School of Policy Studies1 Did the protectionist dog bark? Transparency, accountability, and the WTO during the global crisis Robert Wolfe WTO Public Forum September 16, 2010

School of Policy Studies 2 Accountability in this project Ask: who is accountable to whom; about what; through what processes; in accordance with what criteria; and with what effects? Not simply “abuse of power”  Closing the gap between what is committed or promised, and what is actually accomplished  How do we observe accountability, and what can it explain?

School of Policy Studies 3 Why a dog? Gregory: "Is there any other point to which you would wish to draw my attention?" Holmes: "To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time." Gregory: "The dog did nothing in the night-time." Holmes: "That was the curious incident." - Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze (1892)

School of Policy Studies 6 WTO Members accountable for what? 1. WTO regime obligations? 2. G20 London summit commitments?  How would you assess?

School of Policy Studies 7 Three questions 1. Were G20 Members accountable?  refraining from new barriers, export restrictions, or WTO- inconsistent measures;  minimizing negative impact on trade and investment of stimulus measures;  notifying promptly  International organizations to monitor and report 2. Did civil society contribute to accountability?  drawing attention to data WTO missed, or  providing robust alternative interpretations of data 3. Has the response to the crisis been “protectionist”?  What is the evidence?  How should it be interpreted?

School of Policy Studies 8 Notifying promptly Lots of notification, but some G20 Members seem to have been recalcitrant Good cooperation in “verification” of third- party data TPRB has been monitoring the results Secretariat publishes the reports

School of Policy Studies 9 Refrain from new barriers, export restrictions, or WTO-inconsistent measures tariff increases, but not above binding services changes in direction of openness new AD investigations declined from 193 in 2008 to 152 in 2009 new CVD and safeguard investigations increased  historic high of 30 CVD in 2009  from average of 14 a year to 28 for safeguards  Using legal flexibilities in Agreements not “protectionism”

School of Policy Studies 10 Minimize negative impact? Share of trade covered by G20 import-restricting measures, %

School of Policy Studies 11 The story so far Answers for for first set of questions seems positive on basis of r eports prepared by international organizations dominated by G20 They would say that…

School of Policy Studies 12 Broken Promises? Global Trade Alert (GTA) said  “The protectionist juggernaut continues”  “The serial violation of the G20 pledge”  “The harm done by discriminatory state measures is widespread” Press release:“sky is falling” vs “mostly sunny, with scattered clouds”

School of Policy Studies 13 Did civil society contribute more data? Initiation of AD investigation, one tariff change, and huge subsidy = “measure” WTO found more measures, for most G20 Members

School of Policy Studies 14 State aid/bailout comparison GTA database has measures from 44 countries, plus the EC. WTO has measures from 71 countries, plus the EC. All G20 countries appear in both  six do not appear on the GTA list  one does not appear on the WTO list

School of Policy Studies 15 Robust alternative interpretations? No clarity on how measures categorized or discrimination assessed  e.g. migration Aggregation of unlike measures of varying significance in disparate sectors has no economic basis Tariff lines or trading partners likely to be affected is no substitute for economic analysis of the amount of commerce affected

School of Policy Studies 16 The protectionist dog did not bark 1. What is the evidence? a. No long time series of “measures” but number does not seem far off trend b. Social and economic factors that create pressures to favour “us” at the expense of “them” always present c. Impact seems slight 2. How should accountability be interpreted? a. Institutions seem to be moderating the effects, as intended b. Transparency may be helping to reinforce regime norms, closing the gap

School of Policy Studies 17 What do we learn from the curious incident? Ad hoc notification can work Notification has been uneven  WTO should tell us more about the recalcitrants  But verification of third party data may be better than first party notification in some cases (e.g. subsidies) GTA online database is great  WTO should emulate Civil society organizations should supplement official sources  GTA should probe for gaps; offer alternative interpretations More analysis needed of things that don’t look like traditional trade measures