Voting in the 2011 Welsh Referendum: Nationalism, Valence or What? Richard Wyn Jones (Cardiff University) Roger Scully (Aberystwyth University) Annual Conference of the Elections, Public Opinion and Parties specialist group Exeter, September 2011

Outline of Paper 1.Introduction 2.Background to the Referendum 3.The Campaign & the Result 4.Modelling the Vote: Hypotheses 5.Modelling the Vote: Main Findings 6.Conclusions & Implications

But first, a word from our sponsors… The 2011 Welsh Referendum Study (ESRC Grant RES ) – Survey-based study of voting in the referendum – Conducted via Internet with YouGov – Two-Wave panel study, with first wave conducted as ‘rolling’ study through period of the campaign – N of panel study = 2569 Further support from McDougall Trust for interview-based study of local and national campaigning

The Background, 1 Previous devolution referendums: 1979, GOWA: Flawed Devolution Model – ‘Secondary’ legislative powers: responsibility without power? – ‘Body Corporate’ and other problematic aspects 2004: Richard Commission Report 2006 GOWA: – LCOs – Provision for Referendum on full transfer of primary legislative powers

Wales 2011: the Background, : ‘One Wales’ Labour-Plaid coalition : All Wales Convention BUT continuing caution… – ‘Shadow of 1979’: unwillingness to believe the survey evidence! – Labour parliamentary opposition Final agreement on referendum: March 3 rd 2011

The Campaign: General Context Problems created by nature of the issue at stake: – No fundamental issue of principle – Difficult for campaigns to craft messages – Difficult to frame intelligible and legally accurate referendum question Problems with PPERA: – No official campaigns – Constraints on spending (2011 < 1997!)

The Yes Campaign Support from all four party leaderships in NAW Also widespread support from civil society The ‘Establishment’ campaign Paradox of Yes position: Main strength also main weakness – constrained precisely because it was so all-inclusive – Had to ‘wait for Labour’ – Limited in what it could campaign against (not LCOs, not UK govt) – Main stake-holders had other priorities (particularly 2011 election)

The Yes Campaign

The No campaign Little mainstream support, meaning… – Little ability to raise resources: spending c.£5k – No prominent politicians active. Resulting inexperience obvious in: Breakdown in message discipline (increasingly arguing for abolition) Seem to have believed own propaganda (polls) Failure to produce promised campaign material Local campaigns very weak – ‘Grassroots campaign’ largely without roots Some of the spokesmen very weak – Welsh-speaking voices just plain embarrassing

The No Campaign

Referendum Voting Intention

Voting intentions across last 4 weeks of campaign (3- day rolling averages)

The Result Yes: 517,132 (63.5%) No: 297,380 (36.5%) Turnout = 35.6%

Turnout in major UK referendums ‘Border Referendum’, Northern Ireland, % EC Membership, UK, % Devolution, Scotland, % Devolution, Wales, % Devolution, Scotland, % Devolution, Wales, % Good Friday Agreement, Northern Ireland, % Elected Mayor & GLA, London, % Devolution, North East England, % Devolution, Wales, % AV Electoral Reform, UK, %

Modelling the Vote: Hypotheses Referendum voting choices shaped primarily by: Politics of national recognition ‘Performance politics’ Party Cues Constitutional Preferences

Referendum Vote: National Identity

Referendum Vote: WAG performance evaluations

Referendum Vote: Party Support

Referendum Vote: Constitutional Preference

Why Did Wales Vote Yes? No great impact of campaign Not mainly about attitudes to major parties in government (London or Cardiff) or party leaders or performance of government Not much about social differences (e.g. national identity or language) Mainly about now-settled views concerning how Wales should be governed

And to find out more… Richard Wyn Jones and Roger Scully, Wales Says Yes: Welsh Devolution and the 2011 Welsh Referendum (University of Wales Press, 2012)