1 Needham-Schroeder Key Descriptor 11/12/2002 Needham-Schroeder Key Descriptor Robert G. Moskowitz ICSAlabs IEEE 802 Plenary Meeting Kauai, Nov 12, 2002.

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Presentation transcript:

1 Needham-Schroeder Key Descriptor 11/12/2002 Needham-Schroeder Key Descriptor Robert G. Moskowitz ICSAlabs IEEE 802 Plenary Meeting Kauai, Nov 12, 2002

2 Needham-Schroeder Key Descriptor 11/12/2002 Needham-Schroeder Method AS Auth Supp Credential Request Encrypted Credential Authed Credential Authed ACK

3 Needham-Schroeder Key Descriptor 11/12/2002 Needham-Schroeder in an EAP method Model is the reverse of many EAP methods – The Supplicant drives the authentication – Initial Request might be just a filler record – Needham-Schroeder Request goes into an EAP Response EAP finishes with the Supplicant having the credential for the Authenticator – But Needham-Schroeder exchange is not complete Supplicant needs a methodology to deliver the credential to the Authenticator

4 Needham-Schroeder Key Descriptor 11/12/2002 Needham-Schroeder in an EAP method Authenticator needs a methodology to reply to the supplicant – After which, the authentication is Successful, i.e. the EAP method is Successful This can best be performed in an EAPOL-Key Exchange

5 Needham-Schroeder Key Descriptor 11/12/ x/EAP Exchange The 802.1x/EAP flow for Kerberos might be – AUTH: EAP Ident REQ – SUPP: EAP Ident REP – AS: EAP REQ -- Kerberos – SUPP: EAP REP -- KRB_AS_REQ – AS: EAP REQ -- KRB_AS_REP – SUPP: EAPOL-Key -- KRB_AP_REQ – AUTH: EAPOL-Key -- KRB_AP_REP – SUPP: EAP REP -- Finished – AS: RADIUS Accept – AUTH: EAP Success

6 Needham-Schroeder Key Descriptor 11/12/ x/EAP Reconnect Exchange The 802.1x/EAP flow for Kerberos might be – AUTH: EAP Ident REQ – SUPP: EAP Ident REP – AS: EAP REQ -- Kerberos – SUPP: EAPOL-Key -- KRB_AP_REQ – AUTH: EAPOL-Key -- KRB_AP_REP – SUPP: EAP REP -- Finished – AS: RADIUS Accept – AUTH: EAP Success

7 Needham-Schroeder Key Descriptor 11/12/2002 EAPOL-Key Format Descriptor Type (7.6.1) Octet Number N EAP Type Length Needham-Schroeder Body

8 Needham-Schroeder Key Descriptor 11/12/2002 Samples of Needham-Schroeder Body KRB_AP_REQ (RFC 1510) KRB_AP_REP (RFC 1510)