Towards a more peaceful world? Trends in armed conflict Lecture at HEI, 22 March 2007 Course E 584 Topics in Peace Research Nils Petter Gleditsch Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW), International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) & Department of Sociology & Political Science Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU)

Norman Angell (1910): The Great Illusion Gaddis (1987): The Long Peace The End of War Norman Angell (1910): The Great Illusion Gaddis (1987): The Long Peace Mueller (1989): The Obsolescence of War Mueller (2006): The Waning of War No wars between developed countries during the Cold War Remarkably few major international wars of any kind since World War II The only traditional interstate war since 1975: Iran-Iraq No major war between Israel and its neighbors since 1973 The remnants of war are largely crime

War Is Not (Necessarily) Waning Wallensteen (2006): Too early to tell Prussian War is declining (the two World Wars were atypical) No war between two Security Council members since the Korean War (1950– 53) - and there were many proxy wars during the Cold War War is waning between industrialized countries - but industrialized countries are not lower in war participation There are many regional wars (Middle East, Central Africa in the 1990s) Many wars still have a global impact When will we have peace between major powers: when we have cooperative and universalistic relations between major powers The Prussian wars (the French-German Wars and the two World Wars )were industrial wars, based on mechanized warfare Cultural reactions against war have been particularly strong against this kind of war

Mearsheimer (1990): Back to the future War Is Not Waning Mearsheimer (1990): Back to the future Huntington (1993): Clash of Civilizations Gurr (1994): Surge of Ethnopolitical Conflict - but also Gurr (2000), Ethnic warfare on the wane Rice (1993): Wars of the third kind Kaldor (1999): New wars Marshall (1999): The Third World War Sarkees, Wayman & Singer (2003): A Disturbing constancy of war - different types of war peak at different times and must be examined together - war shifts between regions (proxy wars) Gurr’s article written shortly after Rwanda and after the wars started in Yugoslavia (but before Srebrenica in 1995) Rice’s concept, wars of the third kind, is also used by Holsti (1996). The first kind is nuclear war, the second kind conventional war Extrasystemic war peaked in the period 1870-1899

Number of battle deaths Indirect deaths Number of countries in war A look at the evidence Number of wars Number of battle deaths Indirect deaths Number of countries in war Number of countries at war Area affected by war Non-state conflicts One-sided conflicts Terrorism A longer time perspective A very much longer time perspective If war is waning – why? Gurr’s article written shortly after Rwanda and after the wars started in Yugoslavia (but before Srebrenica in 1995) Rice’s concept, wars of the third kind, is also used by Holsti (1996). The first kind is nuclear war, the second kind conventional war Extrasystemic war peaked in the period 1870-1899

Armed Conflicts in 2005 Countries with conflict on their territory in 2005 (dark brown color), countries with conflict on their territory after the end of the Cold War (light brown color), and the geographical centre of the conflict (red circle). Source: Halvard Buhaug, on the basis of the Uppsala/PRIO conflict data, see www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict.

Armed conflicts, 1946–2005 Source: Harbom, Högbladh & Wallensteen (2006). For the data, see www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict.

Armed conflicts, 1946–2005 For the data, see Harbom, Högbladh & Wallensteen (2006) and www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict. In this figure, the number of conflicts is normalized by the number of independent countries. Figure created by Lars Wilhelmsen.

Wars, 1946–2005 The wars in 2005 were: The Iraq War, … Only conflicts with more than 1000 battle deaths in a single year. See Harbom, Högbladh & Wallensteen (2006) and www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict. In this figure, too, the number of wars is normalized by the number of independent countries. Figure created by Lars Wilhelmsen.

Probability of death in battle, 1900–2005 (%) Peaks to annual world loss of .3%. Of course, some countries, such as Poland, had much higher relative war losses. Some countries have also experience high war losses in wars that were otherwise too small to have a global impact, notably the Korean War and the Vietnam War. Data for the number of battle deaths (civilian and military) from the COW Project (1900–45) and from our own data (1946–2005) at www.prio.no/cscw/cross/battledeaths, cf. Lacina, Gleditsch & Russett (2006). The number of battle deaths have been divided by the world population in all independent countries for that year, based on data in Gleditsch & Ward (2006).

Probability of death in battle, 1946–2005 (%) Figure created by Lars Wilhelmsen. Data for the number of battle deaths (civilian and military) are from www.prio.no/cscw/cross/battledeaths, cf. Lacina & Gleditsch (2005). The number of battle deaths has been divided by the world population in all independent countries for that year, based on population data in Gleditsch & Ward (2006).

