IEEE MEDIA INDEPENDENT HANDOVER DCN: xx-00-sec Title: IEEE r Fast BSS Transition – A Study Date Submitted: September 21, 2009 Present at IEEE meeting in September of 2009 Authors: Lily Chen (NIST) Abstract: This document reviews IEEE r solution in Fast BSS Transition. The purpose is to pursue a proper approach in accommodating different authentication options in media independent handover xx-00-sec

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IEEE Network MAC PHY IEEE Not

Fast BSS Transition xx-00-sec4 Network (not ) Transition

IEEE Way Handshake STA-PMKAP-PMK EAPOL-Key (..., …, ANonce) EAPOL-Key (..., …, SNonce, STA RSN IE, MIC) EAPOL-Key (..., …, ANonce, AP RSN IE, MIC) Generate ANonce Generate SNonce Drive PTK EAPOL-Key (..., …, MIC) Install TK Peer EAP ServerAuthenticator MSK EAP (Full Auth, Pre-Auth, or Re-Auth) IEEE NOT IEEE

IEEE r Key Hierarchy It introduces two level of PMKs PMK-R0 derived from MSK (or PSK) PMK-R1s derived from PMK-R0.

IEEE r – Fast BSS Transition STA Current AP- PMK_R1 A Target AP-PMK_R1 B Secure session and data Auth Req (FT … FIIE(SNonce …)) Auth Res (FT … FIIE(SNonce, ANonce …)) PTK B Generated Re-association Req (….) Re-association Res (….) (New) Secure session and data

IEEE r Key Distribution The R0KH and the R1KH are assumed to have a secure channel between them that can be used to exchange cryptographic keys without exposure to any intermediate parties. The cryptographic strength of the secure channel between the R0KH and R1KH is assumed to be greater than or equal to the cryptographic strength of the channels for which the keys will be used. This standard assumes that the key transfer includes the PMK-R1, the PMK-R1 PMKSA, the PMK-R1 context, and the associated key authorizations. The protocol for distribution of keying material from the R0KH to the R1KH is outside the scope of this standard. - IEEE r, Clause 11A.2.2

What do we learn? Key distribution is not a part of IEEE r. A specific EAP method is not a part of IEEE It is independent to whether it is a Pre-authentication; Re-authentication; or Full-authentication.

What we should ask? Do we have to introduce specific EAP methods in IEEE a? Shall MIHF or any IEEE entities handle specific authentication? If it is in EAP layer or above, then we will need to add function of a peer, an authenticator, or a server to 21 the 21 entity. If it is a low layer, then it cannot be media independent.

Things to clarify In contribution 144, Alternative I: Work with and to introduce pre-authentication architecture. Pre-authentication is out of the scope of This alternative obviously does not apply (For , further study is needed.)