Chapter Thirty-Five Information Technology

Information Technologies  The crucial ideas are:  Complementarity  Network externality

Information Technologies; Complementarity  Definition: Commodity A complements commodity B if more of commodity A increases the value of an extra unit of commodity B.  More software increases the value of a computer.  More roads increase the value of a car.

Information Technologies; Network Externality  Definition: A commodity has a positive (negative) network externality if the utility to a consumer of that commodity increases (decreases) as more people also consume the commodity.  gives more utility to any one user if more other people use .  A highway gives less utility to any one user as more people use it (congestion).

Complementarity  Information technologies have increased greatly the complementarities between commodities.  Computers and operating systems (OS).  DVD players and DVD disks.  WiFi sites and laptop computers.  Cell phones and cell phone towers.

Complementarity  How should a firm behave when it produces a commodity that complements another commodity?  The problem is: When you make more of your product (commodity A) you increase the value of firm B’s product (commodity B). Can you get for yourself some of gain you create for firm B?

Complementarity  An obvious strategy is for firms A and B to cooperate somewhat with each other.  Microsoft releases part of its OS to firms making software that runs under its OS.  DVD manufacturers agree upon a standard format for their disks.

Complementarity  The price of a computer is p C.  The price of the OS is p OS.  The quantities demanded of computers and the OS depends upon p C + p OS, not just p C or just p OS.

Complementarity  The price of a computer is p C.  The price of the OS is p OS.  The quantities demanded of computers and the OS depends upon p C + p OS, not just p C or just p OS.  Suppose the computer and software firms’ marginal production costs are zero. Fixed costs are F C and F OS.

Complementarity  Suppose the firms do not collude.  The computer firm’s problem is: choose p C to maximize p C D(p C + p OS ) – F C.  The OS firm’s problem is: choose p OS to maximize p OS D(p C + p OS ) – F OS.

Complementarity  Suppose the firms do not collude.  The computer firm’s problem is: choose p C to maximize p C D(p C + p OS ) – F C.  The OS firm’s problem is: choose p OS to maximize p OS D(p C + p OS ) – F OS.  Assume D(p C + p OS ) = a – b(p C + p OS ).

Complementarity  The computer firm’s problem is: choose p C to maximize p C (a – b(p C + p OS )) – F C.  The OS firm’s problem is: choose p OS to maximize p OS (a – b(p C + p OS )) – F OS.

Complementarity  Choose p C to maximize p C (a – b(p C + p OS )) – F C  p C = (a – bp OS )/2b. (C)  Choose p OS to maximize p OS (a – b(p C + p OS )) – F OS  p OS = (a – bp C )/2b. (OS)

Complementarity  Choose p C to maximize p C (a – b(p C + p OS )) – F C  p C = (a – bp OS )/2b. (C)  Choose p OS to maximize p OS (a – b(p C + p OS )) – F OS  p OS = (a – bp C )/2b. (OS)  A NE is a pair (p* C,p* OS ) solving (C) and (OS).

Complementarity  Choose p C to maximize p C (a – b(p C + p OS )) – F C  p C = (a – bp OS )/2b. (C)  Choose p OS to maximize p OS (a – b(p C + p OS )) – F OS  p OS = (a – bp C )/2b. (OS)  A NE is a pair (p* C,p* OS ) solving (C) and (OS). p* C = p* OS = a/3b.

Complementarity  p* C = p* OS = a/3b.  When the firms do not cooperate the price of a computer with an OS is p* C + p* OS = 2a/3b and the quantities demanded of computers and OS are q* C + q* OS = a - b×2a/3b = a/3.

Complementarity  What if the firms merge? Then the new firm bundles a computer and an operating system and sells the bundle at a price p B.  The firm’s problem is to choose p B to maximize p B D(p B ) – F B = p B (a – bp B ) – F B.

Complementarity  What if the firms merge? Then the new firm bundles a computer and an operating system and sells the bundle at a price p B.  The firm’s problem is to choose p B to maximize p B D(p B ) – F B = p B (a – bp B ) – F B.  Solution is p* B = a/2b < 2a/3b.

Complementarity  When the firms merge (or fully cooperate) the price of a computer and an OS is p* B = a/2b a/3.

Complementarity  When the firms merge (or fully cooperate) the price of a computer and an OS is p* B = a/2b a/3.  The merged firm supplies more computers and OS at a lower price than do the competing firms. Why?

Complementarity  The noncooperative firms ignore the external benefit (complementarity) each creates for the other. So each undersupplies the market, causing a higher market price.  These externalities are fully internalized in the merged firm, inducing it to supply more computers and OS and thereby cause a lower market price.