The Iraq spike The Burnham et al. article estimated by means of a sample survey that some 650,000 people had been killed in armed violence in Iraq in the first three years since the US invasion. These figures are highly contested. Figure created by Lars Wilhelmsen. The data for the number of battle deaths (civilian and military) are from the same sources as the previous slide but the Lacina figures for Iraqi battle deaths have been replaced by the median estimate of a (somewhat controversial) article in The Lancet (Burnham et al., 2006).

The blodiest conflicts after World War II Time Battle deaths Vietnam War 1955–75 2,100,000 Korean War 1950–53 1,250,000 Chinese Civil War 1946–49 1,200,000 Iran-Irak War 1980–88 650,000 Afghanistan 1978–2002 550,000

What is not included in these numbers? One-sided violence (genocide, politicide, democide) Non-state conflicts (communal conflicts) Crime Nonviolent deaths in the wake of war (indirect deaths) Tabellen viser at de største krigene etter annen verdenskrig har vært internasjonaliserte borgerkriger (Korea, Vietnam), men disser er klassifisert som internasjonale kriger (forklar hvorfor). Iran-Irak-krigen er den største 'rene' mellomstatlige krigen.

Casualties in state, non-state, and one-sided conflicts 2002–03 Kilde: Human Security Report.

Genocide and politicide 1956–2001 The figures refer to the number of cases with serious human rights violations in a given year. The figure has been copied from Mack (2007) based on data from Harff (2003), updated to 2005. Please do not reproduce, since Mack (2007) is still in press. An earlier figure (to 2001) is available in Mack (2005).

Genocide and politicide 1989–2004 Source: Eck & Hultman (2007). The figure for ’government’ in 1994 is 530,399 and is way above the ceiling for the figure.

Democide in the twentieth century The data are from Rummel (1994), updated on his website http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/. Definitions: Genocide: among other things, the killing of people by a government because of their indelible group membership (race, ethnicity, religion, language). Politicide: the murder of any person or people by a government because of their politics or for political purposes. Mass Murder: the indiscriminate killing of any person or people by a government. Democide: The murder of any person or people by a government, including genocide, politicide, and mass murder.

Democide by year, 1900–1987 Source: Rummel (1997): Table 23.1, http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/SOD.FIG23.1.GIF. Some of the democide estimates have subsequently been revised upwards. Including them might make the curve peak in a later year around the ‘Great Leap Forward’ in China, 1958–61), but would probably not affect the inverted U-shape. (This figure was added to the ppt presentation after the lecture.)

Indirect deaths in selected conflicts in Africa Country Time period (a) Battle deaths (b) War deaths b/a Angola 1974–2002 160 475 1,5 mill.; 50% after 1992 9 DR Congo 1998–2001 145 000 2,5 mill. (incl. 350 000 violent) 17 Ethiopia* 1976–91 16 000 1984–85: 1–2 mill. 63–125 Liberia 1989–2001 24 099 150 000–200 000 6–9 Mozambique 1976–92 145 400 500 000–1 mill. 3–7 Nigeria (Biafra ) 1967–70 75 000 500 000–2 mill. 7–27 Sierra Leone 1991–2000 12 997 1991–95: 30 000 2 Somalia 1981–96 67 250 from 1988 to mid-1990s: 250 000–350 000 4–5 Sudan 1983–2002 55 500 2 mill. 36 Sudan (Anya Nya rebellion) 1963–73 20 000 250 000–750 000 13–38 * Eritrea rebellion not included. Source: Lacina & Gleditsch (2005)

Good news about international terrorism, number of episodes, 1982–2003 Source: Mack (2005), based on data from the US Department of State

Bad news about international terrorism, number of deaths 1982–2003 Source: Mack (2005), based on data from the US Department of State

Military expenditure, 1985–2003 Source: Bonn International Center for Conversion, www.bicc.de

More countries are involved in conflict Figure created by Lars Wilhelmsen on the basis of www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict .

Average number of countries per conflict Figure created by Lars Wilhelmsen on the basis of www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict. Number of conflict participants for all conflicts divided by the number of on-going conflicts.

A smaller share of countries have a conflict on their own territory Figure created by Halvard Buhaug, based on the conflict locations reported by Buhaug & Gates (2002).

The size of the conflict zones are declining Computed by Lars Wilhelmsen, based on the circular conflict zones reported by Buhaug & Gates (2002).

Great power wars 1500–2000 The frequency of great-power wars graphed by quarter centuries. From Levy, Walker & Edwards (2001), Figure 2 (20).

