Mission Success Starts With Safety 07/19/2001 (1) NASA EEE Parts Assurance Group (NEPAG) Quality Leadership Forum July 19, 2001 Michael J. Sampson NEPAG Manager GSFC/Code 306 Systems Management Office

Mission Success Starts With Safety 07/19/2001 (2) Overview Organization - Partnerships/International Cooperation EEE Parts Risk Assessment – Relationship between knowledge and risk – Inherent Risk – Risk Matrix – Part Level Stoplights The MIL System – Advantages to NASA – Surprises – A Horror Story EEE Parts Assurance – Why should NASA have guidelines?

Mission Success Starts With Safety 07/19/2001 (3) NEPAG Organization

Mission Success Starts With Safety 07/19/2001 (4) INHERENT RISK IS INVERSELY PROPORTIONAL TO KNOWLEDGE If a part is KNOWN to be high risk, this knowledge can be used to avoid its use or take appropriate actions to move to medium or low risk Lack of knowledge means good parts cannot be distinguished from bad Obtaining reliable knowledge about COTS EEE Parts requires: – Expertise – Time – Vendor visits – Testing and Analysis – BIG BUCKS ONLY a LIMITED number of COTS part types can be reliably deployed in any one system EEE Parts Risk Assessment - Risk versus Knowledge

Mission Success Starts With Safety 07/19/2001 (5) Inherent Risks - for EEE Parts Manufacturing Factors – Spec – Vendor – Maturity/Qualification Status – Knowledge of Changes – Radiation Sensitivity These are risks inherent to the part regardless of: – Redundancy – Derating – Mission Requirements – Mission Budget

Mission Success Starts With Safety 07/19/2001 (6) Risk Levels - Inherent Factors Example

Mission Success Starts With Safety 07/19/2001 (7) EEE Parts - Risk Management FBC means acceptance of risk This requires definition of an acceptable level of risk (ALOR) Risk must be managed against the ALOR Overall ALOR for mission translates to ALORs for systems Low risk missions may include high risk systems and vice versa Parts must be selected based on the ALOR of the application Parts risk is combination of inherent risk and application factors: – Redundancy – Derating – Criticality Parts engineers can provide inherent risk independently but can only modify for application factors with application details Parts Lists for Review Rarely Include Application Details Engineers may be pressured to modify risk assessment based on “implied” but undefined mission factors

Mission Success Starts With Safety 07/19/2001 (8) The MIL System - Advantages for NASA Not “Dead” for EEE Parts Anyhow Generally offers NASA most economical solution in terms of “true cost of ownership” – Typically, no additional qual or screening Still provides majority of EEE parts used by Agency NASA has Custodian status for most EEE parts specs we use: – Can make “Essential Comments” – Must be dispositioned to our satisfaction or can be escalated (eventually to OSD in theory) – Audit participation taken Seriously Free specs and assistance As Government privy to inside information

Mission Success Starts With Safety 07/19/2001 (9) During NASA’s “Nap” some “surprises” initiated: – Class T – Semiconductor Power Rating Class T for microcircuits – Essentially COTS masquerading as MIL – Enacted for commercial interests – High risk due to lack of controls and knowledge – NEPAG eventually gets wording “Not for NASA use” added Semiconductor Power Rating – Increased by 25% on product with 15+ years of experience – Change based on theoretical analysis not problem or need – No testing to validate change is not detrimental (continued spec compliance only) – Changes in place for ONE YEAR before NASA aware – Issue still unresolved DSCC is supported by $ from depot sales so their interest is to increase business The MIL System - Surprises

Mission Success Starts With Safety 07/19/2001 (10) A Horror Story - Intro Two Sources for MIL QPL Part - Orange and Blue Orange in NE USA: QPL ~ 15yrs to date, significant NASA use Orange sold to national corporation Y ~ 94 Blue in SE USA: QPL – ~ 4 years until sold to Y in 96 – GIDEP Alert in 2000 – ~ 4 years until sold to T in 2000 (T has not made similar product in >10yrs) T bought by Y in 2001!!!! Y announces decision to shut Orange facility in March 02 except support to Blue line at T facility – Element fab (Orange design) – QPL test NASA and USAF asked to support “streamlined qual”

Mission Success Starts With Safety 07/19/2001 (11) A Horror Story - NASA Knows “Streamlined qual” proposed based on: – Heritage element used – Established design ( but not with same element) – Danger of loss of critical single source (blackmail) Pre-qual MIL audit (THIS WEEK) – NASA (NEPAG) participation – USAF/SMD, Aerospace Corp (NEPAG) participation – No others except DSCC Audit team finds: – Y has just discovered that Orange element WILL NOT FIT in Blue design without redesign (loss of heritage)!!!! – T personnel poorly trained in process – Y and T were clearly not ready for audit If NEPAG was not participant, would we know?????

Mission Success Starts With Safety 07/19/2001 (12) EEE Parts Assurance - Should NASA have Guidelines? Contractors have own systems NASA cannot expect contractors to use our system instead of theirs So why have guidelines? – To document what we think is needed – To capture our lessons learned – To document our core knowledge – To provide a consistent NASA perspective to the contractors – To preserve our Very Successful culture – To guide participants without systems (Academia etc) High level documents can be VCSs but implementation guidelines should be NASA