Intuitionism G.E. Moore, W.D. Ross

G.E. Moore? Who? ‘Common Sense’ philosopher – often keen to take ‘common sense’ view of philosophical problems Along with Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein, made Cambridge centre for ‘analytic philosophy’ Died in 1944 Wrote at length about morals. ‘Principia Ethica’ is his most famous book. Argues for intuitionism plus a form of utilitarianism… intuitive moral principles identify the good and utilitarian principles maximise it…

Moore’s Ethical Intuitionism A form of non-consequentialism He argues: “The Good” is indefinable, but there are objective moral truths, which are self-evident to a mature mind. Hence known by intuition. ‘This, while not strictly provable, is a presumption of mature common sense – and so should be accepted unless we have proof to the contrary.’

Aside: Closed versus Open questions A closed question must be answered with a simple yes" or "no", or with a specific piece of information. An open-ended question cannot usefully be answered with a simple “yes”, “no”, or a single specific piece of information. Which is which? How much do you weigh? Is Mozart a pop musician or a serious composer? Can Hitler be a vegetarian if he eats meat? Are exam results the only reason for coming to school?

1. The Good is indefinable Moore’s argument that the good is indefinable is known as ‘The Open Question Argument’ O.Q. Arg. = asking "Is it true that X means/is Y?" Closed question if the answer is ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ Shows that X is clearly defined Open question if a conceptually competent person can debate the response. Shows that X is not clearly defined

Moore’s reasoning Exemplar 1 – Open or Closed? Take X to be ‘Father Christmas’ and Y to be ‘kindly old man’ Is it true that X means Y? (Or: is it true that X is Y?) Exemplar 2 – Open or Closed? Take X to be ‘Good’ and Y to be ‘socially approved’… Is it true that X means Y? Exemplar 3 – Open or Closed? Take X to be ‘Good’ and Y to be any plausible quality that you like So, FC is adequately defined, and ‘Good’ is not adequately defined…

All moral Questions = Open Questions Their answers cannot be deduced from the concepts in the terms alone. For Moore, all moral questions are synthetic, not analytic. The Open Question Argument shows any attempt to identify morality with some set of observable, natural properties will always be an open question. Contrast e.g. colour identities, which are observable and public…we know what ‘yellow’ is, or means So moral facts cannot be reduced to natural properties Hence Ethical Naturalism (= moral values are found in nature) is therefore false.

2. Objective moral truths are intuited Moore’s argument for this is something like: Either there are no moral truths (too dreadful to contemplate) Or moral truths are found in nature (commits Naturalistic Fallacy, so is wrong) Or there are intuitive, self-evident moral truths ‘self-evident to a mature mind’ Not a matter of demonstration, proof, justification Basic moral truths are ‘simple ideas’ similar to basic colour ideas, such as the idea of ‘yellow’ they can’t be further analysed, unlike complex ideas (‘horse’ = hooves + neigh)

Analogy: maths and morality Mathematical principles (e.g. 2+2 = 4, y squared tends to infinity) Intuited Yet precise And largely agreed upon by experts of different cultures Moral principles (e.g. all men are created equal; Pleasure is intrinsically good; Hatred is wrong) And largely agreed on by experts of different cultures Does this analogy hold? moral principles are vague, Moral principles are widely disputed by experts Moral principles are subject to social conditioning…) So: are there self-evident moral truths? Moore: to doubt common-sense intuitions is crazy But: this is mud-slinging, not argument…

Strengths of Moore’s Account If moral truths are non-propositional, then much foolish moral debate can be avoided: there is nothing to articulate. The counterintuitive analysis of some moral dilemmas offered by Utilitarianism is avoided: e.g. no ‘George’ or ‘Jim’ problem, as Moore’s account gives us a way of talking about what is intrinsically felt. The doctrinaire sterility of Deontology can be avoided: we do what feels to us to be right, not necessarily only what we can rationally generalise. There is widespread agreement about our moral intuitions, so Moore’s theory accords with the facts: it accords with ‘common sense’.

Hold on! What might be wrong with the idea of ‘self-evident’ moral truths?