War in Primitive Societies Keeley (1996) LeBlanc (2003) Pinker (2007) - against the myth of ‘the peaceful savage’ Absolute deaths have probably climbed because of modern technology (explosive power, delivery vehicles) and large population concentrations. There is nothing in pre-history to match the firebombing of Dresden and Tokyo or the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Nevertheless, in relative terms, primitive warfare seems to have killed a larger share of the population than modern warfare, although there were also peaceful primitive societies Source: …

Modern and primitive warfare Scale: 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1.0 1.2 Annual war deaths as % of population. Source: Keeley (1996: 89, Figure 6.1)

Why was primitive warfare so deadly? The prevalence of wars Frequent low-casualty battles High participation of tribesmen High-frequency deadly raids Customary killing of all adult males Poor treatment of women and children Absolute deaths have probably climbed because of modern technology (explosive power, delivery vehicles) and large population concentrations. There is nothing in pre-history to match the firebombing of Dresden and Tokyo or the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Nevertheless, in relative terms, primitive warfare seems to have killed a larger share of the population than modern warfare, although there were also peaceful primitive societies Source: Keeley (1996), ch. 6.

How to account for the move to peace? Liberalism: Spread of democracy, economic integration, and international organization Realism: Lack of great-power confrontations Structuralism: Hegemonic rule Conflict resolution: More peacekeeping and peacemaking

The growth of the liberal factors - Source for democracy: Marshall & Jaggers (2003), for trade/GDP: Gleditsch (2002), for IGOs: Pevehouse, Nordstrom & Warnke (2004)

Peacemaking and peacekeeping Conflict resolution Peacekeeping Peacemaking - but Luttwak: Give war a chance Mack (2005, 2007) emphasizes the conflict resolution and peacemaking perspective. Luttwak questions whether peacekeeping could lead to a prolongation of wars that would otherwise fizzle out. Mack (2007) accepts this as a

Trends in peacemaking Preventing conflict onsets: A six-fold increase in UN preventive diplomacy missions (1  6) between 1990 and 2002 Ending ongoing conflicts: A five-fold increase in UN peacemaking missions (3  15) between 1989 and 2002 Preventing restarts: A Four-fold increase in UN peace operations (5  20) between 1987 and 1999 Support local actors: A twelve-fold increase in ‘Friends of the Secretary-General’ and other mechanisms (3  36) between 1989 and 2004 Mack (2005, 2007) emphasizes the conflict resolution and peacemaking perspective. Luttwak questions whether peacekeeping could lead to a prolongation of wars that would otherwise fizzle out. Mack (2007) accepts this as a Source: Mack (2007: 3)

Distinguishing between the explanations? Realism, structuralism, and peacekeeping: Change occurs at 1989 - number of conflicts - conflict zone Liberalism: Longer-term change - battle deaths - great-power war

Accounting for the increase in countries at war Realism - more countries assuming regional power role Structuralism - hegemon is commanding more countries into war Liberalism - international norms pursued by more countries Peacekeeping - peacekeeping wars

Number of participants in the 'largest' conflicts No. of states Start End Conflict 36 2003 continuing Iraq intervention and civil war 29 1990 1991 Iraq vs. Kuwait 27 1978 Afghanistan civil war and intervention 20 1998 1999 Yugoslavia (Serbia) –Kosovo War 1949 1953 Korean War 9 1965 1975 Vietnam War 8 1964 2001 Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) 3–6 17 conflicts 2 60 conflicts 1 145 conflicts

Participants in the two recent Iraq conflicts 1990–91 (28 countries vs. 1) USA, Canada, Honduras, Argentina, UK, Netherlands, Belgium, France, Spain, Portugal, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Greece, Norway, Denmark, Senegal, Niger, Morocco, Kuwait, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Australia vs. Iraq 2003– (35 countries vs. 1, 13 old + 23 new) USA, Dominican Republic, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, UK, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Italy, Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Moldova, Rumania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Norway, Denmark, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Republic of Korea, Japan, Philippines, Australia + Tonga

Problems in testing the general models - not all effects linear (in particular democracy, but perhaps economic interdependence and IGOs) democracy where? cannot predict annual changes very well sensitive to single wars but wars backed by major powers on opposite sides seem less likely – hence cautious optimism

