Open Source Intelligence Doctrine ® SNAKES IN THE GRASS: Open Source Intelligence Doctrine Robert D. Steele, OSS CEO <bear@oss.net>

® Information Superiority Information Peacekeeping Relevant Information Information Operations OSINT Support to Acquisition OSINT Support to Operations Security

® WAR LONG TIME HERE THERE SHORT TIME PEACE INFORMATION WARFARE OPERATIONS SECURITY & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE HERE THERE INFORMATION PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE EDUCATION SHORT TIME PEACE

Information Peacekeeping Open Source Intelligence ® CIVIL CENTER OF GRAVITY Private Sector! Information Warfare Information Peacekeeping INFORMATION COMMONS Open Source Intelligence Electronic Security & Counterintelligence Education Big Secret Not Secret

® All-Source Intelligence (Spies, Satellites, and Secrets) Information Warfare Information Peacekeeping INFORMATION OPERATIONS “Don’t send a bullet where a byte will do….” OSINT as Output OSINT as Input Within the allied military community, and to a lesser extent within selected European and Asian militaries, there has been much discussion of the emerging importance of information warfare and information operations. The original hyperbole about “information dominance” is now in disrepute. The military has not, however, come to grips with the fact that the bulk of any information operations campaign must be comprised of content and ideally of open source intelligence--intelligence coming in to guide the commander and staff; and intelligence going out to influence belligerents, bystanders, and coalition bubbas. Information peacekeeping and the role of virtual intelligence in avoiding and resolving conflict are discussed in two of the references, both available through the Internet. We have a long way to go before a byte will be as effective as a bullet. It will take at least a decade--perhaps a half century--before we get desperate enough to actually carry out strategic assessments on vanishing aquifers, the impact of starvation in Africa on Australia, and so on. Only when intelligence steps up to its role as a preventive forecast compelling enough to induce executive action in time of peace, might we be considered skilled at information operations.

® DEFINITION Information Peacekeeping is the active exploitation of information and information technology--in order to peacefully modify the balance of power between specific individuals and groups--so as to achieve national policy objectives. The three elements of Information Peacekeeping, in order of priority, are intelligence (providing useful actionable information); information technology (providing “tools for truth” which afford the recipient access to international information and the ability to communicate with others; and electronic security & counterintelligence (a strictly defensive and preventive aspect of being able to sustain Information Peacekeeping operations. Robert D. Steele, 1994

JOINT STAFF ISSUE AREAS ® JOINT STAFF ISSUE AREAS J-1 No OOB for refugee/POW info. J-2 Assumes SI/TK will have it all. J-3 No OOB for IO/IW/IP J-4 No role in information “supply” J-5 Not held accountable for supportability of plans in terms of information availability J-6 Not accountable for coalition-civil interoperability or for ensuring that external information can be integrated/exploited

Available Information ® NEW INTELLIGENCE GAP INFORMATION TIME Available Information Actionable Intelligence The New Intelligence Gap: the difference between what you can know and what you can use! OSINT is as complex as the other disciplines…

® Existing doctrine assumes RI comes from IC or other units!

What’s Missing? ® SIGINT: Dedicated collectors, processors, exploiters IMINT: Dedicated collectors, processors, exploiters HUMINT: Dedicated collectors, processors, exploiters MASINT: Dedicated collectors, processors, exploiters OSINT: ??? ALL-SOURCE ANALYST

COMPETING OSINT MODELS ® COMPETING OSINT MODELS SI/TK Validated OSINT SI/TK Selective Importation System High/Firewall Just Enough, Just in Time Default to Validated OSINT

® FOUR THREAT/IO TYPES HIC/MRC STRATEGIC NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL MILITARY WAR SOLIC/LEA UNCONVENTIONAL LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT AND GANG WARFARE IW/ECON INFORMATION WAR/ CRIME & ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE MINDWAR RELIGIOUS, POLITICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL REFUGEES PROLIFERATION/MIGRATION JIHAD/ GREENPEACE TERRORISM/ GLOBAL CRIME INFOWAR/ ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE Here is another way of looking at the four warrior classes and the four forms of war they inspire. There are also four operational overlays that highlight the inadequacy of our existing defense, foreign policy, and law enforcement departments, as well as the intelligence programs that support them. I suppose we are ready for strategic nuclear and conventional war, but frankly I don’t think we are. We have moved so many key pieces into the reserve, including combat support and combat service support units as well as civil affairs, intelligence, and other vital elements, that I do not believe we can really go to war in less than 180 days, and I am not at all confident that our stocks of ammunition, and especially precision munitions, will last longer than ten days. We are clearly unprepared in the other three areas of warfare, and this is largely because we do not have a modern understanding of the complexity of the threat, nor a political willingness to restructure our forces and realign modest amounts of funds, in order to create a coherent national security capability that is global, seamless, and effective across organizational, national, cultural, and security boundaries.

That’s it for doctrine….now on to the OSINT overview. ® That’s it for doctrine….now on to the OSINT overview.