Ramanuja ( AD) Commentary on the Vedanta Sutras (Shri-Bhashya)

General outline of the text A critique of Shankara’s metaphysical monism (non-dualism) ( ) A critique of Shankara’s metaphysical idealism ( ) A critique of Shankara’s theory of the Self ( ) A critique of Shankara’s theory of ignorance ( )

Shankara vs. Ramanuja Non-Dualism (Advaita) Brahman alone is real. Brahman & Atman are identical (one & the same). The phenomenal world is an appearance of Brahman caused by ignorance (avidya) & illusion (maya). Qualified Non-Dualism (Vishishadvaita) Brahman alone is ultimately & independently real, but in Brahman there are many individual material beings & many individual conscious selves. Material things & conscious selves are real, but not independently or ultimately so. They exist only in & in relation to Brahman. See fn 2 on p. 177 & fn 3 on p

Detailed outline of the text A critique of S’s metaphysical monism - Brahman, Pure Being, alone is real; distinctions & differences are unreal ( ). –Metaphysical monism is unprovable (177). –Knowing requires objects that are distinct & different from each other (177). –Acts of consciousness reveal metaphysical distinctions (178). –Speech implies metaphysical distinctions (178-9). –Perception reveals metaphysical distinctions ( ). –The process of inference implies metaphysical distinctions (180). –There is no perception of Pure Being (180). –Impermanent things are not necessarily unreal (contrary to S’s view that only that which is permanent is real) (181).

Detailed outline, cont’d A critique of S’s metaphysical idealism (182-6) –Being & consciousness are not one & the same (182). –Consciousness can be an object of consciousness (182-3). –Consciousness is not eternal (although the Self is) (183-5). –There is no consciousness without an object (185-6).

Detailed outline, cont’d Consciousness is an attribute of a permanent Self; Self & consciousness are not one & the same ( ). The basic differences between Ramanuja & Shankara on the nature of the Self (Editor’s Comment, 188-9). The individual conscious subject (the “I-Self”) persists in the state of release & is the true Atman- Self ( ). A critique of S’s theory of the Self ( )

A critique of S’s theory of ignorance ( ) S’s theory of beginningless ignorance (avidya), which can neither “be” nor “not be” ( ) Ramanuja’s critique: –What is the ground of beginningless ignorance? (191-2) –How can beginningless ignorance neither be nor not-be? (192-4) –How can Brahman be affected by ignorance? (194-6) Detailed outline, cont’d

Even more detailed analysis of the text

Ramanuja’s critique of Shankara’s metaphysical monism Shankara’s monism: Brahman, Pure Being, alone is real; distinctions & differences are unreal (177). Individual entities are impermanent (& therefore unreal) appearances of Pure Being. Pure Being alone is “really real.” The differences & distinctions between individual entities are unreal (like the entities themselves) (178). Preliminary criticisms: –Metaphysical monism cannot be proved true [but it can be proved false] (177). –Knowing requires objects that are distinct & different from each other (177). Why? Extra-Credit Essay (Follow instructions in Course Syllabus)

Ramanuja’s critique of Shankara’s metaphysical monism Acts of consciousness reveal metaphysical distinctions (178): 1“I see this.” “I” distinct & different from “this” & vice versa. 2Consciousness itself has various (& different) attributes (permanence, oneness, etc.). 3Philosophical disputation presupposes differences between opposing philosophical views.

Ramanuja’s critique of Shankara’s metaphysical monism Speech implies metaphysical distinctions (178-9): 1A word is a combination of root & suffix - two different linguistic elements. 2The plurality of words is based on a plurality of meanings (each different from the others). 3A sentence is a series of words expressing a number of different meanings.

Ramanuja’s critique of Shankara’s metaphysical monism This is true of both “determinate” and “non- determinate” perception (i.e., perception that recognizes class membership & generic differences & perception that does not include such recognition). They both include recognition of differences & distinctions. Even in “non-determinate” perception, there is recognition of the difference between substance and attribute in the structure of the object perceived (for the 1st time). Perception reveals metaphysical distinctions ( )

Ramanuja’s critique of Shankara’s metaphysical monism The process of inference implies metaphysical distinctions (180)  Perception reveals a world marked by difference. 2 Inference is a process of reasoning based upon perception. 3 Inference must also reveal a world marked by difference.

Ramanuja’s critique of Shankara’s metaphysical monism Shankara claims that the true object of perception is Being-Itself (Pure Being) (see 180). Ramanuja claims that there is no perception of Pure Being (180) :  All objects of perception are things distinguished from other things in various ways. 2 There is a difference between substance & attribute in all objects of perception. 3 If the only true object of perception is Pure Being, then all judgments referring to different objects are meaningless & false. 4 If perceived differences & distinctions are unreal, then a man searching for horse should be satisfied with finding a buffalo. 5 None of the senses (sight, touch, hearing, etc.) have Pure Being for their object.

Ramanuja’s critique of Shankara’s metaphysical monism Another argument for monism by Shankara:  Brahman is permanent.  Individual entities are impermanent.  The permanent is real, & the impermanent is unreal.  Brahman alone is real. R’s response: Impermanent things are not necessarily unreal - sublation & persistence (see Text, 181). (Text, 181) (Is R’s response here a relevant reply to S’s argument? Why or why not?) Extra-Credit Essay

Even more detail, cont’d A critique of S’s metaphysical idealism (182-6) –Being & consciousness are not one & the same (182). –Consciousness can be an object of consciousness (182-3). –Consciousness is not eternal (although the Self is) (183-5). –There is no consciousness without an object (185-6).

Shankara’s argument for metaphysical idealism (according to Ramanuja)  All differences & distinctions are unreal (metaphysical monism).  Being & consciousness are both (obviously) real.  There are no differences or distinctions between Being and consciousness. They must be one and the same (metaphysical idealism). (Text, 182) Again, R appeals to perception to counter the 1st premise of this argument: Perception (he claims) shows that there is a real distinction & relationship between consciousness & its objects (185-6).

Consciousness can be an object of consciousness (182-3) Shankara claims that consciousness cannot be an object of consciousness (182). (Why is this important to him? Is it a part of metaphysical idealism?) Ramanuja claims that there are at least two situations in which consciousness is an object of consciousness: –Consciousness of the consciousness of others –Consciousness of one’s own past states of consciousness Ramanuja’s critique of Shankara’s metaphysical idealism

Ramanuja’s critique of Shankara’s metaphysical idealism (continued) Shankara argues that consciousness is eternal on the ground that the “antecedent non- existence of consciousness” cannot be proved. (See Text, 183)

reacts to Shankara’s argument by trying to show that the “antecedent non-existence of consciousness” can be known (by consciousness itself). (See Text, 184-5) Ramanuja’s critique of Shankara’s metaphysical idealism ( continued)

Ramanuja also argues that there is no consciousness without an object (no pure, undifferentiated consciousness). (See Text, 185-6)

Even more detail, cont’d Consciousness is an attribute of a permanent Self; Self & consciousness are not one & the same (186-8). The basic differences between Ramanuja & Shankara on the nature of the Self (Editor’s Comment, ). The individual conscious subject (the “I-Self”) persists in the state of release & is the true Atman- Self ( ). A critique of S’s theory of the Self ( )

A critique of S’s theory of ignorance ( ) S’s theory of beginningless ignorance (avidya), which can neither “be” nor “not be” ( ) Ramanuja’s critique: –What is the ground of beginningless ignorance? (191-2) –How can beginningless ignorance neither be nor not-be? (192-4) –How can Brahman be affected by ignorance? (194-6) Even more detail, cont’d