Complementarity  More typical cooperation consists of contracts between component manufacturers and an assembler of a final product. Examples are:  Car components and a car assembler.  A computer assembler and manufacturers of CPUs, hard drives, memory chips, etc.

Complementarity  Alternatives include:  Revenue-sharing. Two firms share the revenue from the final product made up from the two firms’ components.  Licensing. Let firms making complements to your product use your technology for a low fee so they make large quantities of complements, thereby increasing the value of your product to consumers.

Information Technologies; Lock-In  Strong complementarities or network externalities make switching from one technology to another very costly. This is called lock-in.  E.g., In the USA, it is costly to switch from speaking English to speaking French.  How do markets operate when there are switching costs or network externalities?

Competition & Switching Costs  Producer’s cost per month of providing a network service is c per customer.  Customer’s switching cost is s.  Producer offers a one month discount, d.  Rate of interest is r.

Competition & Switching Costs  All producers set the same nondiscounted price of p per month.  When is switching producers rational for a customer?

Competition & Switching Costs  Consumer’s cost of not switching is

Competition & Switching Costs  Consumer’s cost of not switching is  Consumer’s cost from switching is

Competition & Switching Costs  Consumer’s cost of not switching is  Consumer’s cost from switching is  Consumer should switch if

Competition & Switching Costs  Consumer’s cost of not switching is  Consumer’s cost from switching is  Consumer should switch if  i.e. if

Competition & Switching Costs  Consumer should switch if  Producer competition will ensure at a market equilibrium that customers are indifferent between switching or not  I.e., the equilibrium value of the discount only just makes it worthwhile for the customer to switch.

Competition & Switching Costs  With d = s, the present-value of the producer’s profits is

Competition & Switching Costs  At equilibrium the present-value of the producer’s profit is zero.  The producer’s price is its marginal cost plus a markup that is a fraction of the consumer’s switching cost.

Competition & Switching Costs  At equilibrium the present-value of the producer’s profit is zero.  The producer’s price is its marginal cost plus a markup that is a fraction of the consumer’s switching cost. If advertising reduces the marginal cost of servicing a consumer by a then

Competition & Switching Costs  At equilibrium the present-value of the producer’s profit is zero.  The producer’s price is its marginal cost plus a markup that is a fraction of the consumer’s switching cost. If advertising reduces the marginal cost of servicing a consumer by a then

Competition & Network Externalities  Individuals 1,…,1000.  Each can buy one unit of a good, providing a network externality.  Person v values a unit of the good at nv, where n is the number of persons who buy the good.

Competition & Network Externalities  Individuals 1,…,1000.  Each can buy one unit of a good providing a network externality.  Person v values a unit of the good at nv, where n is the number of persons who buy the good.  At a price p, what is the quantity demanded of the good?

Competition & Network Externalities  If v is the marginal buyer, valuing the good at nv = p, then all buyers v’ > v value the good more, and so buy it.  Quantity demanded is n = v.  So inverse demand is p = n(1000-n).

Competition & Network Externalities n Willingness-to-pay p = n(1000-n) Demand Curve

Competition & Network Externalities  Suppose all suppliers have the same marginal production cost, c.

Competition & Network Externalities n Demand Curve Supply Curve c Willingness-to-pay p = n(1000-n)

Competition & Network Externalities  What are the market equilibria?

Competition & Network Externalities  What are the market equilibria?  (a) No buyer buys, no seller supplies.  If n = 0, then value nv = 0 for all buyers v, so no buyer buys.  If no buyer buys, then no seller supplies.

Competition & Network Externalities n Demand Curve Supply Curve c Willingness-to-pay p = n(1000-n) (a)

Competition & Network Externalities n Demand Curve Supply Curve n’ c Willingness-to-pay p = n(1000-n) (a)

Competition & Network Externalities  What are the market equilibria?  (b) A small number, n’, of buyers buy.  small n’  small network externality value n’v  good is bought only by buyers with n’v  c; i.e., only large v  v’ = c/n’.

Competition & Network Externalities n Demand Curve Supply Curve n’ (b) n” (c) (a) c Willingness-to-pay p = n(1000-n)

Competition & Network Externalities  What are the market equilibria?  (c) A large number, n”, of buyers buy.  Large n”  large network externality value n”v  good is bought only by buyers with n’v  c; i.e., up to small v  v” = c/n”.

Competition & Network Externalities n Demand Curve Supply Curve n’ (b) n” (c) c Which equilibrium is likely to occur? Willingness-to-pay p = n(1000-n) (a)

Competition & Network Externalities  Suppose the market expands whenever willingness- to-pay exceeds marginal production cost, c.

