Optimally Interconnected Banking Systems Alexander David University of Calgary Alfred Lehar University of Calgary.

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Presentation transcript:

Optimally Interconnected Banking Systems Alexander David University of Calgary Alfred Lehar University of Calgary

Positive Role for Interconnections Critics of the financial system have alleged that banks are too interconnected to fail Large interconnections imply that adverse shock to a bank is rapidly transmitted to entire system, with severe real consequences Cynical View: Interconnections have been created to induce govt. bailouts This Paper: Renegotiations between highly inteconnected banks facilitate mutual private sector bailouts to lower need for govt. bailouts

Examples of Renegotiations 1998: Consortium of banks renegotiate claims to avoid immediate liquidation of LTCM 2007: J.P. Morgan renegotiates claims with Bear Sterns and acquires most of remaining assets 2008: In the absence of govt. payouts to AIG, lower payments would have been made on written derivatives to Goldman, Societe Generale etc.

Renegotiated Interbank Loans We solve for optimal network of interbank loans and other derivatives for joint objective of incentive (to maintain asset quality) and hedging (lower dead weight costs) Optimal contract consists solely of large renegotiated interbank loans. Result robust to alternative bankruptcy and regulatory regimes Systemic risk spillovers and likelihood of financial crises is severely mismeasured if renegotiations not considered

OTCDs Versus Interbank Loans Actual Usage Across countries, BIS estimates that gross credit exposure from derivatives is less than a third of interbank loans Differences across banking systems: 1.For large US banks, the two markets of equivalent size (Federal Reserve Board) 2.For EU countries, interbank exposure substantially larger (European Central Bank) 3.In Canada interbank loan exposure more than 20 times derivatives (Bank of Canada)

Renegotiations Example 1 Three banks (1,2,3) in network Hedging Strategy 1 (CDS): Each Bank receives from each other bank Hedging Strategy 2 (Interbank Loans): Each Bank owes 0.25 to each other bank In the event of liquidation, liquidation costs are 100%

Ex-Post Settlement with CDS E1=1.2 E2=0.95 E3= x(.05)

Ex-Post Settlement with I.Loans E1=1.2 E2=0.95 E3=

Banks N banks in economy. Each bank has asset value The two components are the hedgeable and unhedgeable components of asset value: Derivatives only on hedgeable part Mean of asset value depends on costly effort Bank has deposits of Bank equity:

Interbank Hedging Interbank claims junior to deposits Interbank loans, a, are circular Asset Swaps: bank i pays bank j in return for Credit Default Swaps: bank i pays bank j in return for Netting agreements in place for all hedges

Deposit Insurance Deposit Insurance Premium: if if bank i is liquidated. is the number of banks in economy liquidated For large banking systems, an increase in liquidation correlation will increase the deposit insurance premium

The Bankruptcy Mechanism Clearing Vector: Equity Holder’s Payoff

Bargaining Protocol Game starts with nature choosing a bank to become the first proposer who makes take-it- or-leave-it offers to all its counterparties If offers are accepted, then claims of proposer eliminated and the remaining players bargain over remaining claims If offers are rejected by any counterparty the bankruptcy mechanism is imposed

2 Player Bargaining Efficient liquidation policy for all contracts A bank is liquidated  full interbank payments insufficient  insufficient resources in system Coase Theorem holds

Ex-Post Possible Network Structures

Example of Inefficient Bargaining Bank 1 has 0.8 to give away Bank 2 needs 0.6 to survive leaving 0.2 for bank 3 In bankruptcy bank 3 gets better off by liquidating 1 Failure of Coase Theorem

Renegotiation Breakdowns Renegotiation successful  all parties agree on a settlement  all banks survive Otherwise renegotiations break down Proposition 2: In the two-path structure a necessary condition for a breakdown  at least one bank has negative equity value  bankruptcy cost parameter is not too high Banks will choose hedging contracts to avoid breakdowns

Inoptimality of Interbank Loans without Renegotiation Proposition 3: Without renegotiations interbank loans not optimal Intuition:  Inflexible  Cannot condition payment on state of bank Most existing work on measuring systemic risk use interbank loans and study liquidations without renegotiations

Optimality of Interbank Loans with Renegotiation Proposition 4: With renegotiations and large interbank loans  Liquidations only when aggregate resources insufficient  ex-ante efficient Interbank connections as commitment device to bail out insolvent banks

Interbank Loans versus Swaps Proposition 6: Only hedgeable risk, positive effort costs ( )  Perfect hedging with Large interbank loans dominates asset swaps  Asset quality  Expected profit Intuition: With interbank loans, equity holders are still residual claimants

Optimality of Interbank Loans in Alternative Environments Alternative environments Hedgeable and ungedgeable risk Weak and strong bankruptcy regime  Lower and upper fixed point of the clearing vector  Strong and weak enforcement mechanisms Proposition 7: Banks' ex-ante profits with large pure interbank loans do not depend on the fraction of unhedgeable risk or the bankruptcy regime

Conclusion To maintain incentives and minimize deadweight costs, large renegotiable interbank loans form the best interbank network Renegotiation is a way of ex-post customization of payoffs. Large interconnections are required for commitment to bailouts. Liquidation policy is efficient, but liquidations are highly correlated. Ignoring renegotiations will mis-estimate likelihood of financial crises.

Definitions of Efficiency Ex-post:  minimizes bankruptcy costs  Payments ≤ Contracted payments Ex-Ante  Minimize bankruptcy costs Ex-ante efficient will lead to perfectly correlated liquidations. Liquidations only when

3-Player Bargaining Suppose the two-path structure is realized and bank 3 bids first Bank 3, then takes the max of the payoff from renegotiations And its payoff in bankruptcy