongoing accessing will be revoked. a. the earliest usage will be revoked. Subject attribute: startTime

26 Specification: an Example b. revocation by longest idle usage Subject attributes: state, idleTime

27 Specification: an Example c. revocation by longest total usage Subject attribute: usageTime

28 Outline Introduction of UCON Temporal Logic of Action (TLA) Logic Model for UCON with TLA Specification of Authorization Core Models Obligation and Conditions Conclusions and Future Work

29 Obligations Two types of obligations in UCON: –pre-obligations, which must have been performed before access. –ongoing-obligations, which must be performed during usage.

30 Obligations Example: click license agreement before making order:

31 Conditions Conditions are environment restrictions before or during usage. In UCON, a condition is a predicate built from system attributes, such as time and location. Example:

32 Outline Introduction of UCON Temporal Logic of Action (TLA) Logic Model for UCON with TLA Specification of Authorization Core Models Obligation and Conditions Conclusions and Future Work

33 Conclusions A logical model for UCON with: –States with: subject attributes and values Object attributes and values System attribute and values –Predicates: Authorization predicates built from subject and object attributes Condition predicates built from system attributes –Actions: Attribute update actions Usage control actions Obligation actions –Temporal formulas of usage control policies First-order logic specification of the UCON models with new features of: –Mutability –Continuality

34 Future Work UCON: –Enrich UCON model, such as constraints, delegations –Administrative UCON model Attribute management Administrative policies –Expressive power and safety analysis for UCON –Concurrency of UCON Development of architecture and mechanism for UCON system –DRM technologies –Trusted computing technologies