References (1) Angell, Normann, 1910. The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to Their Economic and Social Advantage. London: Heinemann. Reissued in a new edition, same publisher, 1934. [Shorter version published 1909 as Europe’s Optical Illusion] Buhaug, Halvard & Scott Gates, 2002. ‘The Geography of Civil War’, Journal of Peace Research 39(4): 417–433. Burnham, Gilbert; Riyadh Lafta, Shannon Doocy & Les Roberts, 2006. ’Mortality after the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: A Cross-sectional Cluster Sample Survey’, Lancet 368(9545): 1421–1428. Eck, Kristine & Lisa Hultman, 2007. ’One-Sided Violence against Civilians in War: Insights from New Fatality Data’, Journal of Peace Research 44(2), in press. Gaddis, John Lewis, 1987. The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press. Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede, 2002. ’Expanded Trade and GDP Data’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 46(5): 712–724 Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede & Michael D. Ward, 2006. 'The Diffusion of Democracy and the International Context of Democratization', International Organization 60(4): 911–933 Gurr, Ted Robert, 1994. ‘Peoples against States – Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World-System’, International Studies Quarterly 38(3): 347–377 Gurr, Ted Robert, 1994. ‘Ethnic Warfare on the Wane’, Foreign Affairs 79(3): 52–64 Harff, Barbara, 2003. ‘No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risk of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955’, American Political Science Review 97(1): 57–73 Harbom, Lotta; Stina Högbladh & Peter Wallensteen, 2006. 'Armed Conflict and Peace Agreements', Journal of Peace Research 43(5): 617–631. Hewitt, Joe; Jon Wilkenfeld & Ted Gurr, eds, 2007. Peace and Conflict 2007. Boulder, CO: Paradigm, in press Huntingon, Samuel P., 1993. ‘The Clash of Civilizations’, Foreign Affairs 72(3): 22–49 Kaldor, Mary, 1999. New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press Keeley, Lawrence H., 1996. War before Civilization. New York: Oxford University Press Lacina, Bethany & Nils Petter Gleditsch, 2005: 'Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths', European Journal of Population 21(2–3): 145–166. Lacina, Bethany; Nils Petter Gleditsch & Bruce Russett, 2006. 'The Declining Risk of Death in Battle', International Studies Quarterly 50(3): 673–680

References (2) LeBlanc, Steven A., with Katherine E. Register, 2003. Constant Battles: The Myth of the Peaceful, Noble Savage. New York: St. Martin’s. Levy, Jack S; Thomas C. Walker & Martin S. Edwards, 2001. ’Continuity and Change in the Evolution of Warfare’, in Zeev Maoz & Azar Gat, eds, War in a Changing World. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press (15–48) Luttwak, Edward, 1999. ‘Give War a Chance’, Foreign Affairs 78(4): 36–44 Mack, Andrew, ed., 2005. Human Security Report 2005. War and Peace in the 21st Century. New York: Oxford University Press, for Human Security Centre, University of British Columbia, www.humansecurityreport.org. Mack, Andrew, ed., 2005. Human Security Brief 2006. New York: Oxford University Press, for Human Security Centre, University of British Columbia, www.humansecurityreport.org. Mack, Andrew, 2007. Global Political Violence: Explaining the Post-Cold War Decline. Coping with Crisis. Working Paper Series. New York: International Peace Academy, in press Maoz, Zeev, 2001. ’Democratic Networks: Connecting National, Dyadic, and Systemic Levels of Analysis in the Study of Democracy and War’, in Maoz & Gat, eds (143–182) Maoz, Zeev & Azar Gat, eds, War in a Changing World. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Marshall, Monty G., 1999. Third World War: System, Process, and Conflict Dynamics. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Marshall, Monty G. & Keith Jaggers, 2003. Polity IV Project. http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/. Mearsheimer, John J., 1990. ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War’, International Security 15(1): 5–56 Mueller, John, 1989. Retreat from Doomsday. The Obsolescence of Major War. New York: Basic Books. Mueller, John, 2004. The Remnants of War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press Mueller, John, 2006. ‘Accounting for the Waning of Major War’, ch. 2 in Väyrynen, ed. (64–79) Pevehouse, J., T. Nordstrom and K. Warnke, 2004. Intergovernmental Organizations, 1815-2000: A New Correlates of War Data Set. http://cow2.la.psu.edu/COW2%20Data/IGOs/IGOv2-1.htm Pinker. Steven, 2007. ’We’re Getting Nicer Every Day’, New Republic, 19 March Rice, Edward E., 1993. Wars of the Third Kind: Conflict in Underdeveloped Countries. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press Rummel, Rudolph J., 1994. Death by Government: Genocide and Mass Murder in the Twentieth Century. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Rummel, Rodolph J., 1997. Statistics of Democide. Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900. Charlottesville, VA: Center for National Security Law, School of Law, University of Virginia & Transaction Publishers, Rutgers University, http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/NOTE5.HTM Sarkees, Meredith R.; Frank W. Wayman & J. David Singer, 2003. ‘Inter-state, Intra-state, and Extra-state Wars: A Comprehensive Look at Their Distribution over Time’, International Studies Quarterly 47(1): 49–70 Väyrynen, Raimo, ed., 2006. The Waning of Major War. Theories and Debates. London & New York: Routledge Wallensteen, Peter, 2006, 2006. ‘Trends in Major War: Too Early for Waning’, ch. 3 in Väyrynen, ed.