Data Mining Challenges for Network Management Nick Feamster, Georgia Tech Dave Andersen, CMU (joint with Jay Lepreau and Emulab)

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Presentation transcript:

Data Mining Challenges for Network Management Nick Feamster, Georgia Tech Dave Andersen, CMU (joint with Jay Lepreau and Emulab)

Reactive Operation Problems cause downtime Problems often not immediately apparent What happens if I tweak this policy…? ConfigureObserve Wait for Next Problem Desired Effect? Revert No Yes

Proactive Techniques Better: Proactive Operation Idea: Analyze configuration before deployment Configure rcc Detect Faults Deploy Many faults can be detected with static analysis. Predict Traffic Flow

Dynamics for Network Management Problem: Many problems cant be detected from static configuration analysis of a single AS Dependencies on neighboring ASes –Contract violations –Route hijacks –BGP wedgies –Filtering Dependencies on route arrivals –Simple network configurations can oscillate, but operators cant tell until the routes actually arrive. Threshold-based anomaly detection schemes cannot detect these problems.

Network Management Challenges Infrastructure support for data management –Heterogeneous DB support for longest-prefix match would make correlation of routing and traffic data (joint analysis) much easier –Large volumes –Need for real-time analysis (e.g., for anomalies/intrusion detection) Algorithmic support for data mining –Support for joint analysis –Threshold-based schemes dont work for Small traffic blips Small routing blips Support for proactive, offline analysis of routing dynamics –Analyzing configuration changes, etc. Support for online control

Challenge 1: Infrastructure Support Separate: collection, storage, analysis Collection: abstract type, format, and access method

Challenge 2: Algorithmic Support Blips across signals may be more operationally interesting than any spike in one.

Challenge 3: Proactive Fault Detection Configure Static Fault Detection Construct Network Model Dynamic Analysis In Emulation Deploy Proactive Techniques Existing Routes (e.g., from Datapository) A possibility: detect configuration faults by observing playback of routing dynamics What-if analysis in a safe sandbox.

Challenge 4: Support for Online Control Probes BGP updates IGP updates Netflow Router Configs Compute Engine (input processing) Storage and DB Anomaly Detection Network-Wide Route Selection, Filter deployment, etc. Given a system to monitor, why not also use it for control?