U.S. D EPARTMENT OF E NERGY Office of Electricity Delivery & Energy Reliability May 18, 2015 Stewart Cedres SYMPOSIUM IN HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE Achieving Resilience in America’s Critical Infrastructure A More Resilient Electric Grid

Mission – OE’s Core Purpose OE drives electric grid modernization and resiliency in the energy infrastructure. OE leads the Department of Energy’s efforts to ensure a resilient, reliable, and flexible electricity system. OE accomplishes this mission through research, partnerships, facilitation, modeling and analytics, and emergency preparedness.

OE ORGANIZATION 3 Infrastructure Security & Energy Restoration (ISER) Deputy Assistant Secretary (Emergency Preparedness & Response (physical & cyber), Authorities Execution (HSPD), Mitigation Deployment (EMP/GMD)) National Electricity Delivery (NED) Deputy Assistant Secretary (Transmission Planning, Development, Siting, Technical Assistance to State, regional & tribal governments, Authorities Execution (EPACT), NEPA/Presidential Permits, export authorizations, Smart Grid Policy) Immediate Office of the Assistant Secretary (OAS) Patricia Hoffman Assistant Secretary Corporate Business Operations (CBO) Chief Operating Officer (Budget, HR, Communications, Procurement, Corporate Policies, IT Governance, Training, Audits, Daily Operations, etc…) Energy Infrastructure Modeling & Analysis (EIMA) Deputy Assistant Secretary (Grid Modeling, Environmental Modeling & Analytics, Clean Energy Transmission & Reliability, Energy Infrastructure & Risk Analysis, Visualization) Advanced Grid Integration (AGI) Deputy Assistant Secretary (Smart Grid Investment Grants (SGIG), SGIG Cyber Security Plans, Workforce Training, Net Metering) Power Systems Engineering Research & Development (PSE R&D) Deputy Assistant Secretary (Energy Storage, Smart Grid Demos, Power Electronics, Grid Cyber R&D, Grid Team Topics, Smart Grid Hub, Adaptive Networks, Intelligent Systems) OE ‘s advisory body, Electricity Advisory Committee, was established under FACA in 12/2007 as authorized under EPACT The Committee consists of 29 members.

4 Grid Upgrades T&D Developing New Hardware Integrated Systems, Modeling & Analysis Secure Communications and Data Privacy Cybersecurity R&D and Ops OE’s Portfolio Approach Covers Wide Spectrum: Policy, Operations, Analytics and Research Resiliency and Emergency Preparedness & Response Sector Specific Agency

Natural Disasters NOAA (2015) reported that there were 178 weather related disasters with overall damages of at least $1B (1980 to 2014) – hurricanes, high winds storms, floods, droughts, heat waves, ice storms, wildfires Property Claims Services (2013) listed the ten most costly catastrophes in U.S. history – 1994 Northridge earthquake ranked on the top 5 High Frequency or Low Frequency

Source: DOE’s Office of Electricity Delivery & Energy Reliability

But there is more… All posing a threat to the electric grid Space Weather Events Cyber Threat Technological Accidents Dependency on Other Systems Pandemics Terrorism and Sabotage

This is the same grid… largest interconnected machinery 7,000 power plants; 3,200 electricity providers; 300,000 miles of power lines linked to a universe of systems keeping the lights on Described by Presidential Policy Directive 21 as “uniquely critical due to the enabling functions it provides across all critical sectors”

The Numbers Don’t Lie! $75 million – Silicon Valley $20 trillion – Chicago $6 billion – Northeast 3.5 million gallons – San Diego But not everything is about $ and ¢

Presidential Policy Directives (PPD) 8 and 21 “the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions” – PPD 8: National Preparedness and PPD 21: Critical Infrastructure Security & Resilience Defining Resilience Must also understand resilience!!!

Understanding Risk and Criticality Risk: Function (T, C, V) Criticality: o Impact base – does not necessary translate into vulnerability o Dynamic – time and event driven Unless mandated by regulation, investment on resilience tends to be on what’s both: critical and vulnerable (based on the likelihood of biggest threats to the system)…it is based on Risk.

SIMPLE ENOUGH?

Not that Simple… Vulnerabilities and threats impacting the grid are not always obvious – What about bad policy? Market Structures New Government Policies and Regulations Development of Advanced Technologies Dependencies on other critical infrastructure and technologies Lack of systemic understanding Emerging disrupting technologies Intersecting North American Grid is one of the most Complex Systems on Earth!

Failures – Systems vs. Systemic Last 50 years, the grid has experience several widespread blackouts as a result of or leading to systemic failure Forensic analysis of major widespread blackouts often shows – root cause to be a handful of components – many times the failed components are geographically located far away from where the impact is felt the most Society can probably accept system failure; but systemic failure pose a far greater challenge to both the U.S. economy and security

Systematic, Strategic, and Innovative The grid is VERY reliable The century old grid is going through a transformation…what we do within the next 10 years will have an impact We cannot afford to be reactive We cannot invest on Resiliency by sacrificing – Reliability – Efficiency – Flexibility – Affordability All five are linked adding complexity to the grid…but also making the grid better!

Resilient Grid Coordinated Effort DOE SLTT Assets Owners & Operators Trades Organizations Academia Industry Research Centers Vendors Canada NGOs Regulators Vendors NERC OthersFederal Govt. Other CI