Shadow: Simple HPC for Systems Security Research Invited Talk Kansas State University September 25 th, 2013 Rob Jansen U.S. Naval Research Laboratory

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Presentation transcript:

Shadow: Simple HPC for Systems Security Research Invited Talk Kansas State University September 25 th, 2013 Rob Jansen U.S. Naval Research Laboratory

Outline ● Experimentation Ideology ● Shadow and its Design ● Use case: – Overview: the Distributed Tor Network – Research: the Sniper Attack Against Tor

Outline ● Experimentation Ideology ● Shadow and its Design ● Use case: – Overview: the Distributed Tor Network – Research: the Sniper Attack Against Tor

Properties of Experimentation

Network Research

Testbed Trade-offs Controllable Reproducible Scalable Accuracy Convenient Live NetworkXX PlanetLab? SimulationXXXX EmulationXX ShadowXXX?X

Outline ● Experimentation Ideology ● Shadow and its Design ● Use case: – Overview: the Distributed Tor Network – Research: the Sniper Attack Against Tor

What is Shadow? ● Discrete event network simulator ● Runs real applications without modification ● Simulates time, network, crypto, CPU ● Models routing, latency, bandwidth ● Single Linux box without root privileges

Shadow’s Capabilities

Bootstrapping Shadow

Virtual Network Configuration

Virtual Host Configuration

Simulation Engine

Program Layout Libraries (libc, …) Shadow Engine (shadow-bin) Shadow Plug-in (application+ wrapper)

Plug-in Wrapper Hooks Libraries (libc, …) Shadow Engine (shadow-bin) Shadow Plug-in (application+ wrapper)

Function Interposition LD_PRELOAD=/home/rob/libpreload.so Libraries (libc, …) Shadow Engine (shadow-bin) Shadow Plug-in (application+ wrapper) libpreload (socket, write, …)

Function Interposition LD_PRELOAD=/home/rob/libpreload.so hooks Libraries (libc, …) Shadow Engine (shadow-bin) Shadow Plug-in (application+ wrapper) libpreload (socket, write, …)

Function Interposition libpreload (socket, write, …) LD_PRELOAD=/home/rob/libpreload.so Libraries (libc, …) Shadow Engine (shadow-bin) Shadow Plug-in (application+ wrapper) hooksfopen

Function Interposition libpreload (socket, write, …) LD_PRELOAD=/home/rob/libpreload.so socket Libraries (libc, …) Shadow Engine (shadow-bin) Shadow Plug-in (application+ wrapper) hooksfopen

Function Interposition libpreload (socket, write, …) LD_PRELOAD=/home/rob/libpreload.so write Libraries (libc, …) Shadow Engine (shadow-bin) Shadow Plug-in (application+ wrapper) hooksfopen

Clang/LLVM (custom pass) Virtual Context Switching

Shadow-Tor’s Accuracy

Shadow-Tor’s Scalability Memory: MiB per virtual Tor host

Outline ● Experimentation Ideology ● Shadow and its Design ● Use case: – Overview: the Distributed Tor Network – Research: the Sniper Attack Against Tor

The Tor Anonymity Network torproject.org

How Tor Works

Tor protocol aware

Outline ● Experimentation Ideology ● Shadow and its Design ● Use case: – Overview: the Distributed Tor Network – *Research: the Sniper Attack Against Tor *Joint with Aaron Johnson, Florian Tschorsch, Björn Scheuermann

Tor Flow Control exit entry

Tor Flow Control One TCP Connection Between Each Relay, Multiple Circuits exit entry

Tor Flow Control One TCP Connection Between Each Relay, Multiple Circuits Multiple Application Streams exit entry

Tor Flow Control No end-to-end TCP! exit entry

Tor Flow Control Tor protocol aware exit entry

Tor Flow Control Packaging End Delivery End exit entry

Tor Flow Control Packaging End Delivery End exit entry

Tor Flow Control 1000 Cell Limit SENDME Signal Every 100 Cells exit entry

The Sniper Attack ● Low-cost memory consumption attack ● Disables arbitrary Tor relays ● Anonymous if launched through Tor

The Sniper Attack Start Download Request exit entry

The Sniper Attack Reply DATA exit entry

The Sniper Attack Package and Relay DATA DATA exit entry

The Sniper Attack DATA Stop Reading from Connection DATA R exitentry

The Sniper Attack DATA R exit entry

The Sniper Attack DATA Periodically Send SENDME SENDME R DATA exit entry

The Sniper Attack DATA Out of Memory, Killed by OS R DATA exit entry

Memory Consumed over Time

Mean RAM Consumed, 50 Relays

Mean BW Consumed, 50 Relays

Sniper Attack Defenses ● Authenticated SENDMEs ● Queue Length Limit ● Adaptive Circuit Killer

Circuit-Killer Defense

Sniper Attack Implications ● Reduce Tor’s capacity ● Network Denial of Service ● Influence path selection (selective DoS) ● Deanonymization of hidden services

Outline ● Experimentation Ideology ● Shadow and its Design ● Use case: – Overview: the Distributed Tor Network – Research: the Sniper Attack Against Tor

Questions? shadow.github.io github.com/shadow cs.umn.edu/~jansen think like an adversary