DNSSEC in Windows Server. DNS Server changes Provide DNSSEC support in the DNS server – Changes should allow federal agencies to comply with SC-20 and.

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Presentation transcript:

DNSSEC in Windows Server

DNS Server changes Provide DNSSEC support in the DNS server – Changes should allow federal agencies to comply with SC-20 and SC-21 security controls proposed in NIST – DNS servers support signed DNS records and return the signatures in response to queries (SC-20) – DNS servers support recursive resolvers that authenticate and check integrity of secure records (SC- 21)

DNS Server changes Highlights – Implement core RFCs 4033, 4034, 4035 – Support for RRSIG, NSEC, DNSKEY, DS – Tool for signing DNS zone files. – Enable verification of chain of trust – Authentication and Integrity check of records – Enable support for trust anchors – Policy to return only secure records to clients. – Other policies under consideration.

Our plans Planning currently in progress Beta: middle of 2007 RTM: late 2007 or early 2008 – General availability by first service pack of Longhorn Server.