® Iraq Intel/InfoOps Assessment & Summary of Joint Lessons Learned Robert David Steele Updated 24 October 2003

® Seven Generations of War Evolutionary Eras 1st Generation 2nd Generation 3rd Generation 4th Generation 5th Generation 6th Generation 7th Generation Linch Pin Low Tech Mass New Tech New Doctrine Non-State RMA (C4I) RIA (IO/Intel) RGA Means of Winning Attrition Maneuver Asymmetry Precision Weapons Precision Intel(!!) Everything, Always

® Definitions Intelligence JCS: product JCS: knowledge CIA: knowledge and foreknowledge as prelude to decision and action (covert action silent) OSS: global coverage, all sources, all languages, 24/7, NRT analysis at all times Information Operations 1. Electronic Warfare (EW) 2. Operations Security (OPSEC) 3. Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) 4. Military Deception 5. Computer Network Ops (CNO). 6. Supporting InfoAssurance –Counter Intelligence –Physical Security –Physical Attack 7. Intelligence 8. Public Affairs/Civil Affairs 9. Public Diplomacy & Assistance

® Seven Generations of Intelligence/IO Evolutionary Eras 1st Generation 2nd Generation 3rd Generation 4th Generation 5th Generation 6th Generation 7th Generation What Do We Need to Know Easy: Where is the army? Easy: Where are the trenches? Moderate: How many with what? Hard: Watch every non-state actor. Hard: Watch everything on the fly. Hard: Make sense of billions of bits. Very Hard: 24/7, 29+ languages and get your own house in order.

® US/Allied Intelligence in Iraq Successes Good last minute exiles sent in with money and forged documents to recruit and observe Failures No deep clandestine assets No new nor firm knowledge on WMD Intel vacuum allowed WH adventurism Did not locate Saddaam Could not keep up with battle forces Unable to do guerilla/urban intelligence No peace/reconstruction intelligence (Note: the US corruption is *amazing*)

® US/Allied InfoOps in Iraq Successes Saved the Oil Fields Inspired desertions & no fires Kept most civilians out of fight Failures Sunglasses & armor--aid as PSYOP Girls forced to urinate publicly (rdblks) Saddam as Elvis (cowboy IO) Poor impact on Arabs (bye to Al J.) Poor impact on Europe (bye to Old E.) Ignored non-Arab Muslims world-wide (Central Asia, South Asia, India, Pakistan, Muslim Africa)

® Net Assessment of Iraq Intel/IO F Reconstruction intel F Post-war Guerilla intel F Global IO Images F Covert Ops Options D WMD actual status C Battle damage B Kick-off OOB D Congressional debate Bottom line: Intel/IO had no coherent strategy, conflicting or absent capabilities and messages, earns a 3 out of a possible 7 on the continuum. Note: Policy decisions can be said to have handicapped intelligence.

® Joint Lessons Learned I Did great, need to sustain and improve: –Joint Integration and Adaptive Planning –Joint Force Synergy –Special Operations Forces and SOF- Conventional Force Integration –Mission rehearsal

® Joint Lessons Learned II Did good, but need enhancement –Urban Operations –Information Operations –Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconaissance enemy perspective tactical bandwidth proper dissemination analytic toolkits

® Joint Lessons Learned III Fell short, need work: –Battle Damage Assessment –Fratricide (Friendly ID) –Deployment Planning and Execution –Reserve Mobilization –Coalition Information Sharing

® Joint Lessons Learned IV Lower Tier Issues –Joint Fires –Time Sensitive Targeting –Overmatching Strike –Training –Theater Logistics –Public Affairs/Media Integration –Shaping Interagency Involvement –EUCOM/CENTCOM Seam

® Joint Lessons Learned V Insights to future concepts –Emerging Battlespace –Knowledge-Enabled Warfare –Effects-Based Operations NOT MENTIONED: –Iraqi incompetency.