1 Beyond Goldwater-Nichols -- Legislation in Response to Strategic Security James R. Locher III October 16, 2002

2 More Than an Intellectual Challenge Reformers have the idea that change can be achieved by brute sanity. -- George Bernard Shaw

3 National Security Council problem: still defined by post-World War II concept of national security –diplomacy, military, and intelligence four statutory members –president, vice president, secretary of state, secretary of defense two statutory advisers –chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, director of central intelligence

4 All Instruments of U.S. Power “ How will we fight and win this war? We will direct every resource at our command -- every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war -- to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network.” President George W. Bush, Address to Congress, September 20, 2001

5 National Security Council by statute, add three new members –Secretary of the Treasury –Attorney General –Secretary of Homeland Security highlight their national security responsibilities begin changes to culture

6 Combating Terrorism problem: combating terrorism is now bifurcated National Security Council –counterterrorism -- overseas and domestic –intelligence support for counterterrorism –antiterrorism -- overseas –consequence management -- overseas Homeland Security Council –antiterrorism -- domestic –consequence management -- domestic

7 Combating Terrorism second problem: unnecessary duplication –Department of Homeland Security and Office of Homeland Security course of action –add Secretary of Homeland Security to National Security Council –eliminate Homeland Security Council and Office of Homeland Security

8 Interagency Reform poor unity of effort Joint Staff –“it has been extremely difficult to achieve coordinated interdepartmental planning” Army Training and Doctrine Command –“the diversity of the interagency, with each agency having its own culture, hierarchy, bias, misperceptions, and unique perspectives, makes unity of effort difficult.” –“low technical and procedural interoperability and the absence of a common vision”

9 Interagency Reform problem: imbalance between departmental and national interests –parallels DoD mid-1980s problems addressed by Goldwater-Nichols Act defend departmental turf –“don’t tell them anything” –“don’t let them interfere with our activities” –“don’t let them get any of our money”

10 Interagency Reform departments have little responsibility for the performance and success of the whole –“see it as their first job to defend their function [department], to protect it against marauders in other functions [departments], to make sure ‘it doesn’t get pushed around.’” -- Peter Drucker

11 Interagency Reform different visions different cultures –exercises, contingency plans, rapid-response teams, policy planning no common doctrine different terminology incompatible systems

12 Interagency Reform Congress will offer little legislative help –committee jurisdictions -- major obstacle fix will have to come from executive branch one possibility –interagency study chartered by president –chaired by the vice president –considerable DoD interest

13 Department of Homeland Security: Out of Many, One 170,000 employees 22 agencies 17 different sets of procedures little of unifying the department will be addressed in legislation –focused on structure

14 Organizational Effectiveness SHARED VALUES -- agreed vision, purpose, and principles SYSTEMS -- management processes, procedures, and measurements STRUCTURE -- arrangement of components SKILLS -- core competencies; necessary capabilities and attributes of the organization STAFF -- attributes of personnel; needed qualifications and professional development STYLE -- leadership attitudes and behavior, organization's culture STRATEGY -- plan for achieving objectives

15 Department of Homeland Security: Out of Many, One shared values -- unifying vision systems -- designed to promote integration; emphasis on outcomes skills -- ability to operate cross-department staff -- incentives for service in other elements; education programs style -- culture that highly values unity of effort; high-volume communications

16 Department of Defense: Change-Resistant Culture “Yesterday’s winning formula ossifies into today’s conventional wisdom before petrifying into tomorrow’s tablets of stone.” strategic vulnerability in a world of accelerating change –greatest organizational weakness anticipate and adapt to change change-enabling techniques –strategic visioning -- renewal process

17 Department of Defense: 1960s Management Doctrine outmoded hierarchical authoritarian model bloated bureaucracies ponderous processes input focus uncertain division of labor inattention to civilian personnel management

18 Department of Defense: Revolution in Business Affairs Secretary of Defense Cohen (1997): “bring to the department management techniques and business practices that have restored American corporations to leadership in the marketplace.”

19 Department of Defense: Revolution in Business Affairs –new leadership concept –unifying vision –core functions –information sharing –personnel management –performance goals –cross-functional process teams