The Internet ISP Internet Backbone Provider Internet Backbone Provider Internet Backbone Provider ISP
Big Fixed Costs in Networks P Q AC
What is demand relative to scale? P Q D AC
What is demand relative to scale? P Q D AC
Internet Backbone Provider A NAP Internet Backbone Provider C Internet Backbone Provider B
Sequential Monopoly Broadband service made up of Access and ISP Assumption of no monopsony power for now Demand for Broadband (Final product) P = 200 – 10Q
Sequential Monopoly (Con’t) Demand for Broadband (Final product) P = 200 – 10Q Access provider bundles and sets MR bband = MC access + P isp So P isp = MR bband -MC access
Sequential Monopoly (con’t) $ Q D Broadband Demand
Sequential Monopoly (con’t) $ Q D Broadband Demand MR bband
Sequential Monopoly (con’t) $ Q D Broadband Demand MR bband MC access P isp = MR bband -MC access
Sequential Monopoly (con’t) $ Q D Broadband Demand MR bband MC access P isp = MR bband -MC access MR isp
Sequential Monopoly (con’t) $ Q D Broadband Demand MR bband MC access P isp = MR bband - MC access MR isp MC isp Q
Sequential Monopoly (con’t) $ Q D Broadband Demand MR bband P* D isp MR isp MC isp Q*
Sequential Monopoly (con’t) $ Q D Broadband Demand MR bband P* D isp MR isp MC isp Q* MC bband P** Q**
Sequential Monopoly Math D bband : P = Q MC isp = 10 MC access = 20 D isp = 200 – 20Q – 20 = 180 –20Q Set MR isp = MC isp 180 – 40Q = 10 Q = 4.25 P isp = 95, P bband = Solve single monopoly and get Q = 8.5, P= 115.
Sequential Monopoly Profits isp = (P-MC)* Q = (95 –10)* 4.25 = access = (157.5 – )* 4.25 = Total = Single Monopoly Profits: monop = (115 – 30)*8.5 = Overall welfare increases in this case
Sequential Monopoly (con’t) $ Q D Broadband Demand MR bband P* D isp MR isp MC isp Q* MC bband P** Q** Increased Profit
Price Squeeze? = (P u - C u )*Q O + (P D - C D )*Q i(1) where Q O is quantity of others and Q i is firm quantity If firm sells no upstream, Q O = 0 = (P D - C D )*Q i(0) Decision depends on PC margins and Q’s
Incentive to Squeeze? If Q market stays the same, then if (P D - C D )> (P u - C u ) Q market ↑ Q market ↓
Sequential Monopoly Assumed fixed proportions Markup can lead to inefficient substitution Price can rise or fall in this case
Congestion Too much traffic Drop packets or delay delivery Pricing solutions
Congestion Pricing $ Q SRMC c D QsQs c + K
Congestion Pricing $ Q SRMC c D QsQs c + K Q*
Peak Load Pricing $ Q SRMC c D peak QsQs c + K D off peak
Without Peak Pricing $ Q SRMC c D peak QsQs c + K D off peak P* Loss from overcapacity Loss from overpricing QOQO QpQp
What Does Peak Pricing Do? Low value users stop or shift High value users get priority (and pay) video conferencing
Shifting Peaks $ Q D peak c + K D off peak Q Off Q Peak LRMC Demand for capacity Q* P Off P Peak