Defendant was convicted, following a bench trial in the trial court, of driving under the influence of drugs (DUI) and failure to maintain lane. He appealed. In general, searches are of two types: those conducted with a search warrant or those undertaken without one, and searches conducted outside the judicial process are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.

A well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement in the context of a state-administered blood test is the presence of exigent circumstances. In the context of a blood draw on a charge of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), a valid consent to a search eliminates the need for either probable cause or a search warrant.

Natural metabolization of alcohol in a person's bloodstream does not per se constitute an exigency justifying an exception to the Fourth Amendment's search warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in driving under the influence ( DUI) cases; overruling Strong v. State, 231 Ga. 514, 202 SE2d 428Strong v. State, 231 Ga. 514, 202 SE2d 428

Mere compliance with statutory implied consent requirements for state-administered blood test following arrest for driving under the influence of drugs ( DUI) did not, per se, equate to actual, and therefore voluntary, consent on part of suspect so as to fall within exception to constitutional mandate of search warrant.

When relying on the consent exception to the warrant requirement for state-administered blood testing, the state has the burden of proving that the accused acted freely and voluntarily under the totality of the circumstances.

As noted, it is uncontroverted that Williams submitted to the blood test after the police officer read him the implied consent notice for suspects age 21 or over. However, in Cooper v. State, supra, this Court plainly distinguished compliance with the implied consent statute from the constitutional question of whether a suspect gave actual consent for the state-administered testing. We emphasized such remaining question in regard to the validity of the consent, confirming that “[w]hen relying on the consent exception to the warrant requirement, the State has the burden of proving that the accused acted freely and voluntarily under the totality of the circumstances.”

And, it can certainly be argued that the need for the State to demonstrate actual consent for the purpose of exception to the warrant requirement and its constitutional implications is reinforced by the analysis of the United States Supreme Court in McNeely… The facts of McNeely did not lend themselves to the Supreme Court expressly addressing the issue of a suspect's consent to the testing of bodily fluids as satisfying Fourth Amendment concerns because the defendant in that case refused to consent to a blood test…

…however, a plurality of the Court was plainly rejecting a per se rule for sustaining an exception to the Fourth Amendment's requirement of a search warrant in favor of a case-by-case assessment based on the totality of the circumstances, albeit in the narrow context of exigency… OCGA § 40–5–55OCGA § 40–5–55 provides in relevant part: (a) The State of Georgia considers that any person who drives or is in actual physical control of any moving vehicle in violation of any provision of Code Section 40– 6–391 constitutes a direct and immediate threat to the welfare and safety of the general public….Code Section 40– 6–391

Therefore, any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the highways or elsewhere throughout this state shall be deemed to have given consent, subject to Code Section 40–6–392, to a chemical test or tests of his or her blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substances for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol or any other drug, if arrested for any offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed in violation of Code Section 40–6–391…Code Section 40–6–392Code Section 40–6–391

In considering Williams's motion to suppress, the state court failed to address whether Williams gave actual consent to the procuring and testing of his blood, which would require the determination of the voluntariness of the consent under the totality of the circumstances. Consequently, the judgments of the state court are vacated and the case is remanded to that court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Judgments vacated and case remanded with direction. All the Justices concur.

First, it is important for officers to consider what Williams DOES NOT mean. Simply put, Williams did not : (1) invalidate Georgia’s Implied Consent statutes; (2) overrule any existing case law concerning Implied Consent; (3) authorize officers to stop giving the Implied Consent warning to DUI suspects; (4) hold that the Implied Consent notice is inherently threatening or coercive; or (5) hold that submission to testing after the Implied Consent warning is read cannot be “actual consent” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.

Properly understood, Williams simply clarified that officers in the field must do two things to obtain consent to state-administered chemical testing: (1) observe the requirements of the Implied Consent statute, and (2) ensure that suspects consenting to chemical testing do so freely, voluntarily, and without unconstitutional coercion. As illustrated by several of the cases cited by Williams (see People v. Harris, 234 Cal. App. 4th 671 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2015); State v. Padley, 354 Wis.2d 545 (Wis. App. 2014); State v. Moore, 354 Ore. 493 (Ore. 2013); and State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563 (Minn. 2013)), this is not as difficult as it first sounds. In fact, few—if any—changes to existing law enforcement prac-tices are necessary.

However, Williams DOES require officers to pay more attention to the circumstances and conditions under which a suspect consents to testing. This is because Williams, like other cases involving the Fourth Amendment, requires judges to consider the “totality of the circumstances” within which a DUI suspect agrees to be tested in order to determine whether they did so freely, voluntarily, and without improperly coercive police procedures. Officers who carefully in-corporate the details of those circumstances into their reports (and record a suspect’s consent, where possible) will put their prosecutors in the best position to establish the voluntariness of the defendant’s consent.

Williams requires trial courts to determine whether a suspect’s consent to chemical testing was given freely and voluntarily as required by the Fourth Amendment. This determination is made based upon “the totality of the circumstances,” which includes the circumstances under which consent was given, the characteristics of the defendant, and the nature of the conversation between the suspect and officers (i.e., what was said and how it was said). Furthermore, voluntary consent cannot exist where there is coercion by threats or by force, or where it is given only in submission to a claim of lawful authority.

Therefore, DUI incident reports should include detailed accounts of the events leading up to a suspect’s decision to allow state-administered chemical testing of their bodily substances. In particular, officers should record occurrences— regardless of how minor they might seem—that demonstrate that when Implied Consent was read, the suspect’s decision to consent resulted from:

(1) an environment that allowed free choice; (2) the suspect’s ability to make a meaningful choice; (3) an exchange with police that was as polite and calm as the situation permitted; (4) the officer’s provision of accurate information to the suspect; and (5) the absence of improper and/or coercive police practices designed to overcome the suspect’s resistance. Officers who articulate such details will allow judges to find “actual consent.”

Officers should keep in mind that the decision to seek a search warrant should be based upon the evidence in the case, and not because a suspect chose not to consent. Under no circumstances should an officer use his or her ability to apply for a warrant as a means to influence a suspect’s decision.

Finally, law enforcement agencies should, in conjunction with their elected prosecutor, formulate a plan for those cases where a suspect’s ability to give actual consent is questionable, such as when a suspect is unconscious or does not speak English. Generally, in such cases, officers should either forego a sample, seek a warrant, or—IN VERY RARE CASES—consider whether exi-gent circumstances permit collection of a sample without a warrant.