By Zaim Prosic Ministry of Interior Una Sana Canton Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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Presentation transcript:

By Zaim Prosic Ministry of Interior Una Sana Canton Bosnia and Herzegovina

 First, the law clearly defines the mandate, role and responsibilities of intelligence services and their officials.  Second, a legal basis for all government organizations is essential for promoting transparency.  Third, a legal basis gives intelligence services legitimacy in the eyes of the public.  Finally, public intelligence laws are needed to hold the government accountable. Intelligence oversight bodies and the public at large hold the executive and intelligence services to account for their compliance with such laws.

 Parliament : Legislating, Controlling finances, Overseeing policies and activities  Expert oversight bodies : These bodies are independent from intelligence services, the executive and parliament. They focus exclusively on overseeing particular intelligence services.  The judiciary (Through their rulings, courts set standards for controlling the future conduct of intelligence services)  The internal management of the intelligence service  Complaints commission, ombudsman  Ad hoc (Church Committee)  NGOs and the media

 Legal regulation – usually the least relevant obstacle  Capacity and knowledge of outsiders  Lack of information and the need to maintain secrecy (William Casey testimonies in front of Congressional Intelligence Oversight Board)  Lack of independence by the secondary actors (media) or even primary actors (judicial system)  Lack of political will

 Watergate affair – use of Intelligence service to gain information on political opponents  Iran – Contra – use of clandestine service to promote goals not in line with declared national security policy (C130)  “The Red Scare” – use of security apparatus (FBI) to combat perceived threat of communism, thus violating constitutional human rights

 Previous examples reflect the difficulty in the maintenance of effective oversight despite democratic oversight legal regulation, executive and legislative bodies, and financial and expert capacities embedded in them.  Implementation of legal and ethical standards on which a national consensus exists, is a key to develop an effective Intelligence apparatus oversight in transition democracies  Primary tools : ◦ Education ◦ International cooperation ◦ Security system integration (NATO, OSCE, Interpol, UN) ◦ Awareness campaign

 Political and other elites might always be challenged to misuse government infrastructure. Professional, devoted, educated and independent officers of this infrastructure will not allow themselves to become an expendable tool of government elites, which is the most important safeguard against misuse.  We have to be aware of the responsibilities entrusted by the general population, and act in accordance!