Spamming with BGP Spectrum Agility Anirudh Ramachandran Nick Feamster Georgia Tech.

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Presentation transcript:

Spamming with BGP Spectrum Agility Anirudh Ramachandran Nick Feamster Georgia Tech

2 Collection Two domains instrumented with MailAvenger –Sinkhole domain #1 Continuous spam collection since Aug 2004 No real addresses---sink everything 3 million+ pieces of spam –Sinkhole domain #2 Recently registered domain (Nov 2005) Clean control – domain posted at a few places Not much spam yet…perhaps we are being too conservative

3 Spamming Techniques Mostly botnets, of course Were trying to quantify this –Coordination –Characteristics How were doing this –Correlation with Bobax victims from Georgia Tech botnet sinkhole –Heuristics Distance of Client IP from MX record Coordinated, low-bandwidth sending

4 BGP Spectrum Agility Log IP addresses of SMTP relays Join with BGP route advertisements seen at network where spam trap is co-located. A small club of persistent players appears to be using this technique. Common short-lived prefixes and ASes / / /8 8920

5 Length of short-lived BGP epochs ~ 10% of spam coming from short-lived BGP announcements 1 day Epoch length