Disciplining or Signaling? The Uses of Targets in UK Immigration and Asylum Policy Christina Boswell School of Social and Political Science University of Edinburgh

PSAs and targets, Selection of targets and performance indicators (PIs): -Improve public service delivery (disciplining) -Demonstrate action to address problems (signaling)  ‘Boundary objects’ -Technical criteria: measurable, outcome-oriented, susceptible to steering

Home Office 2000 PSA Strategic objectives: “regulation of entry to, and settlement in, the UK in the interests of social stability and economic growth; the facilitation of travel by UK citizens; the support of destitute asylum seekers during consideration of their claims; and the integration of those accepted as refugees.” Performance targets: By 2004, 75% of asylum applications decided within 2 months Remove greater proportion of failed asylum seekers (2002 SDA added target on detention capacity) Explaining the disparity? Technical criteria, disciplining, or signaling?

Removals 2002 SDA: increase the number of removals to 30,000 by March : Failure to meet target HoC Home Affairs Committee: “We are at a loss to understand the basis for the belief that a target of 30,000 removals a year was achievable, and ministerial pronouncements on the subject are obscure. It is surely not too much to expect that, if it is thought necessary to set targets for removals, they should be rational and achievable” Target decoupled from thorough/realistic organisational assessment?

Asylum applications Blair, Newsnight 2003 pledge: - halve asylum seeker numbers within a year 2004 PSA target: - “reduce unfounded asylum claims” 2004 Autumn Performance Report: New asylum applications fallen 65% since peak in Oct Defined as “performance against targets”. Year-on-year reduction, But: through factors HO couldn’t control? Plus: selection of target highly political, “top-down”

2007 PSA Focus on border control “Securing our borders, preventing abuse of our immigration laws and managing migration to boost the UK” New areas covered: -Identity management, tracking passengers -Reduce vacancy rate in shortage occupations Reduction in number of targets One target: swifter processing of asylum applications

Analysis Coincidence of target zeal/asylum “crisis”  Target as instrument to signal Labour was disciplining -Importance (esp for Labour) of demonstrating control, in context emphasising measurement of outcomes Risks: -Pressure to adopt modish concepts of measurement/performance -Lure of responding to populist construction of problem -Limitations to disciplining/steering capacity

Wider Implications I Understanding immigration policy-making Target audience: -Political, not technical  populist target Mode of legitimation: -Most areas of immigration policy: symbolic -Targets: create opportunity for measurement Taken together: -Targets mobilise political support/trust through signaling discipline -BUT: Signaling remains paramount; meeting of target almost incidental?

Wider Implications II Political rationality and timing When and how do policymakers expect to reap dividends of targets? Announcement of the target? Realisation of the target? What explains preoccupation with the former in the area of immigration? ‘Permanent campaign’ Response to problem of trust Dynamic of political competition Political insecurity