June 21, 2004Washington DC1 Cooperation in the International Space Station Program: Some Lessons for the Future Ian Pryke Senior Fellow Center for Aerospace Policy Research School of Public Policy George Mason University Symposium on “Space Exploration and International Cooperation”

June 21, 2004Washington DC2 Acknowledgement This presentation is based on a paper entitled “Structuring Future International Cooperation: Learning from the ISS”, authored by: - Lynn Cline [NASA] - Peggy Finarelli [ISU] - Graham Gibbs [CSA] - Ian Pryke [then ESA] and originally presented at the International Space University’s June 2002 Symposium “Beyond the International Space Station: The Future of Human Spaceflight”.

June 21, 2004Washington DC3 International Space Station [ISS] The ISS is often referred to as: “The largest, most complex, international scientific and technological co-operation ever undertaken.” As such, it can offer numerous lessons that can be applied in the structuring of future large scale international co-operative space endeavors.

June 21, 2004Washington DC4 Lesson #1: “It is possible to craft a large complex international space cooperation that is multiple decades in duration.” 1984 (January) 1988 (September) (March) 1993 (December) 1998 (January) 1998 (December) 2000 (December) 2003 (January) 2005 (March/April) 2010 (?) 2010 (?) - ??? President Reagan’s State of the Union Address Original IGA / MoUs signed [Freedom] Originally planned on-orbit date Space Station Redesign initiated Russia invited to join the Partnership Renegotiated IGA / MoUs signed [ISS] First Station element launched Permanent occupancy of Station initiated Loss of Challenger –Station Assembly hiatus –Access limited to Russian vehicles –Crew size limited to two Current schedule for Shuttle return to flight Planned completion of Station assembly Utilization of Station

June 21, 2004Washington DC5 Lesson #2: “Long-term Partnerships must be structured so that they can evolve over time if required.” The Original Partnership: The Invitation NASA to develop a permanently manned Space Station and do it within a decade. NASA to “invite other countries to participate so that we can strengthen peace, build prosperity and expand freedom for all who share our goals” “The Friends and Allies”: Canada Europe [Through the European Space Agency] Japan “The Evil Empire”: USSR

June 21, 2004Washington DC6 Lesson #2: “Long-term Partnerships must be structured so that they can evolve over time if required.” The Enlarged Partnership; Originally: US to build “a fully functional space station”. Partners contributions to ”enhance capability” but not be on the critical path. Canadian waiver granted by US. Bringing in the Russians as a full Partner: Required extensive re-negotiation of agreements Opened critical path to all non-US Partners. Bringing in the Italians [in parallel to their ESA involvement] and the Brazilians. Mechanism was foreseen - Participants. “Genuine Partnership”: Each partner dependent on the performance of other partners.

June 21, 2004Washington DC7 Lesson #3: “Partners will have different motivations for getting involved in a program and these motivations can evolve.” United States: Originally “Cold War Politics” Post Cold War - Russian Engagement US budgetary threats encouraged Russian involvement Resulted in re-evaluation of “Partnership” Canada: Originally “Foreseen Economic Return” ‘94 - Budget deficit led to reappraisal of involvement Japan: Interest in developing HSF capabilities High political priority of conducting space program with international cooperation “Missed the boat” on Shuttle

June 21, 2004Washington DC8 Lesson #3: “Partners will have different motivations for getting involved in a program and these motivations can evolve.” Europe: European desire for a degree of autonomy in HSF Amortize SPACELAB investment HERMES / MTFF cancellation ISS involvement currently sole European MSF programme Russia: Post cold war space co-operation with US grew to include: –Station Phase 1: Shuttle-MIR –Station Phase 2: ISS permanent human habitation capability –Station Phase 3: Assembly complete of all partner elements Russian “pride” in HSF capabilities Keep HSF program alive / engineers employed

June 21, 2004Washington DC9 Lesson #4: “Accept that which cannot be changed.” Long term, expensive space cooperation programs have certain inherent characteristics that can create problems: Decisions to undertake taken at highest levels of government Program duration transcends political terms Each partner seeks political and economic leverage on their investment and will have national priorities must be accommodated Partnership must satisfy individual interests of each partner Compromise necessary - up to a point where national interests are in danger of being jeopardized Station has had to contend with: Cost and schedule problems Geopolitical changes many of which were unanticipated but unavoidable.

June 21, 2004Washington DC10 Lesson #4: “Accept that which cannot be changed.” One Partners problems will impact other partners Annual appropriations versus multi-year appropriations Cost overruns and management changes in the U.S. portion of the Station program have had cost and management implications for other Partners Russians involvement: Invitation was politically correct when made Expectation - Cost savings / Schedule Improvement Actuality - Cost increases / Schedule Delays Actuality - Without Russian Involvement the Station would probably not have survived the Clinton Administration and would be in serious trouble with the stand-down of the Shuttle

June 21, 2004Washington DC11 Lesson #5: “A little bit of constructive ambiguity never hurts.” Partnerships must find ways to accommodate policy differences among partners. A Space Station Example: Partners differed in their interpretation of what activities met the commitments they had undertaken in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, re. the use space for “peaceful purposes”, as: U.S.: D.o.D. insisted on being able to utilize the Station. Canada Europe & Japan: Wanted agreements to refer to “a Space Station of exclusively peaceful purposes” Russia: In ISS re-negotiation Russia adopted same position as U.S.

June 21, 2004Washington DC12 Lesson #5: “A little bit of constructive ambiguity never hurts.” Solution adopted in both negotiations: Each Partner defines “peaceful purposes” in relation to the utilization of the elements which it supplies. Solution was memorialized in an exchange of side letters rather than in the agreements themselves. Difficult topics sometimes need to be finessed using less than precise language.

June 21, 2004Washington DC13 Conclusion The Overarching Lesson: “Those involved in structuring and implementing large scale partnerships must approach matters with an open mind. They must realize that they will not be able to identify every contingency in advance and hence must structure their cooperation with built in flexibility.”