SCADA Systems in the Pipeline Industry SHANE AYERS

Failure saves lives. In the airline industry, every time a plane crashes the probability of the next crash is lowered by that. The Titanic saved lives because we're building bigger and bigger ships. So these people died, but we have effectively improved the safety of the system, and nothing failed in vain. - Nassim Nicholas Taleb Why wait for one failure to lower the probability of the next?  Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (“SCADA”) Systems can play a role in operating a safe pipeline.

SCADA… Safety, or Illusion of Safety?  Theoretically, SCADA can  Save lives  Reduce impact of catastrophic failure  Control room management regulations  Integrity Management Program (“IMP”) 2.0  Operator Qualification (“OQ”)  The need for more robust, and more stringent training and qualifications of individuals installing, troubleshooting, repairing and operating SCADA systems, can public safety be impacted in a positive way.

Regulations  Control Room Management regulations were “Controversial”  OQ regulations were “Controversial”  IMP regulations were “Controversial”  Safety Management Systems like the ones in place in the airline and nuclear industries are now “Controversial”  Why?  Current Regulations are the Minimum requirement

Negotiated Rulemaking  OQ mandate in 1992  Rule became effective in 1999  Control Room Regulations  Rule became effective in 2011  Issues still exist…  Non-existing or ineffective training  Failure to identify abnormal operating conditions

VGOA Involvement Regulator and Utility company executive Committee was formed to address common issues such as OQ (Began in June 2011) This committee worked with the Virginia Gas Operator’s Association to address industry issues proactively All agreed that existing training and OQ plans needed to be improved SCADA was not identified as an area needed because it was not in the existing “covered task” lists

Results of Enhanced Construction OQ in Virginia  Initially, with enhanced construction modules, failure rate for previously “qualified individuals” was approximately 60%  Individuals who passed were proud of the accomplishment  3 strike / 6 month lock out policy hit home  Enhanced training has already mitigated 1,000s of documented issues  Feedback from field employees is that OQ is no longer a “joke”

Do Industry Employees believe more stringent procedures, rules and regulations are required regarding SCADA?

Why do Industry Employees believe someone might choose not to report an issue (not following existing procedures, rules and regulations)?

How do Industry Employees believe training and qualification programs can be improved?

Software is Just Software  Pressing a button isn’t the same thing as turning a valve  Software systems can be managed by anyone, anywhere  Outsourcing / offshoring saves money and lowers rates

Nothing Is Wrong With the Way We Were Doing Things  People could be quickly qualified and put to work in their field  Very few accidents compared to other industries of transportation  Training programs already complied with regulations

SCADA Doesn’t Fit the OQ Rule Requirements, Right?  Four Part Criteria  Control room software and communication systems are not technically connected directly to pipelines, so they are exempt from OQ  Only the Technicians that install mechanical equipment connecting to pipelines should be qualified  OQ wasn’t needed for SCADA before, why now?

It Will Take Too Long to Re- Train, and That Costs Money!  Not enough trainers  literacy concerns for field only personnel  Unions  Lock out rule is unfair  Whole process is time consuming to implement  Why cant contractors self administer testing?

Conclusion  People currently working in the industry overwhelmingly agree the quality of existing training programs should be improved  A better trained workforce can make better and safer decisions  Control room employees operating SCADA must have the same knowledge of systems they control as employees who physically control them in the field  Control Rooms must be updated and comprehensive  OQ must extend to SCADA as a covered task and modules be developed and implemented

References Barlas, S. (2008, November). PHMSA releases controller/control room regulation. Underground Construction, 63(11), 10. Retrieved from 01.lirn.net/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA &v=2.1&u=lirn55593&it=r&p=ITOF&sw=w&asid=7b6e5eafebe aa7dce21df6742d Johnson, C. (2008, April). The changing landscape of pipeline integrity. Pipeline & Gas Journal, 235(4), 50. Retrieved from 01.lirn.net/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA &v=2.1&u=lirn55593&it=r&p=ITOF&sw=w&asid=021fdc8fcd7ebf541fbb b664a7 Boyer, S. (2004). What is SCADA? In Scada : Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, 3rd Edition (3rd ed., pp ). Research Triangle Park, NC: The Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society. Treat, R. W. (2015, February). SCADA and telemetry in gas transmission systems. Pipeline & Gas Journal, 242(2), 61+. Retrieved from 02.lirn.net/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA &v=2.1&u=lirn55593&it=r&p=ITOF&sw=w&asid=f433db4e9b0cd5d940 5aa3e506ac780e NTSB: PG&E Completes 10th Safety Recommendation Since 2010 San Bruno Pipeline Explosion. (2015, May 20). Business Wire. Retrieved from 02.lirn.net/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA &v=2.1&u=lirn55593&it=r&p=ITOF&sw=w&asid=08bed4d4cf5bf860952f 7ef64a10e62e