Authorization Infrastructure, a Standards View Hal Lockhart OASIS.

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Presentation transcript:

Authorization Infrastructure, a Standards View Hal Lockhart OASIS

2 Hal Lockhart Principal Technologist, BEA Systems Co-chair XACML TC SAML Issues List Editor WS Security TC Interop Specs Also Member: Provisioning TC, Digital Signature Services TC, Rights Language TC, WS-I Security Planning WG OASIS Security Joint Committee OASIS Liaison to W3C for WS Security

3 Information Security Definition Technologies and procedures intended to implement organizational policy in spite of human efforts to the contrary. Suggested by Authorization Applies to all security services Protection against accidents is incidental Suggests four areas of attention

4 Information Security Areas Policy determination –Expression: code, permissions, ACLs, Language –Evaluation: semantics, architecture, performance Policy enforcement –Maintain integrity of Trusted Computing Base (TCB) –Enforce variable policy

5 Infrastructural Service Consistent enforcement of security policies Minimize user inconvenience Ensure seamless implementation –Coherent, interdependent services –Not just list of products Avoid reimplementation Simplify management and administration

6 Authorization Theory Authentication Authority Attribute Authority Policy Decision Point Policy Enforcement Point Credentials Authentication Assertion System Entity Attribute Assertion Authorization Decision Assertion Policy Credentials Collector Credentials Assertion Application Request

7 Types of Authorization Info - 1 Attribute Assertion –Properties of a system entity (typically a person) –Relatively abstract – business context –Same attribute used in multiple resource decisions –Examples: X.509 Attribute Certificate, SAML Attribute Statement, XrML PossessProperty Authorization Policy –Specifies all the conditions required for access –Specifies the detailed resources and actions (rights) –Can apply to multiple subjects, resources, times… –Examples: XACML Policy, XrML License, X.509 Policy Certificate

8 Types of Authorization Info - 2 AuthZ Decision –Expresses the result of a policy decision –Specifies a particular access that is allowed –Intended for immediate use –Example: SAML AuthZ Decision Statement, IETF COPS

9 Implications of this Model Benefits –Improved scalability –Separation of concerns –Enables federation Distinctions not absolute –Attributes can seem like rights –A policy may apply to one principal, resource –Systems with a single construct tend to evolve to treating principal or resource as abstraction

10 XACML TC Charter Define a core XML schema for representing authorization and entitlement policies Target - any object - referenced using XML Fine grained control, characteristics - access requestor, protocol, classes of activities, and content introspection Consistent with and building upon SAML

11 XACML Objectives Ability to locate policies in distributed environment Ability to federate administration of policies about the same resource Base decisions on wide range of inputs –Multiple subjects, resource properties Decision expressions of unlimited complexity Ability to do policy-based delegation Usable in many different environments –Types of Resources, Subjects, Actions –Policy location and combination

12 XACML Data Flow Model

13 General Characteristics Defined using XML Schema Strongly typed language Extensible in multiple dimensions Borrows from many other specifications Features requiring XPath are optional Obligation feature optional (IPR issue) Language is very “wordy” –Many long URLs Expect it to be generated by programs Complex enough that there is more than one way to do most things

14 XACML Concepts Policy & PolicySet – combining of applicable policies using CombiningAlgorithm Target – Rapidly index to find applicable Policies or Rules Conditions – Complex boolean expression with many operands, arithmetic & string functions Effect – “Permit” or “Deny” Obligations – Other required actions Request and Response Contexts – Input and Output Bag – unordered list which may contain duplicates

15 XACML Concepts PolicySet Policies Obligations Rules Target Obligations Condition Effect Target

16 Request and Response Context

17 Rules Smallest unit of administration, cannot be evaluated alone Elements –Description – documentation –Target – select applicable policies –Condition – boolean decision function –Effect – either “Permit” or “Deny” Results –If condition is true, return Effect value –If not, return NotApplicable –If error or missing data return Indeterminate Plus status code

18 Target Designed to efficiently find the policies that apply to a request Makes it feasible to have very complex Conditions Attributes of Subjects, Resources and Actions Matches against value, using match function –Regular expression –RFC822 ( ) name –X.500 name –User defined Attributes specified by Id or XPath expression Normally use Subject or Resource, not both

19 Condition Boolean function to decide if Effect applies Inputs come from Request Context Values can be primitive, complex or bags Can be specified by id or XPath expression Fourteen primitive types Rich array of typed functions defined Functions for dealing with bags Order of evaluation unspecified Allowed to quit when result is known Side effects not permitted

20 Datatypes From XML Schema –String, boolean –Integer, double –Time, date –dateTime –anyURI –hexBinary –base64Binary From Xquery –dayTimeDuration –yearMonthDuration Unique to XACML –rfc822Name –x500Name

21 Functions Equality predicates Arithmetic functions String conversion functions Numeric type conversion functions Logical functions Arithmetic comparison functions Date and time arithmetic functions Non-numeric comparison functions Bag functions Set functions Higher-order bag functions Special match functions XPath-based functions Extension functions and primitive types

22 Policies and Policy Sets Policy –Smallest element PDP can evaluate –Contains: Description, Defaults, Target, Rules, Obligations, Rule Combining Algorithm Policy Set –Allows Policies and Policy Sets to be combined –Use not required –Contains: Description, Defaults, Target, Policies, Policy Sets, Policy References, Policy Set References, Obligations, Policy Combining Algorithm Combining Algorithms: Deny-overrides, Permit- overrides, First-applicable, Only-one-applicable

23 Request and Response Context Request Context –Attributes of: Subjects – requester, intermediary, recipient, etc. Resource – name, can be hierarchical Resource Content – specific to resource type, e.g. XML document Action – e.g. Read Environment – other, e.g. time of request Response Context –Resource ID –Decision –Status (error values) –Obligations