Stare at center of left frame for 1 min., then at right.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
The Mind-Body Problem & What it is like to be a bat
Advertisements

Week 2, Lecture 3 Dualism: mental events, substance vs. property dualism, four arguments.
Philosophy of Mind Dualism: in addition to the physical/material body, there is an immaterial mind Dualism: in addition to the physical/material body,
Michael Lacewing Is the mind the brain? Michael Lacewing © Michael Lacewing.
Dualism. The reading for today is Ch. 1 of Philosophy of Mind: A Beginner’s Guide.
Metaphysics Part II. Thought Experiment: Physical & Mental Properties A1. 2 more objects: quarters, books, grass… A2. 2 more physical descriptors: green,
LECTURE 24 THE NATURE OF PERSONS PHYSICALISM AND DUALISM (“WHAT AM I?)
Mind and Body Clark Wolf Department of Philosophy Iowa State University
Mind and Body I Bodies and Ghosts, Qualia, and Mind-Brain identity.
Substance dualism: do Descartes’ arguments work? Michael Lacewing
CHURCHLAND 1 REDUCTIVE MATERIALISM also known as THE IDENTITY THEORY.
The “Explanatory Gap” Where it is said that identity theory is not necessary false, but merely unknowable.
Chapter 2 The Mind-Body Problem
Property dualism and mental causation Michael Lacewing
The Knowledge Argument There’s Something About Mary.
© Michael Lacewing Dualism and the Mind-Body Identity Theory Michael Lacewing
Descartes argument for dualism
The Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory
© Michael Lacewing Functionalism and the Mind- Body Problem Michael Lacewing
© Michael Lacewing Mental causation Michael Lacewing
Consciousness and biological naturalism
Philosophy 4610 Philosophy of Mind Week 11: The Problem of Consciousness.
Philosophy of Mind Week 3: Objections to Dualism Logical Behaviorism
Descartes I am essentially rational, only accidentally an animal ‘essentially’ = logically necessarily ‘essentially’ = logically necessarily Strictly speaking,
1 Philosophy of Mind I. Introduction II. Ontological Issues.
Knowledge and Reality Lecture 2: Dualism. Dualism: what is it? Mind and body are different basic substances They have different essences The mind is essentially.
How do you know you have a mind? How do you know the person next to you has a mind? What is a mind? psychlotron.org.uk.
Descartes. Descartes - b.1596 d.1650 ❑ Not a skeptic – “there really is a world, that men have bodies, and the like (things which no one of sound mind.
Chapter 2 The Mind-Body Problem McGraw-Hill © 2013 McGraw-Hill Companies. All Rights Reserved.
This week’s aims: To set clear expectations regarding homework, organisation, etc. To re-introduce the debate concerning the mind-body problem To analyse.
Mind-Body Dualism. The Mind-Body Problem The problem of explaining how a mind is connected to and interacts with a body whose mind it is, or the problem.
Human Nature 2.3 The Mind-Body Problem: How Do Mind and Body Relate?
The argument from neural dependency A natural consequence of dualism should be that the mind itself is not damaged whenever the brain is damaged. A natural.
Philosophy of Mind - Mind/Body Introduction to Philosophy Jason M. Chang.
Introduction to Philosophy Lecture 12 Minds and bodies #1 (Descartes) By David Kelsey.
Place Identity Theory Correlation: Causation vs. Identity Token vs. Type Identity Phenomenological Fallacy Empirical Hypothesis Contingent.
Philosophy 4610 Philosophy of Mind Week 4: Objections to Behaviorism The Identity Theory.
Introduction to Philosophy Lecture 14 Minds and Bodies #3 (Jackson) By David Kelsey.
Owen Flanagan James B. Duke Professor of Philosophy Professor of Psychology and Neuroscience Co-Director Center for Comparative Philosophy Duke University.
© Michael Lacewing Substance and Property Dualism Michael Lacewing
Substance dualism Michael Lacewing co.uk.
Substance dualism Michael Lacewing
Descartes on the mind Michael Lacewing co.uk.
Eliminative materialism
Introduction to Philosophy Lecture 13 Minds and Bodies #2 (Physicalism) By David Kelsey.
The argument for the existence of bodies (Meditation 6) 1.Nature provided me with a strong propensity to believe there are bodies. 2.The only way I could.
DUALISM: CAUSAL INTERACTIONISM Philosophy of Mind.
Blindsight, Zombies & Consciousness Jim Fahey Department of Cognitive Science Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 10/4/2007.
The Mind-Body Problem & What it is like to be a bat.
The Mind And Body Problem Mr. DeZilva.  Humans are characterised by the body (physical) and the mind (consciousness) These are the fundamental properties.
Substance and Property Dualism Quick task: Fill in the gaps activity Quick task: Fill in the gaps activity ?v=sT41wRA67PA.
This week’s aims  To test your understanding of substance dualism through an initial assessment task  To explain and analyse the philosophical zombies.
Mind body problem What is the relationship between mental states and the physical world? Zoltán Dienes, Philosophy of Psychology René Descartes ( )
Recap on your whiteboards
Substance and Property Dualism
The Mind-Body Problem.
Property dualism: objections
The zombie argument: responses
Descartes, Meditations 1 and 2
Michael Lacewing The zombie argument Michael Lacewing
Michael Lacewing Descartes on the mind Michael Lacewing
Recap Questions What is interactionism?
The Mind-Body Problem & What it is like to be a bat
What did I google to find this picture?
Analytically or Ontologically Reducible?
The Mind Body Problem Our minds seem to be non-physical and different from our bodies. Our bodies seem to be something different from our minds. Are they.
The Mind-Body Problem.
What is good / bad about this answer?
Michael Lacewing Descartes on the mind Michael Lacewing
The ‘hard problem’ of consciousness:
Presentation transcript:

Stare at center of left frame for 1 min., then at right

The Identity Theory J.J.C. Smart Australian philosopher,

the Identity thesis Mental events, states and processes are (literally identical to) physical events, states and processes. Mental events, states and processes are (literally identical to) physical events, states and processes. Every mental event = some physical event. Every mental event = some physical event. Every mental state = some physical state. Every mental state = some physical state. Every mental process= some physical process. Every mental process= some physical process.

(The most a Dualist could say is) M ental events, states and processes are CORRELATED WITH physical events, states and processes. M ental events, states and processes are CORRELATED WITH physical events, states and processes. Every mental event is correlated with some physical event. Every mental event is correlated with some physical event. Every mental state is correlated with some physical state. Every mental state is correlated with some physical state. Every mental process is correlated with some physical process. Every mental process is correlated with some physical process.

Empirical discovery Water = H 2 O The stuff we've been drinking for thousands of years known as water turned out to be molecules of hydrogen oxide. The stuff we've been drinking for thousands of years known as water turned out to be molecules of hydrogen oxide. Strokes turn out to be, not God striking a person, but blood vessels bursting in the brain and causing lots of damage. Strokes turn out to be, not God striking a person, but blood vessels bursting in the brain and causing lots of damage.

Lightning = electrical discharge The optical phenomenon known as lightning we've seen for thousands of years turned out to be electrical discharge due to ionization of clouds of water vapor in the atmosphere.

Similarly Our sensations, emotions, beliefs and perceptions turn out to be brain events/states--contrary to what the ancient Egyptians thought. When they mummified someone, they threw out the useless brains, and carefully wrapped up the heart and put it back in the chest.

Pros No interaction problem whatsoever; No interaction problem whatsoever; No problem of other minds; No problem of other minds; Explains why Neuroscience is so important to mental states. Explains why Neuroscience is so important to mental states. Jives nicely with the current physicalism in science, which looks for and finds unbroken chains of physical and biochemical causes. Jives nicely with the current physicalism in science, which looks for and finds unbroken chains of physical and biochemical causes.

Occam’s Razor Identity Theory vs. Dualism Need only one substance Need only one substance Need only neuroscientific explanations Need only neuroscientific explanations Need two substances Need neuroscientific explanations plus causal explanations that explain how exactly mental phenomena (if they are non-physical) cause physical phenomena, and vice versa.