A problem with self-evidence Allegedly “self-evident truths” can differ widely. “One basic principle must be the absolute rule for the SS man: we must be honest, decent, loyal, and comradely to members of our own blood and to nobody else. What happens to a Russian, to a Czech does not interest me in the slightest…” - Josef Goebbels (Nazi propagandist) “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.” - Thomas Jefferson (First President of US…slave-owner…)

More issues with self-evidence… Are self-evident truths present from birth? Do all adults know them? Is it self-evident what we ought to do in every concrete situation? (What dilemmas can you think of?) Should we accept as self-evident any principle that seems initially plausible to us? (What could be wrong with a ‘gut feel’?) Intuitionist moral education inculcates parental (and perhaps Nazi or terrorist) norms – which later will seem to be “self-evident truths.” …We need some way to rationally criticise inherited moral intuitions.

Time to read Moore No pun intended…let’s look to his text for a minute.

W.D. Ross – Prima Facie obligations W.D.Ross (1877-1971) wrote The Right and the Good (1930) Moral realist (believes in the existence of moral truth), and so is… Not a consequentialist: you should aim for moral truth (some actions are wrong in themselves) not just (for instance) maximising the good… For instance, we have a strong, but not exceptionless, prima facie (‘on the face of it’) duty to keep our promises. Shares some similarities with Kant (so avoids pitfalls of utilitarianism) but also avoids issues over exceptionless promises…(Kant’s problem) and provides a way of reasoning about moral intuitions (Moore’s problem)

Moral Realism – an aside = view that ethical sentences express propositions and Some such propositions are true. Those propositions are made true by objective features of the world, independent of subjective opinion. So “X is good” is true if that thing really is good. These objective features are not natural features, though (to say so would be commit the Naturalistic Fallacy) Ross: “The moral order...is just as much part of the fundamental nature of the universe…as is the spatial or numerical structure expressed in the axioms of geometry or arithmetic.” These objective features or duties are known through (rational) intuition “at first glance” by the mature person So, Ross, like Moore, is an intuitionist…

Reading Ross Let’s take ten minutes to read over the five sections of Ross’s text, in five pairs or small groups. Each group will then present their findings. Or ask questions of the text.

Ross’s list of obligations (Ross does not claim that this list is all-inclusive) Fidelity: Keep your promises. Reparation: Make up for harm you do to others. Gratitude: Return good for good. Justice: Upset distributions of pleasure or happiness that don’t accord with people’s merit. Self-improvement: Grow in virtue and knowledge. Beneficence: Do good to others. Nonmaleficence: Don’t harm others. Morality is objective, but morals are conditional When a conflict between duties arise one should follow the over-riding duty. For instance, maximising the good is only the sixth of seven prima facie obligations…

Advantages of Ross’s Approach Ross’s approach solves moral dilemmas: in any given situation, any number of these prima facie obligations may apply. In the case of ethical dilemmas, they may even contradict one another. Nonetheless, there can never be a true ethical dilemma, Ross would argue, because one of the prima facie obligations in a given situation is always the weightiest, and overrules all the others. This is thus the absolute obligation, the action that the person ought to perform. Ross accepts a pluralistic view of value: virtue, knowledge, pleasure, life, and freedom (etc…)are good in themselves – and ought to be promoted for their own sake.

Problems with Ross Why are ‘prima facie’ moral obligations any better than Moore’s ‘moral intuitions’? Hence, all the problems of Moore’s intuitionism might apply…see previous slides… ‘prima facie’ or ‘on the face of it’ may not carry the kind of genuine moral weight Ross wants modern commentators often prefer the phrase ‘pro tanto’ or ‘as far as it is able, as far as it will go’ instead. But doesn’t this sound like the kind of moral pragmatism that lacks ultimate grounding?

A conclusion about Ross But (Kant): aren’t there exceptionless duties? For instance, “Never set light to someone for a joke”, “Do not knowingly sentence an innocent person to death.” Would it be possible for another of Ross’s moral obligations to override these? Yet exceptionless duties are problematic Cases to trouble consistency might exist cases of inhumanity… And where great evil is concerned… Might not Ross’s approach offer a middle way between Kant and Utilitarianism? Or: might it not sound very like pluralistic rule utilitarianism? Intuition could simply provide the basis for the rules which we then systemically apply…