Hardware Support for Trustworthy Systems Ted Huffmire ACACES 2012 Fiuggi, Italy.

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Presentation transcript:

Hardware Support for Trustworthy Systems Ted Huffmire ACACES 2012 Fiuggi, Italy

Disclaimer The views presented in this course are those of the speaker and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Department of Defense.

About Me Assistant Professor of CS at NPS Research –Computer Architecture, Computer Security –Fast and Secure –Hardware-Oriented Security

Course Overview Lecture 1: Overview: Hardware-Oriented Security and Security Engineering Lecture 2: Reconfigurable Security Primitives Lecture 3: Apply Primitives to Memory Protection, Design Example Lecture 4: Forward-Looking Problems

Lecture 1 Overview Hardware-Oriented Security Security Engineering

Hardware-Oriented Security Security Engineering

What is Hardware Security? Many of the issues of hardware security are similar to traditional computer security Anything can be hacked, but the attacker has finite resources. Each security technique has tradeoffs.

What is Hardware Security? Foundry Trust Intellectual Property Operational Attacks Developmental Attacks System Assurance

What is Hardware Security? Interfaces Composition Metrics Education

Problems Global Supply Chain of Integrated Circuits System Assurance

Confronting Security at the Hardware Level Opportunities of the hardware level Challenges of the hardware level

A Brief Word About ‘Cyber’ Beware of propaganda Think critically

Security Engineering Hardware-Oriented Security Security Engineering

Defending against skilled attackers is hard Holistic view of entire system Use the scientific method Every security technique has tradeoffs

Security Engineering Assume the enemy will be in your networks Increase the risk and cost for the adversary

Security Engineering Do not rely on security through obscurity Principle of least privilege Minimize system complexity

Security Engineering Reference monitor concept Separation (of duties and system components)

Security Engineering Penetrate & patch vs. inherently trustworthy Platform diversity Checklists and hardening guides

Security Engineering Study past success Secure defaults Backups, recovery, and rollback

Security Engineering Important Considerations Approaches to Security Engineering

Rigorous Design Practices Configuration management of tools/IP Eliminate support for insecure legacy technology Default configuration disables unnecessary services

Rigorous Design Practices Only develop the features needed Debugging messages not in production code Error messages that don’t reveal information

Rigorous Design Practices Secure coding practices Use of formal security analysis and evaluation Covert channel analysis Side channel analysis

Rigorous Design Practices Protocol analysis Robust protocols and authentication schemes Is the implementation faithful to the spec? Manage complexity. Reference monitor concept.

Self-protection Do not expose critical security functions to attack from other circuitry. Examples

Layered Dependencies Security-critical circuitry must not depend on circuitry of lesser trustworthiness In trusted software stack, applications depend on OS libraries, which depend on secure kernel

Lecture 1 Reading Secure Design – Reflections on Trusting Trust – The Protection of Information in Computer Systems on.pdf – Design Principles for Security (NPS Technical Report) f

Lecture 1 Reading Secure Design – Design and verification of secure systems – Shared Resource Matrix Methodology: An Approach to Identifying Storage and Timing Channels – On the Buzzword ‘Security Policy’

Lecture 1 Reading Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust – Trustworthy Hardware: Identifying and Classifying Hardware Trojans – Security Engineering – Micro-Architectural Cryptanalysis – Physical Unclonable Functions for Device Authentication and Secret Key Generation

Lecture 1 Reading Physical Attacks – Temperature Attacks 64 – Information Leakage from Optical Emanations – Differential Power Analysis – Keyboard Acoustic Emanations 11

Lecture 1 Reading trust-HUB.org – Introduction to Hardware Security and Trust – Towards Hardware-Intrinsic Security –