Chapter 8 The Internal Organization of the Firm. Copyright © 2001 Addison Wesley LongmanSlide 8- 2 Figure 8.1 The Bowl-Contracting Game.

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Presentation transcript:

Chapter 8 The Internal Organization of the Firm

Copyright © 2001 Addison Wesley LongmanSlide 8- 2 Figure 8.1 The Bowl-Contracting Game

Copyright © 2001 Addison Wesley LongmanSlide 8- 3 Figure 8.2(a)

Copyright © 2001 Addison Wesley LongmanSlide 8- 4 Figure 8.2(b)

Copyright © 2001 Addison Wesley LongmanSlide 8- 5 Figure 8.3 The Mean Effort Levels in an Experiment Involving Economic Tournaments

Copyright © 2001 Addison Wesley LongmanSlide 8- 6 Figure 8.4 The Mean Effort Levels in an Experiment on Economic Tournaments with a Different Equilibrium Level

Copyright © 2001 Addison Wesley LongmanSlide 8- 7 Figure 8.5 Mean Effort Levels Where Disadvantaged Member Dropped Out

Copyright © 2001 Addison Wesley LongmanSlide 8- 8 Figure 8.6 Firms Average Desired Effort in the Two- and Three-Stage Treatment

Copyright © 2001 Addison Wesley LongmanSlide 8- 9 Figure 8.7 Workers Average Actual Effort in the Two- and Three-Stage Treatment

Copyright © 2001 Addison Wesley LongmanSlide Figure 8.8 Workers Average Actual Effort Given Firms Offered Rents