Objection #1 (that Smart considers) Any illiterate peasant can talk perfectly well about what he sees, how he feels, his aches and pains. He is directly and immediately aware of such things. Yet he may, like the Egyptians, know nothing about brain processes. Therefore, such conscious experiences cannot be brain processes.

Smart’s response The same sort of reasoning would show lightning isn’t electrical discharge. The same sort of reasoning would show lightning isn’t electrical discharge. Distinguish meaning from reference : Distinguish meaning from reference : “the Georgetown alumnus married to Hilary Clinton” does not mean “the 42 nd President of the US” yet both refer to Bill Clinton “the Georgetown alumnus married to Hilary Clinton” does not mean “the 42 nd President of the US” yet both refer to Bill Clinton “The morning star” means the heavenly body near the horizon in the morning; “ the evening star” means …Yet it was discovered 6 th C. BC by Pythagoras that both refer to Venus. “The morning star” means the heavenly body near the horizon in the morning; “ the evening star” means …Yet it was discovered 6 th C. BC by Pythagoras that both refer to Venus.

Objection #3 Even if there aren’t any irreducibly psychic processes, there are irreducibly psychic properties— such as yellow— yellowness of an after-image. [Think sense datum.] Philosophers call this a Quale; ( plural is Qualia) or a raw feel. Even if there aren’t any irreducibly psychic processes, there are irreducibly psychic properties— such as yellow— the yellowness of an after-image. [Think sense datum.] Philosophers call this a Quale; ( plural is Qualia) or a raw feel.

That is, A sensation (or perception) cannot be a brain process, since it has a phenomenal property (how it seems to us) (a quale) not possessed by brain processes—for example, the phenomenal property of the yellowness of the after-image, for example.

Smart’s response What is it to say that something is yellow? It means something like “a normal percipient would not easily pick it out of a clump of these petals:

(Smart tries to “analyze away” the Quale) When a person says they see a yellow after- image, they are saying something like: “ There is something going on which is like what is going on when I have my eyes open, am awake and am looking at this figure.”

Objection #4 When you stare at something purple for a while, after you stop you will experience a yellow after-image. The after-image is not in physical space; the brain process is. So the after-image is not a brain process. Response : misses the point, which is not that the after-image is a brain process, but that the EXPERIENCE of having one is. "There is, in a sense, no such thing as an after- image...”

Objection #6 Sensations are private--can only be had by one person; brain processes are public (at least in principle). Moreover, Sensations are private--can only be had by one person; brain processes are public (at least in principle). Moreover, I cannot be wrong about whether I’m seeing a yellow after image; anyone can be wrong about whether some brain process is taking place. Therefore, sensations are not brain processes. I cannot be wrong about whether I’m seeing a yellow after image; anyone can be wrong about whether some brain process is taking place. Therefore, sensations are not brain processes.

Smart’s response “The language of introspective reports has a different logic from the language of material processes. Until the brain- process theory is much improved and widely accepted there will be no criteria for saying ‘Smith has an experience of such-and-such a sort’ except Smith’s introspective reports.” (151)

Notice the form of most of these objections: (1)There are properties that mental events/states/processes have that brain events/states/processes do not. (1)There are properties that mental events/states/processes have that brain events/states/processes do not. (2)If X & Y do not have the same properties, then X ≠ Y. (2)If X & Y do not have the same properties, then X ≠ Y. (3)Mental events/states/processes are not brain events/states/processes. (3)Mental events/states/processes are not brain events/states/processes.

Premise (2) is Leibniz’ Law Recall that this principle does not apply to intentional properties, like Jocasta's property of being such that Oedipus wants to marry her (because Jocasta = Oedipus's mother, yet O wants to marry Jocasta, but does not want to marry his mother.) So this sort of argument, to be sound, must avoid using intentional properties. So, for example, being such that I can be wrong about it sounds like an intentional property. Think Freud.

Objection #7 7) I can imagine myself turned to stone and yet having images, aches, pains and so on. (Response: "I can imagine that the electrical theory of lightning is false, that lightning is some sort of purely optical phenomenon.")

Nice neuroscience lecture on how mind-brain works A A A A