Competition & Network Externalities n Demand Curve Supply Curve n’n” c Which equilibrium is likely to occur? Willingness-to-pay p = n(1000-n)

Competition & Network Externalities n Demand Curve Supply Curve n’n” c Which equilibrium is likely to occur? Willingness-to-pay p = n(1000-n) Unstable

Competition & Network Externalities n Demand Curve Supply Curve n” c Which equilibrium is likely to occur? Willingness-to-pay p = n(1000-n) Stable

Information  Essentially, anything that can be digitized is information.  Information Goods: books, database, magazines, movies, music, web pages.

Cost of producing information  Information is costly to produce but cheap to reproduce.  In economics terms, production of an information good involves high fixed cost but low marginal cost.  Therefore, we price information according to its value, not its cost.

Managing Intellectual Property  Since an information good can be reproduced cheaply, others can copy it cheaply.  Intellectual property is very important, but enforcement is an issue. e.g., patent, copyright, trademark  When managing IP, the goal should be to choose the terms and conditions that maximize the value of the IP, not the ones that maximize the protection.

Information as an “Experience Good”  A good is an experience good if consumers must experience it to value it.  Information is an experience good every time it’s consumed.  How do you know today’s Wall Street Journal is worth $1?  Most media producers overcome the experience the experience good problem through branding and reputation.

Information as an “Experience Good” (Cont’d)  The brand name of the wall Street Journal is one of its chief asset, and the Journal heavily in building a reputation for accuracy, timeliness, and relevance.  The Journal’s online edition carries over the look and feel of the print version  extending the same authority, brand identity, and customer loyalty from the print product to the on-line product.

Rights Management  Should a good be  sold outright,  licensed for production by others, or  rented?  How is the ownership right of the good to be managed?

Rights Management  Suppose production costs are negligible.  Market demand is p(y).  The firm wishes to

Rights Management

 The rights owner now allows a free trial period. This causes  a consumption increase;

Rights Management  The rights owner now allows a free trial period. This causes  a consumption increase;  lower sales per consumption unit

Rights Management  The rights owner now allows a free trial period. This causes  a consumption increase;  lower sales per consumption unit  increase in value to all users  increase in willingness-to- pay;

Rights Management

 The firm’s problem is now to

Rights Management  The firm’s problem is now to  This problem must have the same solution as

Rights Management  The firm’s problem is now to  This problem must have the same solution as  So

Rights Management

 higher profit

Rights Management  lower profit

Sharing Intellectual Property  Produce a lot for direct sales, or only a little for multiple rentals?  Sell a tool, or rent it?  Allow a movie to be shown only at a theatre, or sell only to video rental stores, or sell only by pay-per-view, or sell DVDs in retail stores?  When is selling for rental more profitable than selling for personal use only?

Sharing Intellectual Property  F is the fixed cost of designing the good.  c is the constant marginal cost of copying the good.  p(y) is the market demand.  Direct sales problem is to

Sharing Intellectual Property  F is the fixed cost of designing the good.  c is the constant marginal cost of copying the good.  p(y) is the market demand.  Direct sales problem is to

Sharing Intellectual Property  Is selling for rental more profitable?  Each rental unit is used by k > 1 consumers.  So y units sold  x = ky consumption units.

Sharing Intellectual Property  Is selling for rental more profitable?  Each rental unit is used by k > 1 consumers.  So y units sold  x = ky consumption units.  Marginal consumer’s willingness-to-pay is p(x) = p(ky).

Sharing Intellectual Property  Is selling for rental more profitable?  Each rental unit used by k > 1 consumers.  So y units sold  x = ky consumption units.  Marginal consumer’s willingness-to-pay is p(x) = p(ky).  Rental transaction cost t reduces willingness-to-pay to p(ky) - t.

Sharing Intellectual Property  Rental transaction cost t reduces willingness-to-pay to p(ky) - t.  Rental store’s willingness-to-pay is

Sharing Intellectual Property  Rental transaction cost t reduces willingness-to-pay to p(ky) - t.  Rental store’s willingness-to-pay is  Producer’s sale-for-rental problem is

Sharing Intellectual Property  Rental transaction cost t reduces willingness-to-pay to p(ky) - t.  Rental store’s willingness-to-pay is  Producer’s sale-for-rental problem is

Sharing Intellectual Property  Rental transaction cost t reduces willingness-to-pay to p(ky) - t.  Rental store’s willingness-to-pay is  Producer’s sale-for-rental problem is

Sharing Intellectual Property This is the same as the direct sale problem except for the marginal cost.

Sharing Intellectual Property This is the same as the direct sale problem except for the marginal cost. Direct sale is better for the producer if

Sharing Intellectual Property  Direct sale is better for the producer if  i.e. if

Sharing Intellectual Property  Direct sale is better for the producer if  Direct sale is better if  replication cost c is low  rental transaction cost t is high  rentals per item, k, is small.